diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86-speculation-make-all-retbleed-mitigations-depend.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86-speculation-make-all-retbleed-mitigations-depend.patch | 56 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 56 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86-speculation-make-all-retbleed-mitigations-depend.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86-speculation-make-all-retbleed-mitigations-depend.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1fd1a380b..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/x86-speculation-make-all-retbleed-mitigations-depend.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,56 +0,0 @@ -From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> -Date: Sat, 23 Jul 2022 16:20:34 +0200 -Subject: x86/speculation: Make all RETbleed mitigations depend on X86_64 -Forwarded: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtwSR3NNsWp1ohfV@decadent.org.uk/T/ - -The mitigations for RETBleed are currently ineffective on x86_32 since -entry_32.S does not use the required macros. However, for an x86_32 -target, the kconfig symbols for them are still enabled by default and -/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed will wrongly report -that mitigations are in place. - -Make all of these symbols depend on X86_64, and only enable RETHUNK by -default on X86_64. - -Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org -Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> ---- - arch/x86/Kconfig | 8 ++++---- - 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - ---- a/arch/x86/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig -@@ -2473,7 +2473,7 @@ config RETHUNK - bool "Enable return-thunks" - depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK - select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL -- default y -+ default y if X86_64 - help - Compile the kernel with the return-thunks compiler option to guard - against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding return speculation. -@@ -2482,21 +2482,21 @@ config RETHUNK - - config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY - bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry" -- depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK -+ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64 - default y - help - Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation. - - config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY - bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry" -- depends on CPU_SUP_AMD -+ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 - default y - help - Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation. - - config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY - bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry" -- depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL -+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64 - default y - help - Compile the kernel with support for the spectre_v2=ibrs mitigation. |