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authorMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2016-05-31 11:28:14 +0100
committerMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>2016-06-07 21:58:46 +0100
commite82fd1b4574c8908b2c3bb68e1237f057a981820 (patch)
treeb12f6f05737e2922f1e287b1d0bfa5eb26511530
parentb7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b (diff)
downloadopenssl-e82fd1b4574c8908b2c3bb68e1237f057a981820.tar.gz
Fix BN_mod_word bug
On systems where we do not have BN_ULLONG (e.g. typically 64 bit systems) then BN_mod_word() can return incorrect results if the supplied modulus is too big. RT#4501 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 37258dadaa9e36db4b96a3aa54aa6c67136160cc)
-rw-r--r--crypto/bn/bn_word.c22
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_word.c b/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
index b031a60b5b..9b5f9cb98c 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
@@ -72,10 +72,32 @@ BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
if (w == 0)
return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+#ifndef BN_LLONG
+ /*
+ * If |w| is too long and we don't have BN_ULLONG then we need to fall
+ * back to using BN_div_word
+ */
+ if (w > ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4)) {
+ BIGNUM *tmp = BN_dup(a);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+
+ ret = BN_div_word(tmp, w);
+ BN_free(tmp);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
bn_check_top(a);
w &= BN_MASK2;
for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
#ifndef BN_LLONG
+ /*
+ * We can assume here that | w <= ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4) | and so
+ * | ret < ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4) | and therefore the shifts here are
+ * safe and will not overflow
+ */
ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | ((a->d[i] >> BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | (a->d[i] & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
#else