diff options
| author | Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org> | 2016-08-05 19:03:17 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org> | 2016-08-18 14:02:29 +0200 |
| commit | a230b26e0959dc5f072fbbdadcc9ed45e904c50c (patch) | |
| tree | 85a928954cdf2f564c574138bbcd786f1ab1101e | |
| parent | 604f6eff31a3837abd3d96a2a41a3b269df757c4 (diff) | |
| download | openssl-a230b26e0959dc5f072fbbdadcc9ed45e904c50c.tar.gz | |
Indent ssl/
Run util/openssl-format-source on ssl/
Some comments and hand-formatted tables were fixed up
manually by disabling auto-formatting.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
39 files changed, 1218 insertions, 1405 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ssl/d1_lib.c index 08a503786f..7fb9b96d1d 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c @@ -338,8 +338,7 @@ int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s) if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { mtu = - BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, - NULL); + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL); if (mtu < s->d1->mtu) s->d1->mtu = mtu; } @@ -391,10 +390,13 @@ static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t) GetSystemTime(&st); SystemTimeToFileTime(&st, &now.ft); + /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */ # ifdef __MINGW32__ now.ul -= 116444736000000000ULL; # else - now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64; /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */ + /* *INDENT-OFF* */ + now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64; + /* *INDENT-ON* */ # endif t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul / 10000000); t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul % 10000000)) / 10; @@ -408,7 +410,6 @@ static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t) #endif } - #define LISTEN_SUCCESS 2 #define LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST 1 @@ -531,7 +532,7 @@ int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client) goto end; } - if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto end; } @@ -744,7 +745,6 @@ int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client) s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); - if ((tmpclient = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; @@ -805,13 +805,15 @@ int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client) */ ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(s); - /* Some BIOs may not support this. If we fail we clear the client address */ + /* + * Some BIOs may not support this. If we fail we clear the client address + */ if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, client) <= 0) BIO_ADDR_clear(client); ret = 1; clearpkt = 0; -end: + end: BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient); BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL); if (clearpkt) { @@ -842,12 +844,12 @@ static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS -#define HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding) ( \ +# define HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding) ( \ 1 /* heartbeat type */ + \ 2 /* heartbeat length */ + \ (payload) + (padding)) -#define HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, 16) +# define HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, 16) int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length) { @@ -987,8 +989,7 @@ int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) if (ret >= 0) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - buf, size, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); + buf, size, s, s->msg_callback_arg); dtls1_start_timer(s); s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; diff --git a/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/ssl/d1_srtp.c index 94c0127312..7e88f17754 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_srtp.c +++ b/ssl/d1_srtp.c @@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ static SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE srtp_known_profiles[] = { }, { "SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM", - SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM + SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM, }, { "SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM", - SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM + SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM, }, {0} }; @@ -76,8 +76,7 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string, do { col = strchr(ptr, ':'); - if (!find_profile_by_name(ptr, &p, - col ? col - ptr : (int)strlen(ptr))) { + if (!find_profile_by_name(ptr, &p, col ? col - ptr : (int)strlen(ptr))) { if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles, p) >= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); @@ -104,7 +103,7 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string, *out = profiles; return 0; -err: + err: sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles); return 1; } @@ -190,8 +189,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) - || (ct & 1) != 0 - || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) { + || (ct & 1) != 0 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; @@ -238,7 +236,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { + || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; @@ -281,10 +279,9 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) - || ct != 2 - || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id) - || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + || ct != 2 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id) + || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; diff --git a/ssl/methods.c b/ssl/methods.c index 7d27f9d8ff..c846143277 100644 --- a/ssl/methods.c +++ b/ssl/methods.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ #include <openssl/objects.h> #include "ssl_locl.h" -/* +/*- * TLS/SSLv3 methods */ @@ -19,201 +19,148 @@ IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0, TLS_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data) - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, tlsv1_2_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, tlsv1_1_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_1_enc_data) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, tlsv1_method, - ossl_statem_accept, - ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_enc_data) + ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_enc_data) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(sslv3_method, ossl_statem_accept, ossl_statem_connect) #endif - - -/* +/*- * TLS/SSLv3 server methods */ - IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0, TLS_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, - ssl_undefined_function, - TLSv1_2_enc_data) - + ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_2_enc_data) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, tlsv1_2_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, - ssl_undefined_function, - TLSv1_2_enc_data) + ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_2_enc_data) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, tlsv1_1_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, - ssl_undefined_function, - TLSv1_1_enc_data) + ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_1_enc_data) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, tlsv1_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, - ssl_undefined_function, - TLSv1_enc_data) + ssl_undefined_function, TLSv1_enc_data) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(sslv3_server_method, - ossl_statem_accept, - ssl_undefined_function) + ossl_statem_accept, ssl_undefined_function) #endif - - -/* +/*- * TLS/SSLv3 client methods */ - IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0, TLS_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, - ossl_statem_connect, - TLSv1_2_enc_data) - + ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2, tlsv1_2_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, - ossl_statem_connect, - TLSv1_2_enc_data) + ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_2_enc_data) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, tlsv1_1_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, - ossl_statem_connect, - TLSv1_1_enc_data) + ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_1_enc_data) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(TLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, tlsv1_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, - ossl_statem_connect, - TLSv1_enc_data) + ossl_statem_connect, TLSv1_enc_data) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(sslv3_client_method, - ssl_undefined_function, - ossl_statem_connect) + ssl_undefined_function, ossl_statem_connect) #endif - - -/* +/*- * DTLS methods */ - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1, dtlsv1_method, ossl_statem_accept, - ossl_statem_connect, - DTLSv1_enc_data) + ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_enc_data) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2, dtlsv1_2_method, ossl_statem_accept, - ossl_statem_connect, - DTLSv1_2_enc_data) + ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data) #endif - IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0, DTLS_method, ossl_statem_accept, - ossl_statem_connect, - DTLSv1_2_enc_data) + ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data) -/* +/*- * DTLS server methods */ - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1, dtlsv1_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, - ssl_undefined_function, - DTLSv1_enc_data) + ssl_undefined_function, DTLSv1_enc_data) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2, dtlsv1_2_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, - ssl_undefined_function, - DTLSv1_2_enc_data) + ssl_undefined_function, DTLSv1_2_enc_data) #endif - IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0, DTLS_server_method, ossl_statem_accept, - ssl_undefined_function, - DTLSv1_2_enc_data) - + ssl_undefined_function, DTLSv1_2_enc_data) -/* +/*- * DTLS client methods */ - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_METHOD IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1, dtlsv1_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, - ossl_statem_connect, - DTLSv1_enc_data) + ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_enc_data) IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_BAD_VER, SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, - ossl_statem_connect, - DTLSv1_enc_data) + ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_enc_data) #endif - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2_METHOD IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION, 0, SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2, dtlsv1_2_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, - ossl_statem_connect, - DTLSv1_2_enc_data) + ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data) #endif - IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION, 0, 0, DTLS_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, - ossl_statem_connect, - DTLSv1_2_enc_data) - + ossl_statem_connect, DTLSv1_2_enc_data) #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L - # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_METHOD const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void) { @@ -317,4 +264,3 @@ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void) # endif #endif - diff --git a/ssl/packet_locl.h b/ssl/packet_locl.h index 0ff4cccf3b..d34034dedb 100644 --- a/ssl/packet_locl.h +++ b/ssl/packet_locl.h @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static ossl_inline const unsigned char *PACKET_end(const PACKET *pkt) { return pkt->curr + pkt->remaining; } + /* * Returns a pointer to the PACKET's current position. * For use in non-PACKETized APIs. @@ -107,8 +108,7 @@ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_equal(const PACKET *pkt, const void *ptr, * the original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|. */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_sub_packet(const PACKET *pkt, - PACKET *subpkt, - size_t len) + PACKET *subpkt, size_t len) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < len) return 0; @@ -122,8 +122,7 @@ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_sub_packet(const PACKET *pkt, * original |pkt|, so data wrapped by |pkt| must outlive the |subpkt|. */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_sub_packet(PACKET *pkt, - PACKET *subpkt, - size_t len) + PACKET *subpkt, size_t len) { if (!PACKET_peek_sub_packet(pkt, subpkt, len)) return 0; @@ -151,8 +150,7 @@ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_net_2(const PACKET *pkt, /* Equivalent of n2s */ /* Get 2 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */ -__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_2(PACKET *pkt, - unsigned int *data) +__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_2(PACKET *pkt, unsigned int *data) { if (!PACKET_peek_net_2(pkt, data)) return 0; @@ -181,8 +179,7 @@ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_net_3(const PACKET *pkt, /* Equivalent of n2l3 */ /* Get 3 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */ -__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_3(PACKET *pkt, - unsigned long *data) +__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_3(PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data) { if (!PACKET_peek_net_3(pkt, data)) return 0; @@ -212,8 +209,7 @@ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_net_4(const PACKET *pkt, /* Equivalent of n2l */ /* Get 4 bytes in network order from |pkt| and store the value in |*data| */ -__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_4(PACKET *pkt, - unsigned long *data) +__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_net_4(PACKET *pkt, unsigned long *data) { if (!PACKET_peek_net_4(pkt, data)) return 0; @@ -333,8 +329,7 @@ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(const PACKET *pkt, * The caller is responsible for ensuring that |data| can hold |len| bytes. */ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_copy_bytes(PACKET *pkt, - unsigned char *data, - size_t len) + unsigned char *data, size_t len) { if (!PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(pkt, data, len)) return 0; @@ -417,7 +412,7 @@ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_strndup(const PACKET *pkt, char **data) /* Returns 1 if |pkt| contains at least one 0-byte, 0 otherwise. */ static ossl_inline int PACKET_contains_zero_byte(const PACKET *pkt) { - return memchr(pkt->curr, 0, pkt->remaining) != NULL; + return memchr(pkt->curr, 0, pkt->remaining) != NULL; } /* Move the current reading position forward |len| bytes */ @@ -460,22 +455,23 @@ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(PACKET *pkt, * Like PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1, but additionally, fails when there are * leftover bytes in |pkt|. */ -__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(PACKET *pkt, PACKET *subpkt) +__owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(PACKET *pkt, + PACKET *subpkt) { - unsigned int length; - const unsigned char *data; - PACKET tmp = *pkt; - if (!PACKET_get_1(&tmp, &length) || - !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length) || - PACKET_remaining(&tmp) != 0) { - return 0; - } + unsigned int length; + const unsigned char *data; + PACKET tmp = *pkt; + if (!PACKET_get_1(&tmp, &length) || + !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length) || + PACKET_remaining(&tmp) != 0) { + return 0; + } - *pkt = tmp; - subpkt->curr = data; - subpkt->remaining = length; + *pkt = tmp; + subpkt->curr = data; + subpkt->remaining = length; - return 1; + return 1; } /* @@ -511,21 +507,21 @@ __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(PACKET *pkt, __owur static ossl_inline int PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(PACKET *pkt, PACKET *subpkt) { - unsigned int length; - const unsigned char *data; - PACKET tmp = *pkt; + unsigned int length; + const unsigned char *data; + PACKET tmp = *pkt; - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&tmp, &length) || - !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length) || - PACKET_remaining(&tmp) != 0) { - return 0; - } + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&tmp, &length) || + !