Tidy up CRL handling by checking for critical extensions when it is

loaded. Add new function X509_CRL_get0_by_serial() to lookup a revoked
entry to avoid the need to access the structure directly.

Add new X509_CRL_METHOD to allow common CRL operations (verify, lookup) to be
redirected.

7 files changed, 113 insertions, 53 deletions

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 8f9c9a1ae3..93db3118e1 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,12 @@
 
  Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.9  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Add an X509_CRL_METHOD structure to allow CRL processing to be redirected
+     to external functions. This can be used to increase CRL handling 
+     efficiency especially when CRLs are very large by (for example) storing
+     the CRL revoked certificates in a database.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) Overhaul of by_dir code. Add support for dynamic loading of CRLs so
      new CRLs added to a directory can be used. New command line option
      -verify_return_error to s_client and s_server. This causes real errors
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_locl.h b/crypto/asn1/asn1_locl.h
index 099690203a..318e27eeb4 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_locl.h
@@ -113,3 +113,18 @@ struct evp_pkey_asn1_method_st
 	int (*old_priv_encode)(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder);
 
 	} /* EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD */;
+
+/* Method to handle CRL access.
+ * In general a CRL could be very large (several Mb) and can consume large
+ * amounts of resources if stored in memory by multiple processes.
+ * This method allows general CRL operations to be redirected to more
+ * efficient callbacks: for example a CRL entry database.
+ */
+
+struct x509_crl_method_st
+	{
+	int (*crl_init)(X509_CRL *crl);
+	int (*crl_free)(X509_CRL *crl);
+	int (*crl_lookup)(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *ser);
+	int (*crl_verify)(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk);
+	};
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c b/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c
index f8ad1f3417..266c497f33 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_crl.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
@@ -111,6 +112,9 @@ static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
 								void *exarg)
 	{
 	X509_CRL *crl = (X509_CRL *)*pval;
+	STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+	X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+	int idx;
 
 	switch(operation)
 		{
@@ -119,6 +123,7 @@ static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
 		crl->akid = NULL;
 		crl->flags = 0;
 		crl->idp_flags = 0;
+		crl->meth = 0;
 		break;
 
 		case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
@@ -132,9 +137,37 @@ static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
 
 		crl->akid = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
 				NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);	
+		if (crl->meth && crl->meth->crl_init)
+			return crl->meth->crl_init(crl);
+
+		/* See if we have any unhandled critical CRL extensions and 
+		 * indicate this in a flag. We only currently handle IDP so
+		 * anything else critical sets the flag.
+		 *
+		 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly:
+		 * applications shouldn't do this.
+		 */
+
+		exts = crl->crl->extensions;
+
+		for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
+			{
+			ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
+			if (ext->critical > 0)
+				{
+				/* We handle IDP now so permit it */
+				if (OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object) ==
+					NID_issuing_distribution_point)
+					continue;
+				crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+				break;
+				}
+			}
 		break;
 
 		case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
+		if (crl->meth && crl->meth->crl_free)
+			return crl->meth->crl_free(crl);
 		if (crl->akid)
 			AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(crl->akid);
 		if (crl->idp)
@@ -217,6 +250,44 @@ int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r)
+	{
+	if (crl->meth && crl->meth->crl_verify)
+		return crl->meth->crl_verify(crl, r);
+	return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),
+		crl->sig_alg, crl->signature,crl->crl,r));
+	}
+
+int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl,
+		X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+	{
+	X509_REVOKED rtmp;
+	int idx;
+	if (crl->meth && crl->meth->crl_lookup)
+		return crl->meth->crl_lookup(crl, ret, serial);
+	rtmp.serialNumber = serial;
+	/* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
+	 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
+ 	 */
+	if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
+		{
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+		sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+		}
+	idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
+	/* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
+	 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
+	 */
+	if(idx >= 0)
+		{
+		if (ret)
+			*ret = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(crl->crl->revoked, idx);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_REVOKED)
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_CRL)
diff --git a/crypto/ossl_typ.h b/crypto/ossl_typ.h
index 5ebf0fab1c..b132405098 100644
--- a/crypto/ossl_typ.h
+++ b/crypto/ossl_typ.h
@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ typedef struct ecdsa_method ECDSA_METHOD;
 typedef struct x509_st X509;
 typedef struct X509_algor_st X509_ALGOR;
 typedef struct X509_crl_st X509_CRL;
+typedef struct x509_crl_method_st X509_CRL_METHOD;
+typedef struct x509_revoked_st X509_REVOKED;
 typedef struct X509_name_st X509_NAME;
 typedef struct X509_pubkey_st X509_PUBKEY;
 typedef struct x509_store_st X509_STORE;
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509.h b/crypto/x509/x509.h
index de93bf9005..f28086c175 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509.h
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509.h
@@ -420,13 +420,13 @@ typedef struct x509_cert_pair_st {
 			XN_FLAG_FN_LN | \
 			XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN)
 
-typedef struct X509_revoked_st
+struct x509_revoked_st
 	{
 	ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber;
 	ASN1_TIME *revocationDate;
 	STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) /* optional */ *extensions;
 	int sequence; /* load sequence */
-	} X509_REVOKED;
+	};
 
 DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED)
 DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_REVOKED)
@@ -460,6 +460,7 @@ struct X509_crl_st
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
 	unsigned char sha1_hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 #endif
+	X509_CRL_METHOD *meth;
 	} /* X509_CRL */;
 
 DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_CRL)
@@ -969,6 +970,8 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO)
 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL)
 
 int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev);
+int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl,
+		X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial);
 
 X509_PKEY *	X509_PKEY_new(void );
 void		X509_PKEY_free(X509_PKEY *a);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 1252439f1e..d1aa3dafd6 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -937,60 +937,29 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
 /* Check certificate against CRL */
 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
 	{
-	int idx, ok;
-	X509_REVOKED rtmp;
-	STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
-	X509_EXTENSION *ext;
-	/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
-	rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
-	/* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
-	 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
- 	 */
-	if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
-		{
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
-		sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
-		}
-	idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
-	/* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
+	int ok;
+	/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
+	 * If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
 	 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
 	 */
-	if(idx >= 0)
+	if (X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(crl, NULL, X509_get_serialNumber(x)) > 0)
 		{
 		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
 		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-		if (!ok) return 0;
+		if (!ok)
+			return 0;
 		}
 
-	if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
-		return 1;
-
-	/* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
-	 * currently only handle IDP the CRL must be rejected if any others
-	 * are present. 
-	 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
-	 * shouldn't do this.
-	 */
-
-	exts = crl->crl->extensions;
-
-	for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
+	if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
 		{
-		ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
-		if (ext->critical > 0)
-			{
-			/* We handle IDP now so permit it */
-			if (OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object) ==
-				NID_issuing_distribution_point)
-				continue;
-			ctx->error =
-				X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
-			ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-			if(!ok) return 0;
-			break;
-			}
+		if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+			return 1;
+		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
+		ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+		if(!ok)
+			return 0;
 		}
+
 	return 1;
 	}
 
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_all.c b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
index 9039caad60..de516f8fd4 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
@@ -83,12 +83,6 @@ int X509_REQ_verify(X509_REQ *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
 		a->sig_alg,a->signature,a->req_info,r));
 	}
 
-int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
-	{
-	return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),
-		a->sig_alg, a->signature,a->crl,r));
-	}
-
 int NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(NETSCAPE_SPKI *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
 	{
 	return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_SPKAC),