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmp, &data, (size_t)length) || + PACKET_remaining(&tmp) != 0) { + return 0; + } - *pkt = tmp; - subpkt->curr = data; - subpkt->remaining = length; + *pkt = tmp; + subpkt->curr = data; + subpkt->remaining = length; - return 1; + return 1; } /* diff --git a/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c b/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c index 7ddadfa2bd..f9bf10963c 100644 --- a/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c +++ b/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl) if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL) return (0); - rl->d = d; d->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new(); @@ -97,18 +96,14 @@ void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e) { if (e == rl->d->w_epoch - 1) { memcpy(rl->d->curr_write_sequence, - rl->write_sequence, - sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); + rl->write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); memcpy(rl->write_sequence, - rl->d->last_write_sequence, - sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); + rl->d->last_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); } else if (e == rl->d->w_epoch + 1) { memcpy(rl->d->last_write_sequence, - rl->write_sequence, - sizeof(unsigned char[8])); + rl->write_sequence, sizeof(unsigned char[8])); memcpy(rl->write_sequence, - rl->d->curr_write_sequence, - sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); + rl->d->curr_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); } rl->d->w_epoch = e; } @@ -118,7 +113,6 @@ void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl) memcpy(rl->write_sequence, rl->read_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); } - void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq) { memcpy(rl->write_sequence, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); @@ -232,7 +226,6 @@ int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue) dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ &((s)->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds)) - int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) { pitem *item; @@ -249,7 +242,8 @@ int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) return (0); if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds), - SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0) + SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) < + 0) return -1; } } @@ -264,7 +258,6 @@ int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) return (1); } - /*- * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. * 'type' is one of the following: @@ -390,7 +383,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, /* get new packet if necessary */ if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) - || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { + || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { ret = dtls1_get_record(s); if (ret <= 0) { ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret); @@ -413,7 +406,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection. */ if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data), - SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) { + SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } @@ -432,8 +425,8 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, } if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) - || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC - && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) { + || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) { /* * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or @@ -525,7 +518,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { /* We allow a 0 return */ if (dtls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr), - SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) < 0) { + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) < 0) { return -1; } /* Exit and notify application to read again */ @@ -542,7 +535,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again * reading. */ - if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { BIO *bio; s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); @@ -563,14 +556,14 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, * XDTLS: In a pathological case, the Client Hello may be * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */ - if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < dest_maxlen) { + if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < dest_maxlen) { #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE /* * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this * non-existing alert... */ - FIX ME + FIX ME; #endif s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); @@ -628,8 +621,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, - SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } @@ -734,8 +726,7 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, - SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; @@ -874,7 +865,6 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, return (-1); } - /* * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake * is started. @@ -884,7 +874,7 @@ static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, { if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) - && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) + && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ { unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment; @@ -981,7 +971,7 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it. */ if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION && - s->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { + s->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff; } else { @@ -1040,7 +1030,8 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, if (mac_size != 0) { if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr, - &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr) + eivlen]), 1) < 0) + &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr) + eivlen]), + 1) < 0) goto err; SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size); } @@ -1115,7 +1106,7 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, } DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, - unsigned int *is_next_epoch) + unsigned int *is_next_epoch) { *is_next_epoch = 0; @@ -1126,7 +1117,7 @@ DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */ else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1) && - (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { + (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { *is_next_epoch = 1; return &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap; } @@ -1144,8 +1135,7 @@ void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw) s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++; memcpy(&s->rlayer.d->bitmap, &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, sizeof(s->rlayer.d->bitmap)); - memset(&s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, 0, - sizeof(s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap)); + memset(&s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap)); } else { seq = s->rlayer.write_sequence; memcpy(s->rlayer.d->last_write_sequence, seq, diff --git a/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c b/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c index c2f96669cb..52a8dcf4e5 100644 --- a/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c +++ b/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c @@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; - /* Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not + /* + * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is * that right? */ @@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) { return (rl->numwpipes > 0) - && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes-1]) != 0; + && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0; } int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len) @@ -130,7 +131,7 @@ int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) { if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]) - != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) + != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) return 0; num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]); } @@ -262,7 +263,7 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold) * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end */ - if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { /* len > 0 */ + if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { /* len > 0 */ memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left); s->rlayer.packet = pkt; rb->offset = len + align; @@ -327,7 +328,6 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold) return (n); } - /* * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. @@ -365,7 +365,6 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) return -1; } - s->rlayer.wnum = 0; if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { @@ -538,22 +537,22 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) /* * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we * shouldn't get here - */ + */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if (maxpipes == 0 - || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL - || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) - & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) - || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) + || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL + || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) + || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) maxpipes = 1; if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment - || split_send_fragment == 0) { + || split_send_fragment == 0) { /* * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send * fragments so we shouldn't get here - */ + */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } @@ -658,8 +657,7 @@ int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, sess = s->session; if ((sess == NULL) || - (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || - (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { + (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ mac_size = 0; } else { @@ -691,8 +689,7 @@ int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, goto err; if (prefix_len > - (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) - { + (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { /* insufficient space */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; @@ -718,9 +715,9 @@ int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, } else if (prefix_len) { wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) - + prefix_len; + + prefix_len; } else { - for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) { + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j]; #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; @@ -749,11 +746,10 @@ int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, } else eivlen = 0; - totlen = 0; /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */ memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr); - for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) { + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { /* write the header */ *(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff; SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); @@ -802,12 +798,12 @@ int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j], - &(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]), 1) < 0) + &(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]), + 1) < 0) goto err; SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size); } - SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]); SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); @@ -822,7 +818,7 @@ int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) goto err; - for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) { + for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j], outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1) < 0) @@ -841,7 +837,8 @@ int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is * wr->length long */ - SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */ + SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for + * debugging */ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); if (create_empty_fragment) { @@ -859,11 +856,9 @@ int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, /* now let's set up wb */ SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j], - prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j])); + prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j])); } - - /* * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write * retries later @@ -899,17 +894,17 @@ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, for (;;) { /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */ if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0 - && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) { + && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) { currbuf++; continue; } clear_sys_error(); if (s->wbio != NULL) { s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; - i = BIO_write(s->wbio, - (char *)&(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])[ - SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]), - (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])); + i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *) + &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf]) + [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]), + (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; @@ -1059,7 +1054,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, /* Skip over any records we have already read */ for (curr_rec = 0; curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]); - curr_rec++); + curr_rec++) ; if (curr_rec == num_recs) { RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0); num_recs = 0; @@ -1089,8 +1084,8 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, } if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) - || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC - && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) { + || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) { /* * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or @@ -1108,8 +1103,8 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, } if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE - && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC - && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { + && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; @@ -1152,8 +1147,8 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, goto start; } if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs - && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) - && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) + && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) + && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); return read_bytes; } @@ -1186,7 +1181,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, } if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION - && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { + && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { /* * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with @@ -1273,8 +1268,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, if (i < 0) return (i); if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, - SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (-1); } @@ -1405,7 +1399,7 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) - && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { + && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); diff --git a/ssl/record/record.h b/ssl/record/record.h index ce60a1508f..a093aed48f 100644 --- a/ssl/record/record.h +++ b/ssl/record/record.h @@ -33,46 +33,36 @@ typedef struct ssl3_record_st { /* Record layer version */ /* r */ int rec_version; - /* type of record */ /* r */ int type; - /* How many bytes available */ /* rw */ unsigned int length; - /* * How many bytes were available before padding was removed? This is used * to implement the MAC check in constant time for CBC records. */ /* rw */ unsigned int orig_len; - /* read/write offset into 'buf' */ /* r */ unsigned int off; - /* pointer to the record data */ /* rw */ unsigned char *data; - /* where the decode bytes are */ /* rw */ unsigned char *input; - /* only used with decompression - malloc()ed */ /* r */ unsigned char *comp; - /* Whether the data from this record has already been read or not */ /* r */ unsigned int read; - /* epoch number, needed by DTLS1 */ /* r */ unsigned long epoch; - /* sequence number, needed by DTLS1 */ /* r */ unsigned char seq_num[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; @@ -81,7 +71,6 @@ typedef struct ssl3_record_st { typedef struct dtls1_bitmap_st { /* Track 32 packets on 32-bit systems and 64 - on 64-bit systems */ unsigned long map; - /* Max record number seen so far, 64-bit value in big-endian encoding */ unsigned char max_seq_num[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; } DTLS1_BITMAP; @@ -96,12 +85,11 @@ typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st { unsigned int packet_length; SSL3_BUFFER rbuf; SSL3_RECORD rrec; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo recordinfo; -# endif +#endif } DTLS1_RECORD_DATA; - typedef struct dtls_record_layer_st { /* * The current data and handshake epoch. This is initially @@ -110,12 +98,10 @@ typedef struct dtls_record_layer_st { */ unsigned short r_epoch; unsigned short w_epoch; - /* records being received in the current epoch */ DTLS1_BITMAP bitmap; /* renegotiation starts a new set of sequence numbers */ DTLS1_BITMAP next_bitmap; - /* Received handshake records (processed and unprocessed) */ record_pqueue unprocessed_rcds; record_pqueue processed_rcds; @@ -133,7 +119,6 @@ typedef struct dtls_record_layer_st { unsigned int alert_fragment_len; unsigned char handshake_fragment[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; unsigned int handshake_fragment_len; - /* save last and current sequence numbers for retransmissions */ unsigned char last_write_sequence[8]; unsigned char curr_write_sequence[8]; @@ -157,7 +142,6 @@ typedef struct record_layer_st { int read_ahead; /* where we are when reading */ int rstate; - /* How many pipelines can be used to read data */ unsigned int numrpipes; /* How many pipelines can be used to write data */ @@ -168,14 +152,11 @@ typedef struct record_layer_st { SSL3_BUFFER wbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; /* each decoded record goes in here */ SSL3_RECORD rrec[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; - /* used internally to point at a raw packet */ unsigned char *packet; unsigned int packet_length; - /* number of bytes sent so far */ unsigned int wnum; - /* * storage for Alert/Handshake protocol data received but not yet * processed by ssl3_read_bytes: @@ -184,10 +165,8 @@ typedef struct record_layer_st { unsigned int alert_fragment_len; unsigned char handshake_fragment[4]; unsigned int handshake_fragment_len; - /* The number of consecutive empty records we have received */ unsigned int empty_record_count; - /* partial write - check the numbers match */ /* number bytes written */ int wpend_tot; @@ -195,17 +174,13 @@ typedef struct record_layer_st { /* number of bytes submitted */ int wpend_ret; const unsigned char *wpend_buf; - unsigned char read_sequence[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; unsigned char write_sequence[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; - /* Set to true if this is the first record in a connection */ unsigned int is_first_record; - DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; } RECORD_LAYER; - /***************************************************************************** * * * The following macros/functions represent the libssl internal API to the * @@ -247,7 +222,7 @@ __owur int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send); __owur int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send); __owur int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len); + unsigned int len); __owur int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send); __owur int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send); int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl); @@ -261,6 +236,5 @@ __owur int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); __owur int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); __owur int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, - unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragement); + unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragement); void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw); - diff --git a/ssl/record/record_locl.h b/ssl/record/record_locl.h index f9dbc33466..3b9a700d9f 100644 --- a/ssl/record/record_locl.h +++ b/ssl/record/record_locl.h @@ -40,11 +40,10 @@ __owur int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold); void RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *ws); DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, - unsigned int *is_next_epoch); + unsigned int *is_next_epoch); int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s); int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue); -int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, - unsigned char *priority); +int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, unsigned char *priority); void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq); /* Functions provided by the DTLS1_BITMAP component */ @@ -52,7 +51,6 @@ void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq); int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); - /* Macros/functions provided by the SSL3_BUFFER component */ #define SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(b) ((b)->buf) @@ -108,9 +106,9 @@ __owur int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr); void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size); __owur int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, - unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); + unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); __owur int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, - SSL3_RECORD *rec, - unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); + SSL3_RECORD *rec, + unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size); int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s); __owur int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s); diff --git a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c index f1d6f72d83..1782780db9 100644 --- a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c +++ b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c @@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); } - /* * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting * for us in the buffer. @@ -151,9 +150,10 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, - SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0); + SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, + num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0); if (n <= 0) - return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ + return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello. */ if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer) - && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { + && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { /* * SSLv2 style record * @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) rr[num_recs].length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1]; if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just * end. */ - goto err; + goto err; } /* * Send back error using their minor version number :-) @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) } if (rr[num_recs].length > - SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 0); if (n <= 0) - return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ + return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ } /* set state for later operations */ @@ -335,14 +335,13 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer); } while (num_recs < max_recs - && rr[num_recs-1].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && rr[num_recs - 1].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) - & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s)); - /* * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. @@ -402,7 +401,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - for (j=0; j < num_recs; j++) { + for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { /* * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, @@ -495,7 +494,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) if (rr[j].length == 0) { RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) - > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { + > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; @@ -527,8 +526,7 @@ int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr) return 0; i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, - (int)rr->length); + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length); if (i < 0) return 0; else @@ -709,7 +707,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) if (n_recs > 1) { if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) - & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) { + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) { /* * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the * cipher doesn't support pipelining @@ -722,7 +720,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length; if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) - & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { unsigned char *seq; seq = send ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) @@ -786,7 +784,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS, - n_recs, data) <= 0) { + n_recs, data) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); } /* Set the input buffers */ @@ -794,9 +792,9 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS, - n_recs, data) <= 0 + n_recs, data) <= 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS, - n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { + n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); return -1; } @@ -804,7 +802,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) i = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, reclen[0]); if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) - & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0)) return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ @@ -924,18 +922,18 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) p = md; s2n(rec->length, p); if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx); return -1; } @@ -977,8 +975,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) mac_ctx = hash; } else { hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (hmac == NULL - || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) + if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) return -1; mac_ctx = hmac; } @@ -1020,8 +1017,8 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) } } else { if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { + || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); return -1; } @@ -1031,7 +1028,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) rec->length, rec->orig_len)) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); return -1; - } + } } EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); @@ -1138,7 +1135,8 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; - if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { + if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & + EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { /* padding is already verified */ rec->length -= padding_length + 1; return 1; @@ -1439,7 +1437,6 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) return (0); } - /* * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, * processed @@ -1487,13 +1484,14 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, - SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1); + SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1); /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ if (n <= 0) return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ - if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } @@ -1573,7 +1571,7 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); if (bitmap == NULL) { rr->length = 0; - RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP @@ -1603,7 +1601,7 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) { if (dtls1_buffer_record (s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)), - rr->seq_num) < 0) + rr->seq_num) < 0) return -1; /* Mark receipt of record. */ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); @@ -1615,7 +1613,7 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) { rr->length = 0; - RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */ diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c index febd88a117..9a228f7de2 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c +++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c @@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ */ #define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128 - - /* * u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four. @@ -129,14 +127,14 @@ char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error */ int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, - unsigned char *md_out, - size_t *md_out_size, - const unsigned char header[13], - const unsigned char *data, - size_t data_plus_mac_size, - size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, - const unsigned char *mac_secret, - unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3) + unsigned char *md_out, + size_t *md_out_size, + const unsigned char header[13], + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_plus_mac_size, + size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, + const unsigned char *mac_secret, + unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3) { union { double align; @@ -461,8 +459,8 @@ int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length); if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0) + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0) goto err; } else { /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */ @@ -470,7 +468,7 @@ int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a; if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0) + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0) goto err; } ret = EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u); @@ -479,7 +477,7 @@ int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return 1; -err: + err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return 0; } @@ -491,8 +489,8 @@ err: */ int tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, - EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data, - size_t data_len, size_t orig_len) + EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len, size_t orig_len) { size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c index 3240735fab..56bd34a3d1 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_enc.c +++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c @@ -140,8 +140,8 @@ int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) dd = s->enc_read_ctx; if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, m) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err2; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err2; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* COMPRESS */ @@ -170,8 +170,8 @@ int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx); dd = s->enc_write_ctx; if (ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, m) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err2; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err2; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* COMPRESS */ @@ -374,7 +374,8 @@ int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s, int keep) if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) { hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); if (hdatalen <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, + SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH); return 0; } @@ -385,10 +386,8 @@ int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s, int keep) } md = ssl_handshake_md(s); - if ( md == NULL - || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, md, NULL) - || !EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst, hdata, hdatalen)) - { + if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, md, NULL) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst, hdata, hdatalen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -431,10 +430,10 @@ int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int len, unsigned char *p) } if ((sender != NULL && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sender, len) <= 0) - || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, - s->session->master_key_length, - s->session->master_key) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, p, NULL) <= 0) { + || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + s->session->master_key_length, + s->session->master_key) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, p, NULL) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_FINAL_FINISH_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = 0; } @@ -472,19 +471,18 @@ int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, } for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, s->ctx->sha1, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt[i], - strlen((const char *)salt[i])) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, p, len) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, buf, &n) <= 0 - - || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, p, len) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, buf, n) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, &n) <= 0) { + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt[i], + strlen((const char *)salt[i])) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, p, len) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, buf, &n) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, s->ctx->md5, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, p, len) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, buf, n) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, &n) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_MASTER_SECRET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = 0; break; diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c index 81d21f2b68..8925717a62 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_lib.c +++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c @@ -66,8 +66,7 @@ * Cipher families: Chacha/poly, Camellila, Gost, IDEA, SEED * Weak ciphers */ -static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = -{ +static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = { { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5, @@ -1135,7 +1134,7 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = 256, 256, }, -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK { @@ -1709,8 +1708,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = 0, 0, }, -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP { @@ -1848,7 +1847,7 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = 256, 256, }, -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA @@ -1867,7 +1866,7 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = 256, 256, }, -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC { @@ -1900,7 +1899,7 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = 256, 256, }, -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK { @@ -1963,8 +1962,9 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = 256, 256, }, -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ -#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) */ +# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && + * !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA { @@ -2222,8 +2222,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, - 128 - }, + 128, + }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, @@ -2237,8 +2237,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, - 256 - }, + 256, + }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, @@ -2252,8 +2252,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, - 128 - }, + 128, + }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, @@ -2267,9 +2267,9 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, - 256 - }, -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ + 256, + }, +# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK { @@ -2285,8 +2285,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, - 128 - }, + 128, + }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, @@ -2300,8 +2300,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, - 256 - }, + 256, + }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, @@ -2315,8 +2315,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, - 128 - }, + 128, + }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, @@ -2330,8 +2330,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, - 256 - }, + 256, + }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, @@ -2345,8 +2345,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, - 128 - }, + 128, + }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, @@ -2360,8 +2360,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, - 256 - }, + 256, + }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, @@ -2375,8 +2375,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, - 128 - }, + 128, + }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, @@ -2390,11 +2390,11 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, - 256 - }, -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ + 256, + }, +# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST { @@ -2410,8 +2410,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC, 256, - 256 - }, + 256, + }, { 1, "GOST2001-NULL-GOST94", @@ -2425,8 +2425,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_STRONG_NONE, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94, 0, - 0 - }, + 0, + }, { 1, "GOST2012-GOST8912-GOST8912", @@ -2440,8 +2440,8 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_256 | TLS1_PRF_GOST12_256 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC, 256, - 256 - }, + 256, + }, { 1, "GOST2012-NULL-GOST12", @@ -2455,8 +2455,9 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = SSL_STRONG_NONE, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_256 | TLS1_PRF_GOST12_256 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC, 0, - 0}, -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_GOST */ + 0, + }, +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_GOST */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA { @@ -2537,7 +2538,7 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = 128, 128, }, -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SEED */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SEED */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { @@ -2647,7 +2648,7 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = 128, 128, }, -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK { @@ -2695,13 +2696,12 @@ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = 128, 128, }, -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS */ }; - static int cipher_compare(const void *a, const void *b) { const SSL_CIPHER *ap = (const SSL_CIPHER *)a; @@ -2716,7 +2716,6 @@ void ssl_sort_cipher_list(void) cipher_compare); } - const SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data = { ssl3_enc, n_ssl3_mac, @@ -2767,7 +2766,7 @@ int ssl3_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len) s->init_num = (int)len + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off = 0; - return 1; + return 1; } int ssl3_handshake_write(SSL *s) @@ -2785,7 +2784,7 @@ int ssl3_new(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s)) - goto err; + goto err; #endif s->method->ssl_clear(s); return (1); @@ -2833,7 +2832,7 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s) #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp); -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ ssl3_free_digest_list(s); @@ -2861,8 +2860,7 @@ static char *srp_password_from_info_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) } #endif -static int ssl3_set_req_cert_type(CERT *c, const unsigned char *p, - size_t len); +static int ssl3_set_req_cert_type(CERT *c, const unsigned char *p, size_t len); long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { @@ -3102,13 +3100,11 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES: return tls1_set_curves(&s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, - &s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, - parg, larg); + &s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, parg, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST: return tls1_set_curves_list(&s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, - &s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, - parg); + &s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, parg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_CURVE: return tls1_shared_curve(s, larg); @@ -3300,7 +3296,8 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { unsigned char *keys = parg; long tlsext_tick_keylen = (sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name) + - sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key) + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key)); + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key) + + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key)); if (keys == NULL) return tlsext_tick_keylen; if (larg != tlsext_tick_keylen) { @@ -3314,7 +3311,8 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name), sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key)); memcpy(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, - keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name) + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), + keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name) + + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key)); } else { memcpy(keys, ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, @@ -3322,7 +3320,8 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) memcpy(keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name), ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key)); - memcpy(keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name) + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), + memcpy(keys + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name) + + sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, sizeof(ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key)); } @@ -3355,8 +3354,7 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL; if (parg == NULL) break; - if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255 - || strlen((const char *)parg) < 1) { + if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255 || strlen((const char *)parg) < 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME); return 0; } @@ -3560,7 +3558,7 @@ int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *p) * Returns the selected cipher or NULL when no common ciphers. */ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr) + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr) { const SSL_CIPHER *c, *ret = NULL; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow; @@ -3611,11 +3609,11 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, /* Skip ciphers not supported by the protocol version */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && - ((s->version < c->min_tls) || (s->version > c->max_tls))) + ((s->version < c->min_tls) || (s->version > c->max_tls))) continue; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && - (DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, c->min_dtls) || - DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, c->max_dtls))) + (DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, c->min_dtls) || + DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, c->max_dtls))) continue; mask_k = s->s3->tmp.mask_k; @@ -3642,14 +3640,14 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, alg_a, mask_k, mask_a, (void *)c, c->name); #endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral * EC key check it */ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) ok = ok && tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s, c->id); -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (!ok) continue; @@ -3803,8 +3801,7 @@ int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len) if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s); - return s->method->ssl_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, - buf, len); + return s->method->ssl_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len); } static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek) @@ -4040,11 +4037,12 @@ EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey_curve(int id) pkey = NULL; } - err: + err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return pkey; } #endif + /* Derive premaster or master secret for ECDH/DH */ int ssl_derive(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *privkey, EVP_PKEY *pubkey) { @@ -4083,7 +4081,7 @@ int ssl_derive(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *privkey, EVP_PKEY *pubkey) rv = 1; } - err: + err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return rv; diff --git a/ssl/s3_msg.c b/ssl/s3_msg.c index 185f0e9890..82513d2590 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_msg.c +++ b/ssl/s3_msg.c @@ -24,8 +24,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); return (0); } diff --git a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c index 67d8e0c498..aa6e3e6a13 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, *pp = p; return ret; - err: + err: M_ASN1_free_of(as, SSL_SESSION_ASN1); if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)) SSL_SESSION_free(ret); diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c index c155e787d5..0c931db97d 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c @@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "internal/thread_once.h" -static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, - int bits, int nid, void *other, +static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, + int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex); static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; @@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ssl_x509_store_ctx_init) { ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, - "SSL for verify callback", - NULL, NULL, NULL); + "SSL for verify callback", + NULL, NULL, NULL); return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx >= 0; } @@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) { ret->dh_tmp = cert->dh_tmp; @@ -134,11 +133,9 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length = - cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length; + ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length = cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length; memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo, - cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo, - cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); + cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo, cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); } } @@ -412,7 +409,8 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) /* Set suite B flags if needed */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s)); - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) { + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data + (ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) { goto end; } @@ -454,7 +452,7 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) /* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param); -end: + end: X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); return i; } @@ -505,7 +503,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s) { - if (!s->server) { /* we are in the client */ + if (!s->server) { /* we are in the client */ if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL)) return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names); else @@ -576,8 +574,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) X509 *x = NULL; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL; - LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = - lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp); + LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp); if ((name_hash == NULL) || (in == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -651,8 +648,7 @@ int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } @@ -806,7 +802,7 @@ int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; if (chain_store) { - X509_STORE_CTX* xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (xs_ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -823,10 +819,10 @@ int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can */ - (void) X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); + (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ ERR_clear_error(); - chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); + chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); if (i != 1) { #if 0 @@ -892,8 +888,7 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) { error = ERR_peek_last_error(); if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 || - ERR_GET_REASON(error) != - X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) + ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) goto err; ERR_clear_error(); } @@ -1001,8 +996,8 @@ int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref) return 1; } -static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, - int bits, int nid, void *other, +static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, + int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex) { int level, minbits; diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c index 060bd9d1c3..366dcc9d20 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c @@ -131,9 +131,9 @@ static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_mac[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { {SSL_GOST89MAC, NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3 */ {SSL_SHA256, NID_sha256}, /* SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4 */ {SSL_SHA384, NID_sha384}, /* SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5 */ - {SSL_GOST12_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6 */ - {SSL_GOST89MAC12, NID_gost_mac_12}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7 */ - {SSL_GOST12_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8 */ + {SSL_GOST12_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6 */ + {SSL_GOST89MAC12, NID_gost_mac_12}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7 */ + {SSL_GOST12_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8 */ {0, NID_md5_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9 */ {0, NID_sha224}, /* SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10 */ {0, NID_sha512} /* SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11 */ @@ -143,28 +143,30 @@ static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; +/* *INDENT-OFF* */ static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_kx[] = { - { SSL_kRSA, NID_kx_rsa }, - { SSL_kECDHE, NID_kx_ecdhe }, - { SSL_kDHE, NID_kx_dhe }, - { SSL_kECDHEPSK, NID_kx_ecdhe_psk }, - { SSL_kDHEPSK, NID_kx_dhe_psk }, - { SSL_kRSAPSK, NID_kx_rsa_psk }, - { SSL_kPSK, NID_kx_psk }, - { SSL_kSRP, NID_kx_srp }, - { SSL_kGOST, NID_kx_gost } + {SSL_kRSA, NID_kx_rsa}, + {SSL_kECDHE, NID_kx_ecdhe}, + {SSL_kDHE, NID_kx_dhe}, + {SSL_kECDHEPSK, NID_kx_ecdhe_psk}, + {SSL_kDHEPSK, NID_kx_dhe_psk}, + {SSL_kRSAPSK, NID_kx_rsa_psk}, + {SSL_kPSK, NID_kx_psk}, + {SSL_kSRP, NID_kx_srp}, + {SSL_kGOST, NID_kx_gost} }; static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_auth[] = { - { SSL_aRSA, NID_auth_rsa }, - { SSL_aECDSA, NID_auth_ecdsa }, - { SSL_aPSK, NID_auth_psk }, - { SSL_aDSS, NID_auth_dss }, - { SSL_aGOST01, NID_auth_gost01 }, - { SSL_aGOST12, NID_auth_gost12 }, - { SSL_aSRP, NID_auth_srp }, - { SSL_aNULL, NID_auth_null } + {SSL_aRSA, NID_auth_rsa}, + {SSL_aECDSA, NID_auth_ecdsa}, + {SSL_aPSK, NID_auth_psk}, + {SSL_aDSS, NID_auth_dss}, + {SSL_aGOST01, NID_auth_gost01}, + {SSL_aGOST12, NID_auth_gost12}, + {SSL_aSRP, NID_auth_srp}, + {SSL_aNULL, NID_auth_null} }; +/* *INDENT-ON* */ /* Utility function for table lookup */ static int ssl_cipher_info_find(const ssl_cipher_table * table, @@ -286,9 +288,11 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = { {0, SSL_TXT_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, SSL_TXT_GOST, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, - {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8, 0, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, 0, 0, 0, + SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, - {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES256CCM8, 0, + {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, 0, 0, 0, + SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES256CCM8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, @@ -303,7 +307,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = { {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, - {0, SSL_TXT_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, + {0, SSL_TXT_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, /* MAC aliases */ {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, @@ -453,7 +457,8 @@ void ssl_load_ciphers(void) disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC; } - ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac-12"); + ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = + get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac-12"); if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX]) { ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = 32; } else { @@ -469,7 +474,8 @@ void ssl_load_ciphers(void) /* * Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available * */ - if ((disabled_auth_mask & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) == (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) + if ((disabled_auth_mask & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) == + (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST; } @@ -824,8 +830,8 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey, #endif if (rule == CIPHER_DEL || rule == CIPHER_BUMP) - reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between - * currently deleted ciphers */ + reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between currently + * deleted ciphers */ head = *head_p; tail = *tail_p; @@ -1057,8 +1063,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str, * it is no command or separator nor * alphanumeric, so we call this an error. */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, - SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); retval = found = 0; l++; break; @@ -1216,8 +1221,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str, ok = 1; } } else - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, - SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); if (ok == 0) retval = 0; /* @@ -1293,8 +1297,7 @@ static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c, } return 1; # else - SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, - SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE); return 0; # endif } @@ -1347,8 +1350,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, STACK ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers, disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, - disabled_mac, co_list, &head, - &tail); + disabled_mac, co_list, &head, &tail); /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference. */ @@ -1366,18 +1368,17 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, STACK ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail); - /* Within each strength group, we prefer GCM over CHACHA... */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); - /* - * ...and generally, our preferred cipher is AES. - * Note that AEADs will be bumped to take preference after sorting by - * strength. - */ + /* + * ...and generally, our preferred cipher is AES. + * Note that AEADs will be bumped to take preference after sorting by + * strength. + */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES ^ SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); @@ -1441,9 +1442,9 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, STACK ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); + CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, - CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); + CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail); @@ -1485,7 +1486,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, STACK if (ok && (strlen(rule_p) > 0)) ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list, c); - OPENSSL_free(ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */ + OPENSSL_free(ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */ if (!ok) { /* Rule processing failure */ OPENSSL_free(co_list); @@ -1530,8 +1531,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, STACK if (*cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id); *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list; - (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, - ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); + (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id); return (cipherstack); @@ -1542,8 +1542,7 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len) const char *ver; const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac; uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac; - static const char *format = - "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n"; + static const char *format = "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n"; if (buf == NULL) { len = 128; @@ -1753,8 +1752,8 @@ int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits) if (c != NULL) { if (alg_bits != NULL) - *alg_bits = (int) c->alg_bits; - ret = (int) c->strength_bits; + *alg_bits = (int)c->alg_bits; + ret = (int)c->strength_bits; } return ret; } @@ -1785,11 +1784,13 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) { return NULL; } + STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *meths) { return meths; } + int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) { return 1; @@ -1861,8 +1862,7 @@ int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID); return (1); } - if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL - || !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp)) { + if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL || !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp)) { OPENSSL_free(comp); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); diff --git a/ssl/ssl_conf.c b/ssl/ssl_conf.c index 890b0af795..3957946092 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_conf.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_conf.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static void ssl_set_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int name_flags, break; case SSL_TFLAG_VFY: - pflags = cctx->pvfy_flags; + pflags = cctx->pvfy_flags; break; case SSL_TFLAG_OPTION: @@ -142,8 +142,7 @@ static int ssl_match_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const ssl_flag_tbl *tbl, if (namelen == -1) { if (strcmp(tbl->name, name)) return 0; - } else if (tbl->namelen != namelen - || strncasecmp(tbl->name, name, namelen)) + } else if (tbl->namelen != namelen || strncasecmp(tbl->name, name, namelen)) return 0; ssl_set_option(cctx, tbl->name_flags, tbl->option_value, onoff); return 1; @@ -192,8 +191,7 @@ static int cmd_SignatureAlgorithms(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) } /* Set supported client signature algorithms */ -static int cmd_ClientSignatureAlgorithms(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, - const char *value) +static int cmd_ClientSignatureAlgorithms(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value) { int rv; if (cctx->ssl) @@ -285,7 +283,8 @@ static int protocol_from_string(const char *value) {"TLSv1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION}, {"TLSv1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION}, {"DTLSv1", DTLS1_VERSION}, - {"DTLSv1.2", DTLS1_2_VERSION}}; + {"DTLSv1.2", DTLS1_2_VERSION} + }; size_t i; size_t n = OSSL_NELEM(versions); @@ -625,8 +624,7 @@ static int ssl_conf_cmd_skip_prefix(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char **pcmd) } /* Determine if a command is allowed according to cctx flags */ -static int ssl_conf_cmd_allowed(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, - const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl * t) +static int ssl_conf_cmd_allowed(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl * t) { unsigned int tfl = t->flags; unsigned int cfl = cctx->flags; @@ -664,8 +662,7 @@ static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl *ssl_conf_cmd_lookup(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, return NULL; } -static int ctrl_switch_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, - const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl * cmd) +static int ctrl_switch_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl * cmd) { /* Find index of command in table */ size_t idx = cmd - ssl_conf_cmds; diff --git a/ssl/ssl_init.c b/ssl/ssl_init.c index 543da13339..b286a98dec 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_init.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_init.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_ssl_base) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_ssl_base: " - "Adding SSL ciphers and digests\n"); + "Adding SSL ciphers and digests\n"); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cbc()); @@ -85,10 +85,10 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_ssl_base) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384()); EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512()); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP -#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG +# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_ssl_base: " - "SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods()\n"); -#endif + "SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods()\n"); +# endif /* * This will initialise the built-in compression algorithms. The value * returned is a STACK_OF(SSL_COMP), but that can be discarded safely @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_ssl_base) #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_ssl_base: " - "SSL_add_ssl_module()\n"); + "SSL_add_ssl_module()\n"); #endif SSL_add_ssl_module(); /* @@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_load_ssl_strings) */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ERR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AUTOERRINIT) # ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_load_ssl_strings: " - "ERR_load_SSL_strings()\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_load_ssl_strings: " + "ERR_load_SSL_strings()\n"); # endif ERR_load_SSL_strings(); #endif @@ -146,10 +146,10 @@ static void ssl_library_stop(void) if (ssl_base_inited) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP -#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG +# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ssl_library_stop: " - "ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int()\n"); -#endif + "ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int()\n"); +# endif ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(); #endif } @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static void ssl_library_stop(void) if (ssl_strings_inited) { #ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ssl_library_stop: " - "err_free_strings_int()\n"); + "err_free_strings_int()\n"); #endif /* * If both crypto and ssl error strings are inited we will end up @@ -169,13 +169,12 @@ static void ssl_library_stop(void) } } - /* * If this function is called with a non NULL settings value then it must be * called prior to any threads making calls to any OpenSSL functions, * i.e. passing a non-null settings value is assumed to be single-threaded. */ -int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings) +int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS * settings) { static int stoperrset = 0; @@ -200,13 +199,12 @@ int OPENSSL_init_ssl(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings) return 0; if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS) - && !RUN_ONCE(&ssl_strings, ossl_init_no_load_ssl_strings)) + && !RUN_ONCE(&ssl_strings, ossl_init_no_load_ssl_strings)) return 0; if ((opts & OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS) - && !RUN_ONCE(&ssl_strings, ossl_init_load_ssl_strings)) + && !RUN_ONCE(&ssl_strings, ossl_init_load_ssl_strings)) return 0; return 1; } - diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 04bd9ee2fc..3347191f17 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -82,22 +82,28 @@ struct ssl_async_args { SSL *s; void *buf; int num; - enum { READFUNC, WRITEFUNC, OTHERFUNC} type; + enum { READFUNC, WRITEFUNC, OTHERFUNC } type; union { - int (*func_read)(SSL *, void *, int); - int (*func_write)(SSL *, const void *, int); - int (*func_other)(SSL *); + int (*func_read) (SSL *, void *, int); + int (*func_write) (SSL *, const void *, int); + int (*func_other) (SSL *); } f; }; static const struct { uint8_t mtype; uint8_t ord; - int nid; + int nid; } dane_mds[] = { - { DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL, 0, NID_undef }, - { DANETLS_MATCHING_2256, 1, NID_sha256 }, - { DANETLS_MATCHING_2512, 2, NID_sha512 }, + { + DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL, 0, NID_undef + }, + { + DANETLS_MATCHING_2256, 1, NID_sha256 + }, + { + DANETLS_MATCHING_2512, 2, NID_sha512 + }, }; static int dane_ctx_enable(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx) @@ -105,7 +111,7 @@ static int dane_ctx_enable(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx) const EVP_MD **mdevp; uint8_t *mdord; uint8_t mdmax = DANETLS_MATCHING_LAST; - int n = ((int) mdmax) + 1; /* int to handle PrivMatch(255) */ + int n = ((int)mdmax) + 1; /* int to handle PrivMatch(255) */ size_t i; if (dctx->mdevp != NULL) @@ -194,7 +200,7 @@ static int ssl_dane_dup(SSL *to, SSL *from) return 0; } - num = sk_danetls_record_num(from->dane.trecs); + num = sk_danetls_record_num(from->dane.trecs); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { danetls_record *t = sk_danetls_record_value(from->dane.trecs, i); @@ -205,24 +211,20 @@ static int ssl_dane_dup(SSL *to, SSL *from) return 1; } -static int dane_mtype_set( - struct dane_ctx_st *dctx, - const EVP_MD *md, - uint8_t mtype, - uint8_t ord) +static int dane_mtype_set(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx, + const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord) { int i; if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL && md != NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, - SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL); return 0; } if (mtype > dctx->mdmax) { const EVP_MD **mdevp; uint8_t *mdord; - int n = ((int) mtype) + 1; + int n = ((int)mtype) + 1; mdevp = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdevp, n * sizeof(*mdevp)); if (mdevp == NULL) { @@ -239,7 +241,7 @@ static int dane_mtype_set( dctx->mdord = mdord; /* Zero-fill any gaps */ - for (i = dctx->mdmax+1; i < mtype; ++i) { + for (i = dctx->mdmax + 1; i < mtype; ++i) { mdevp[i] = NULL; mdord[i] = 0; } @@ -261,13 +263,10 @@ static const EVP_MD *tlsa_md_get(SSL_DANE *dane, uint8_t mtype) return dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype]; } -static int dane_tlsa_add( - SSL_DANE *dane, - uint8_t usage, - uint8_t selector, - uint8_t mtype, - unsigned char *data, - size_t dlen) +static int dane_tlsa_add(SSL_DANE *dane, + uint8_t usage, + uint8_t selector, + uint8_t mtype, unsigned char *data, size_t dlen) { danetls_record *t; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; @@ -512,8 +511,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth) &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id), SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, - SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); return (0); } return (1); @@ -603,7 +601,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); s->initial_ctx = ctx; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, @@ -622,10 +620,10 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; } -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; -# endif +#endif if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) { s->alpn_client_proto_list = @@ -665,7 +663,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (!SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ctx->ct_validation_callback, - ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg)) + ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg)) goto err; #endif @@ -930,7 +928,8 @@ int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector, return dane_tlsa_add(&s->dane, usage, selector, mtype, data, dlen); } -int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord) +int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, + uint8_t ord) { return dane_mtype_set(&ctx->dane, md, mtype, ord); } @@ -1004,7 +1003,7 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); @@ -1389,15 +1388,12 @@ int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f) /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { - if ((ctx == NULL) || - (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, - SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); + if ((ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return (0); } if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, - SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return (0); } return (X509_check_private_key @@ -1477,7 +1473,8 @@ long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) } static int ssl_start_async_job(SSL *s, struct ssl_async_args *args, - int (*func)(void *)) { + int (*func) (void *)) +{ int ret; if (s->waitctx == NULL) { s->waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(); @@ -1485,7 +1482,7 @@ static int ssl_start_async_job(SSL *s, struct ssl_async_args *args, return -1; } switch (ASYNC_start_job(&s->job, s->waitctx, &ret, func, args, - sizeof(struct ssl_async_args))) { + sizeof(struct ssl_async_args))) { case ASYNC_ERR: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC); @@ -1736,7 +1733,7 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) } case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTMS_SUPPORT: if (!s->session || SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) - return -1; + return -1; if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) return 1; else @@ -2122,8 +2119,7 @@ int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, - const unsigned char *client, - unsigned int client_len) + const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) { unsigned int i, j; const unsigned char *result; @@ -2294,7 +2290,6 @@ void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data, *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; } - int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, @@ -2399,9 +2394,9 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) goto err; #endif if (!ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, - &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id, - SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert) - || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { + &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id, + SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert) + || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); goto err2; } @@ -2433,9 +2428,12 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) ret->split_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; /* Setup RFC5077 ticket keys */ - if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0) - || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key)) <= 0) - || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key)) <= 0)) + if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, + sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0) + || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, + sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key)) <= 0) + || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, + sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key)) <= 0)) ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP @@ -2616,8 +2614,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } -void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), - void *arg) +void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg); } @@ -2802,8 +2799,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; c = s->cert; - if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && - (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) + if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) @@ -2889,7 +2885,7 @@ int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth) if (s->method != meth) { const SSL_METHOD *sm = s->method; - int (*hf)(SSL *) = s->handshake_func; + int (*hf) (SSL *) = s->handshake_func; if (sm->version == meth->version) s->method = meth; @@ -3412,7 +3408,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) } SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); - SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ + SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ ssl->ctx = ctx; return ssl->ctx; @@ -3507,7 +3503,7 @@ size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) } size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, - unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) + unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { if (session->master_key_length < 0) { /* Should never happen */ @@ -3587,8 +3583,7 @@ void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) { if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint); @@ -3641,8 +3636,7 @@ void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, - unsigned int - max_psk_len)) + unsigned int max_psk_len)) { s->psk_client_callback = cb; } @@ -3664,8 +3658,7 @@ void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s, unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, - unsigned int - max_psk_len)) + unsigned int max_psk_len)) { s->psk_server_callback = cb; } @@ -3783,7 +3776,6 @@ void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug) } #endif - void SSL_set_security_level(SSL *s, int level) { s->cert->sec_level = level; @@ -3795,16 +3787,17 @@ int SSL_get_security_level(const SSL *s) } void SSL_set_security_callback(SSL *s, - int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, - int bits, int nid, void *other, - void *ex)) + int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, + int op, int bits, int nid, + void *other, void *ex)) { s->cert->sec_cb = cb; } -int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s)) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, - int bits, int nid, - void *other, void *ex) { +int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s)) (const SSL *s, + const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, + int bits, int nid, void *other, + void *ex) { return s->cert->sec_cb; } @@ -3829,9 +3822,9 @@ int SSL_CTX_get_security_level(const SSL_CTX *ctx) } void SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, - int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, - int bits, int nid, void *other, - void *ex)) + int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, + int op, int bits, int nid, + void *other, void *ex)) { ctx->cert->sec_cb = cb; } @@ -3855,7 +3848,6 @@ void *SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx) return ctx->cert->sec_ex; } - /* * Get/Set/Clear options in SSL_CTX or SSL, formerly macros, now functions that * can return unsigned long, instead of the generic long return value from the @@ -3865,22 +3857,27 @@ unsigned long SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->options; } -unsigned long SSL_get_options(const SSL* s) + +unsigned long SSL_get_options(const SSL *s) { return s->options; } + unsigned long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op) { return ctx->options |= op; } + unsigned long SSL_set_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op) { return s->options |= op; } + unsigned long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op) { return ctx->options &= ~op; } + unsigned long SSL_clear_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op) { return s->options &= ~op; @@ -3902,7 +3899,8 @@ IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); * the caller. * Returns the number of SCTs moved, or a negative integer if an error occurs. */ -static int ct_move_scts(STACK_OF(SCT) **dst, STACK_OF(SCT) *src, sct_source_t origin) +static int ct_move_scts(STACK_OF(SCT) **dst, STACK_OF(SCT) *src, + sct_source_t origin) { int scts_moved = 0; SCT *sct = NULL; @@ -3925,16 +3923,16 @@ static int ct_move_scts(STACK_OF(SCT) **dst, STACK_OF(SCT) *src, sct_source_t or } return scts_moved; -err: + err: if (sct != NULL) - sk_SCT_push(src, sct); /* Put the SCT back */ + sk_SCT_push(src, sct); /* Put the SCT back */ return -1; } /* -* Look for data collected during ServerHello and parse if found. -* Return 1 on success, 0 on failure. -*/ + * Look for data collected during ServerHello and parse if found. + * Return 1 on success, 0 on failure. + */ static int ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(SSL *s) { int scts_extracted = 0; @@ -3961,7 +3959,7 @@ static int ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(SSL *s) */ static int ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(SSL *s) { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int scts_extracted = 0; const unsigned char *p; OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL; @@ -3987,21 +3985,22 @@ static int ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(SSL *s) if (single == NULL) continue; - scts = OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(single, NID_ct_cert_scts, NULL, NULL); - scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, - SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE); + scts = + OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(single, NID_ct_cert_scts, NULL, NULL); + scts_extracted = + ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE); if (scts_extracted < 0) goto err; } -err: + err: SCT_LIST_free(scts); OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp); return scts_extracted; -#else +# else /* Behave as if no OCSP response exists */ return 0; -#endif +# endif } /* @@ -4043,17 +4042,17 @@ const STACK_OF(SCT) *SSL_get0_peer_scts(SSL *s) s->scts_parsed = 1; } return s->scts; -err: + err: return NULL; } -static int ct_permissive(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, +static int ct_permissive(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx, const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg) { return 1; } -static int ct_strict(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, +static int ct_strict(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx, const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg) { int count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0; @@ -4078,14 +4077,17 @@ int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, * for this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT. */ if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(s->ctx, - TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) { + TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) + { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED); return 0; } if (callback != NULL) { - /* If we are validating CT, then we MUST accept SCTs served via OCSP */ + /* + * If we are validating CT, then we MUST accept SCTs served via OCSP + */ if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(s, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)) return 0; } @@ -4097,15 +4099,15 @@ int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, } int SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, - ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, - void *arg) + ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg) { /* * Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look for * this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT. */ if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(ctx, - TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) { + TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) + { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED); return 0; @@ -4148,8 +4150,7 @@ int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s) */ if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL || cert == NULL || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK || - s->verified_chain == NULL || - sk_X509_num(s->verified_chain) <= 1) + s->verified_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(s->verified_chain) <= 1) return 1; /* @@ -4198,9 +4199,9 @@ int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s) ret = s->ct_validation_callback(ctx, scts, s->ct_validation_callback_arg); if (ret < 0) - ret = 0; /* This function returns 0 on failure */ + ret = 0; /* This function returns 0 on failure */ -end: + end: CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(ctx); /* * With SSL_VERIFY_NONE the session may be cached and re-used despite a @@ -4258,7 +4259,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path) return CTLOG_STORE_load_file(ctx->ctlog_store, path); } -void SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE *logs) +void SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE * logs) { CTLOG_STORE_free(ctx->ctlog_store); ctx->ctlog_store = logs; diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h index e7084fc7e8..6fba98325a 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h +++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ # include "e_os.h" # if defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) -# include <sys/time.h> /* struct timeval for DTLS */ +# include <sys/time.h> /* struct timeval for DTLS */ # endif # include <openssl/buffer.h> @@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ # include <openssl/async.h> # include <openssl/symhacks.h> # include <openssl/ct.h> -#include "record/record.h" -#include "statem/statem.h" -#include "packet_locl.h" -#include "internal/dane.h" +# include "record/record.h" +# include "statem/statem.h" +# include "packet_locl.h" +# include "internal/dane.h" # ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN @@ -164,13 +164,15 @@ (c)[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ (c)[2]=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)),(c)+=3) -/* DTLS version numbers are strange because they're inverted. Except - * for DTLS1_BAD_VER, which should be considered "lower" than the rest. */ -#define dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) (((v1) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 0xff00 : (v1)) -#define DTLS_VERSION_GT(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) < dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) -#define DTLS_VERSION_GE(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) <= dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) -#define DTLS_VERSION_LT(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) > dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) -#define DTLS_VERSION_LE(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) >= dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) +/* + * DTLS version numbers are strange because they're inverted. Except for + * DTLS1_BAD_VER, which should be considered "lower" than the rest. + */ +# define dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) (((v1) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 0xff00 : (v1)) +# define DTLS_VERSION_GT(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) < dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) +# define DTLS_VERSION_GE(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) <= dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) +# define DTLS_VERSION_LT(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) > dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) +# define DTLS_VERSION_LE(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) >= dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) /* LOCAL STUFF */ @@ -224,7 +226,7 @@ /* all PSK */ -#define SSL_PSK (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kDHEPSK) +# define SSL_PSK (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kDHEPSK) /* Bits for algorithm_auth (server authentication) */ /* RSA auth */ @@ -376,7 +378,7 @@ # define SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s) \ SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s) -# define SSL_USE_ETM(s) (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +# define SSL_USE_ETM(s) (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) /* Mostly for SSLv3 */ # define SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC 0 @@ -407,30 +409,29 @@ #define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY 2 */ - /* CipherSuite length. SSLv3 and all TLS versions. */ -#define TLS_CIPHER_LEN 2 +# define TLS_CIPHER_LEN 2 /* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */ struct ssl_cipher_st { uint32_t valid; - const char *name; /* text name */ - uint32_t id; /* id, 4 bytes, first is version */ + const char *name; /* text name */ + uint32_t id; /* id, 4 bytes, first is version */ /* * changed in 1.0.0: these four used to be portions of a single value * 'algorithms' */ - uint32_t algorithm_mkey; /* key exchange algorithm */ - uint32_t algorithm_auth; /* server authentication */ - uint32_t algorithm_enc; /* symmetric encryption */ - uint32_t algorithm_mac; /* symmetric authentication */ - int min_tls; /* minimum SSL/TLS protocol version */ - int max_tls; /* maximum SSL/TLS protocol version */ - int min_dtls; /* minimum DTLS protocol version */ - int max_dtls; /* maximum DTLS protocol version */ - uint32_t algo_strength; /* strength and export flags */ - uint32_t algorithm2; /* Extra flags */ - int32_t strength_bits; /* Number of bits really used */ - uint32_t alg_bits; /* Number of bits for algorithm */ + uint32_t algorithm_mkey; /* key exchange algorithm */ + uint32_t algorithm_auth; /* server authentication */ + uint32_t algorithm_enc; /* symmetric encryption */ + uint32_t algorithm_mac; /* symmetric authentication */ + int min_tls; /* minimum SSL/TLS protocol version */ + int max_tls; /* maximum SSL/TLS protocol version */ + int min_dtls; /* minimum DTLS protocol version */ + int max_dtls; /* maximum DTLS protocol version */ + uint32_t algo_strength; /* strength and export flags */ + uint32_t algorithm2; /* Extra flags */ + int32_t strength_bits; /* Number of bits really used */ + uint32_t alg_bits; /* Number of bits for algorithm */ }; /* Used to hold SSL/TLS functions */ @@ -494,8 +495,8 @@ struct ssl_method_st { * I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-). */ struct ssl_session_st { - int ssl_version; /* what ssl version session info is being - * kept in here? */ + int ssl_version; /* what ssl version session info is being kept + * in here? */ int master_key_length; unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; /* session_id - valid? */ @@ -533,8 +534,8 @@ struct ssl_session_st { long time; unsigned int compress_meth; /* Need to lookup the method */ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; - unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used - * to load the 'cipher' structure */ + unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used to + * load the 'cipher' structure */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */ /* @@ -548,11 +549,12 @@ struct ssl_session_st { unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; /* peer's list */ size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; /* peer's list */ -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* RFC4507 info */ unsigned char *tlsext_tick; /* Session ticket */ size_t tlsext_ticklen; /* Session ticket length */ - unsigned long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in seconds */ + unsigned long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in + * seconds */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP char *srp_username; # endif @@ -561,8 +563,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st { }; /* Extended master secret support */ -# define SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS 0x1 - +# define SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS 0x1 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP @@ -595,7 +596,7 @@ DEFINE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION); /* Needed in ssl_cert.c */ DEFINE_LHASH_OF(X509_NAME); -#define TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH 16 +# define TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH 16 struct ssl_ctx_st { const SSL_METHOD *method; @@ -650,9 +651,9 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st { int sess_hit; /* session reuse actually done */ int sess_cb_hit; /* session-id that was not in the cache was * passed back via the callback. This - * indicates that the application is - * supplying session-id's from other - * processes - spooky :-) */ + * indicates that the application is supplying + * session-id's from other processes - spooky + * :-) */ } stats; int references; @@ -730,15 +731,15 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st { int quiet_shutdown; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT - CTLOG_STORE *ctlog_store; /* CT Log Store */ +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT + CTLOG_STORE *ctlog_store; /* CT Log Store */ /* - * Validates that the SCTs (Signed Certificate Timestamps) are sufficient. - * If they are not, the connection should be aborted. - */ + * Validates that the SCTs (Signed Certificate Timestamps) are sufficient. + * If they are not, the connection should be aborted. + */ ssl_ct_validation_cb ct_validation_callback; void *ct_validation_callback_arg; -# endif +# endif /* * If we're using more than one pipeline how should we divide the data @@ -757,12 +758,12 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st { /* The default read buffer length to use (0 means not set) */ size_t default_read_buf_len; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* * Engine to pass requests for client certs to */ ENGINE *client_cert_engine; -# endif +# endif /* TLS extensions servername callback */ int (*tlsext_servername_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *); @@ -774,15 +775,14 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st { /* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */ int (*tlsext_ticket_key_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *name, unsigned char *iv, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, - HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc); /* certificate status request info */ /* Callback for status request */ int (*tlsext_status_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *tlsext_status_arg; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, @@ -791,13 +791,13 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st { unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); -# endif +# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */ -# endif +# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* Next protocol negotiation information */ /* @@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st { const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg); void *next_proto_select_cb_arg; -# endif +# endif /* * ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to @@ -857,13 +857,13 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st { * basis, depending on the chosen cipher. */ int (*not_resumable_session_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure); -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* EC extension values inherited by SSL structure */ size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* ext status type used for CSR extension (OCSP Stapling) */ int tlsext_status_type; @@ -871,14 +871,12 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st { CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; - struct ssl_st { /* * protocol version (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION, * DTLS1_VERSION) */ int version; - /* SSLv3 */ const SSL_METHOD *method; /* @@ -897,7 +895,6 @@ struct ssl_st { * request needs re-doing when in SSL_accept or SSL_connect */ int rwstate; - int (*handshake_func) (SSL *); /* * Imagine that here's a boolean member "init" that is switched as soon @@ -921,26 +918,21 @@ struct ssl_st { int shutdown; /* where we are */ OSSL_STATEM statem; - BUF_MEM *init_buf; /* buffer used during init */ void *init_msg; /* pointer to handshake message body, set by * ssl3_get_message() */ int init_num; /* amount read/written */ int init_off; /* amount read/written */ - struct ssl3_state_st *s3; /* SSLv3 variables */ struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */ - /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */ void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *msg_callback_arg; int hit; /* reusing a previous session */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; - /* Per connection DANE state */ SSL_DANE dane; - /* crypto */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id; @@ -983,7 +975,7 @@ struct ssl_st { int error; /* actual code */ int error_code; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned int (*psk_client_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, @@ -992,7 +984,7 @@ struct ssl_st { unsigned int (*psk_server_callback) (SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len); -# endif +# endif SSL_CTX *ctx; /* Verified chain of peer */ STACK_OF(X509) *verified_chain; @@ -1012,7 +1004,6 @@ struct ssl_st { int first_packet; /* what was passed, used for SSLv3/TLS rollback check */ int client_version; - /* * If we're using more than one pipeline how should we divide the data * up between the pipes? @@ -1023,10 +1014,8 @@ struct ssl_st { * be more than this due to padding and MAC overheads. */ unsigned int max_send_fragment; - /* Up to how many pipelines should we use? If 0 then 1 is assumed */ unsigned int max_pipelines; - /* TLS extension debug callback */ void (*tlsext_debug_cb) (SSL *s, int client_server, int type, const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg); @@ -1042,11 +1031,11 @@ struct ssl_st { /* certificate status request info */ /* Status type or -1 if no status type */ int tlsext_status_type; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* - * Validates that the SCTs (Signed Certificate Timestamps) are sufficient. - * If they are not, the connection should be aborted. - */ + * Validates that the SCTs (Signed Certificate Timestamps) are sufficient. + * If they are not, the connection should be aborted. + */ ssl_ct_validation_cb ct_validation_callback; /* User-supplied argument tha tis passed to the ct_validation_callback */ void *ct_validation_callback_arg; @@ -1061,7 +1050,7 @@ struct ssl_st { uint16_t tlsext_scts_len; /* Have we attempted to find/parse SCTs yet? */ int scts_parsed; -# endif +# endif /* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */ int tlsext_status_expected; /* OCSP status request only */ @@ -1072,14 +1061,14 @@ struct ssl_st { int tlsext_ocsp_resplen; /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */ int tlsext_ticket_expected; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC size_t tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; /* our list */ unsigned char *tlsext_ecpointformatlist; size_t tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; /* our list */ unsigned char *tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* TLS Session Ticket extension override */ TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT *tlsext_session_ticket; /* TLS Session Ticket extension callback */ @@ -1089,7 +1078,7 @@ struct ssl_st { tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secret_cb; void *tls_session_secret_cb_arg; SSL_CTX *initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello @@ -1099,8 +1088,8 @@ struct ssl_st { */ unsigned char *next_proto_negotiated; unsigned char next_proto_negotiated_len; -# endif -# define session_ctx initial_ctx +# endif +# define session_ctx initial_ctx /* What we'll do */ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles; /* What's been chosen */ @@ -1122,39 +1111,32 @@ struct ssl_st { */ unsigned char *alpn_client_proto_list; unsigned alpn_client_proto_list_len; - /*- * 1 if we are renegotiating. * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) */ int renegotiate; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* ctx for SRP authentication */ SRP_CTX srp_ctx; -# endif +# endif /* * Callback for disabling session caching and ticket support on a session * basis, depending on the chosen cipher. */ int (*not_resumable_session_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure); - RECORD_LAYER rlayer; - /* Default password callback. */ pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback; - /* Default password callback user data. */ void *default_passwd_callback_userdata; - /* Async Job info */ ASYNC_JOB *job; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx; - CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; - typedef struct ssl3_state_st { long flags; int read_mac_secret_size; @@ -1205,9 +1187,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st { int message_type; /* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */ const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher; -# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) - EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* holds short lived DH/ECDH key */ -# endif +# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) + EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* holds short lived DH/ECDH key */ +# endif /* used for certificate requests */ int cert_req; int ctype_num; @@ -1219,11 +1201,11 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st { const EVP_MD *new_hash; int new_mac_pkey_type; int new_mac_secret_size; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const SSL_COMP *new_compression; -# else +# else char *new_compression; -# endif +# endif int cert_request; /* Raw values of the cipher list from a client */ unsigned char *ciphers_raw; @@ -1231,11 +1213,11 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st { /* Temporary storage for premaster secret */ unsigned char *pms; size_t pmslen; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* Temporary storage for PSK key */ unsigned char *psk; size_t psklen; -#endif +# endif /* * signature algorithms peer reports: e.g. supported signature * algorithms extension for server or as part of a certificate @@ -1277,12 +1259,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st { unsigned char previous_server_finished_len; int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer. */ int next_proto_neg_seen; -# endif +# endif /* * ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to @@ -1302,14 +1284,14 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st { /* used by the client to know if it actually sent alpn */ int alpn_sent; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari on * 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support. */ char is_probably_safari; -# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* For clients: peer temporary key */ # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) @@ -1318,21 +1300,20 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st { } SSL3_STATE; - /* DTLS structures */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP -# define DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL "EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP" -# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP +# define DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL "EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP" +# endif /* Max MTU overhead we know about so far is 40 for IPv6 + 8 for UDP */ -# define DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD 48 +# define DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD 48 /* * Flag used in message reuse to indicate the buffer contains the record * header as well as the the handshake message header. */ -# define DTLS1_SKIP_RECORD_HEADER 2 +# define DTLS1_SKIP_RECORD_HEADER 2 struct dtls1_retransmit_state { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ @@ -1380,7 +1361,7 @@ typedef struct pitem_st *piterator; pitem *pitem_new(unsigned char *prio64be, void *data); void pitem_free(pitem *item); -pqueue* pqueue_new(void); +pqueue *pqueue_new(void); void pqueue_free(pqueue *pq); pitem *pqueue_insert(pqueue *pq, pitem *item); pitem *pqueue_peek(pqueue *pq); @@ -1394,17 +1375,14 @@ typedef struct dtls1_state_st { unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH]; unsigned int cookie_len; unsigned int cookie_verified; - /* handshake message numbers */ unsigned short handshake_write_seq; unsigned short next_handshake_write_seq; unsigned short handshake_read_seq; - /* Buffered handshake messages */ pqueue *buffered_messages; /* Buffered (sent) handshake records */ pqueue *sent_messages; - unsigned int link_mtu; /* max on-the-wire DTLS packet size */ unsigned int mtu; /* max DTLS packet size */ struct hm_header_st w_msg_hdr; @@ -1416,15 +1394,12 @@ typedef struct dtls1_state_st { struct timeval next_timeout; /* Timeout duration */ unsigned short timeout_duration; - unsigned int retransmitting; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP int shutdown_received; -# endif +# endif } DTLS1_STATE; - - # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * From ECC-TLS draft, used in encoding the curve type in ECParameters @@ -1439,7 +1414,6 @@ typedef struct cert_pkey_st { EVP_PKEY *privatekey; /* Chain for this certificate */ STACK_OF(X509) *chain; - /*- * serverinfo data for this certificate. The data is in TLS Extension * wire format, specifically it's a series of records like: @@ -1559,10 +1533,10 @@ typedef struct cert_st { /* Security level */ int sec_level; void *sec_ex; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* If not NULL psk identity hint to use for servers */ char *psk_identity_hint; -#endif +# endif int references; /* >1 only if SSL_copy_session_id is used */ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; } CERT; @@ -1680,8 +1654,8 @@ extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data; /* * Flags for SSL methods */ -#define SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS (1U<<0) -#define SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB (1U<<1) +# define SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS (1U<<0) +# define SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB (1U<<1) # define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, flags, mask, func_name, s_accept, \ s_connect, enc_data) \ @@ -1801,7 +1775,7 @@ struct openssl_ssl_test_functions { int (*p_ssl3_setup_buffers) (SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS int (*p_dtls1_process_heartbeat) (SSL *s, - unsigned char *p, unsigned int length); + unsigned char *p, unsigned int length); # endif }; @@ -1822,17 +1796,21 @@ __owur SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket); __owur int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b); DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); __owur int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, - const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp); + const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp); __owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sorted, - const char *rule_str, CERT *c); + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref, + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) + **sorted, + const char *rule_str, + CERT *c); void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode); __owur int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc, - const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, - int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm); + const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, + int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp, + int use_etm); __owur int ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(const SSL_CIPHER *c); -__owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr); +__owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, + const unsigned char *ptr); __owur int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); __owur int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); __owur int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); @@ -1840,31 +1818,35 @@ __owur int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); __owur int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x); __owur int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long arg); __owur X509 *ssl_cert_get0_next_certificate(CERT *c, int first); -void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), - void *arg); +void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg); __owur int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); __owur int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l); __owur int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags); -__owur int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref); +__owur int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, + int ref); __owur int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other); -__owur int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other); +__owur int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, + void *other); int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_undefined_void_function(void); __owur int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s); __owur CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(SSL *s); -__owur int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo, - size_t *serverinfo_length); -__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD **pmd); +__owur int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, + const unsigned char **serverinfo, + size_t *serverinfo_length); +__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, + const EVP_MD **pmd); __owur int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pkey); void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s); __owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type); void ssl_sort_cipher_list(void); void ssl_load_ciphers(void); -__owur int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, int len); +__owur int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, + int len); __owur int ssl_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *pms, size_t pmslen, int free_pms); __owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey(EVP_PKEY *pm); @@ -1880,7 +1862,7 @@ void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type); int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc); __owur int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, - unsigned char *p, int len); + unsigned char *p, int len); __owur int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p); __owur int ssl3_num_ciphers(void); __owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u); @@ -1888,7 +1870,7 @@ int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *ssl); __owur int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen, - unsigned char *p); + unsigned char *p); __owur int ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len); void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s); __owur unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk); @@ -1923,17 +1905,18 @@ __owur int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound); __owur int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version); -int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version); +int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, + int *max_version); __owur long tls1_default_timeout(void); __owur int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type); void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, - unsigned long frag_off, - unsigned long frag_len); + unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len); -__owur int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len); +__owur int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, + int len); __owur int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code); __owur int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs); @@ -1979,13 +1962,13 @@ void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s); __owur int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which); __owur int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s); __owur int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, - const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *p); + const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *p); __owur int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, - unsigned char *p, int len); + unsigned char *p, int len); __owur int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, - const char *label, size_t llen, - const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, - int use_context); + const char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, + int use_context); __owur int tls1_alert_code(int code); __owur int ssl3_alert_code(int code); __owur int ssl_ok(SSL *s); @@ -2008,20 +1991,20 @@ __owur int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid); __owur int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len); __owur int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch); __owur int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, - int *curves, size_t ncurves); + int *curves, size_t ncurves); __owur int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, - const char *str); + const char *str); __owur int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long id); __owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey_curve(int id); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ __owur int tls1_shared_list(SSL *s, - const unsigned char *l1, size_t l1len, - const unsigned char *l2, size_t l2len, int nmatch); + const unsigned char *l1, size_t l1len, + const unsigned char *l2, size_t l2len, int nmatch); __owur unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, - unsigned char *limit, int *al); + unsigned char *limit, int *al); __owur unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, - unsigned char *limit, int *al); + unsigned char *limit, int *al); __owur int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s); __owur int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s); @@ -2032,7 +2015,8 @@ __owur int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS __owur int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s); -__owur int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length); +__owur int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, + unsigned int length); # endif __owur int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, @@ -2040,53 +2024,54 @@ __owur int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, SSL_SESSION **ret); __owur int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, - const EVP_MD *md); + const EVP_MD *md); __owur int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk); __owur const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg); void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op); __owur int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client); -__owur int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *salg, size_t salglen, int client); +__owur int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *salg, size_t salglen, + int client); int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int idx); void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT __owur int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s); -#endif +# endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH __owur DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s); # endif __owur int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee); -__owur int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *ex, int vfy); +__owur int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *ex, + int vfy); __owur EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md); void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash); -__owur int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, - int maxlen); -__owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, - int *al); -__owur int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, - int maxlen); +__owur int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, + int *len, int maxlen); +__owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al); +__owur int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, + int *len, int maxlen); __owur int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al); __owur long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s); __owur size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen); + const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen); __owur int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize); __owur int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s); __owur size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs); __owur int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, - const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey); + const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey); void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op); __owur int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, - int maxlen); + int maxlen); __owur int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al); __owur int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, - int maxlen); + int maxlen); __owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al); __owur int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, int outlen); @@ -2119,12 +2104,14 @@ __owur int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al); void custom_ext_init(custom_ext_methods *meths); __owur int custom_ext_parse(SSL *s, int server, - unsigned int ext_type, - const unsigned char *ext_data, size_t ext_size, int *al); -__owur int custom_ext_add(SSL *s, int server, - unsigned char **pret, unsigned char *limit, int *al); - -__owur int custom_exts_copy(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src); + unsigned int ext_type, + const unsigned char *ext_data, size_t ext_size, + int *al); +__owur int custom_ext_add(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char **pret, + unsigned char *limit, int *al); + +__owur int custom_exts_copy(custom_ext_methods *dst, + const custom_ext_methods *src); void custom_exts_free(custom_ext_methods *exts); void ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(void); diff --git a/ssl/ssl_mcnf.c b/ssl/ssl_mcnf.c index ac9cc95267..c2d9dba64a 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_mcnf.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_mcnf.c @@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ static int ssl_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf) STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *cmds = NCONF_get_section(cnf, sect->value); if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cmds) <= 0) { if (cmds == NULL) - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT, SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_NOT_FOUND); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT, + SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_NOT_FOUND); else SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT, SSL_R_SSL_COMMAND_SECTION_EMPTY); ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", sect->name, ", value=", sect->value); @@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ static int ssl_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf) } rv = 1; - err: + err: if (rv == 0) ssl_module_free(md); return rv; @@ -165,9 +166,9 @@ static int ssl_do_config(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name) SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx); } if (meth->ssl_accept != ssl_undefined_function) - flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER; + flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER; if (meth->ssl_connect != ssl_undefined_function) - flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT; + flags |= SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT; SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, flags); for (i = 0, cmd = nm->cmds; i < nm->cmd_count; i++, cmd++) { rv = SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, cmd->cmd, cmd->arg); @@ -177,12 +178,12 @@ static int ssl_do_config(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name) else SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE); ERR_add_error_data(6, "section=", name, ", cmd=", cmd->cmd, - ", arg=", cmd->arg); + ", arg=", cmd->arg); goto err; } } rv = SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx); - err: + err: SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx); return rv <= 0 ? 0 : 1; } diff --git a/ssl/ssl_rsa.c b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c index 3484536400..3eb1a8ae15 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_rsa.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey) * cards. */ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA - && RSA_flags(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK); + && RSA_flags(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK) ; else #endif if (!X509_check_private_key(c->pkeys[i].x509, pkey)) { @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) */ if (EVP_PKEY_id(c->pkeys[i].privatekey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA && RSA_flags(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(c->pkeys[i].privatekey)) & - RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK) ; + RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK) ; else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ if (!X509_check_private_key(x, c->pkeys[i].privatekey)) { @@ -410,8 +410,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type) return (ret); } -int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, - const unsigned char *d) +int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, const unsigned char *d) { X509 *x; int ret; @@ -649,7 +648,7 @@ static int use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL *ssl, const char *file) while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, passwd_callback, passwd_callback_userdata)) - != NULL) { + != NULL) { if (ctx) r = SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, ca); else @@ -892,8 +891,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file) size_t num_extensions = 0; if (ctx == NULL || file == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, - ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto end; } @@ -922,8 +920,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file) } /* Check that PEM name starts with "BEGIN SERVERINFO FOR " */ if (strlen(name) < strlen(namePrefix)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, - SSL_R_PEM_NAME_TOO_SHORT); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, SSL_R_PEM_NAME_TOO_SHORT); goto end; } if (strncmp(name, namePrefix, strlen(namePrefix)) != 0) { @@ -940,8 +937,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file) goto end; } /* Append the decoded extension to the serverinfo buffer */ - tmp = - OPENSSL_realloc(serverinfo, serverinfo_length + extension_length); + tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(serverinfo, serverinfo_length + extension_length); if (tmp == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_SERVERINFO_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c index 509175b1ab..eee1ca1f5b 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c @@ -158,7 +158,6 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) if (dest->peer_chain == NULL) goto err; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (src->psk_identity_hint) { dest->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(src->psk_identity_hint); @@ -181,7 +180,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) } if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, - &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) { + &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) { goto err; } @@ -195,21 +194,22 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) if (src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, - src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); + src->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); if (dest->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) goto err; } if (src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, - src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); + src->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); if (dest->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL) goto err; } #endif if (ticket != 0) { - dest->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen); + dest->tlsext_tick = + OPENSSL_memdup(src->tlsext_tick, src->tlsext_ticklen); if (dest->tlsext_tick == NULL) goto err; } else { @@ -227,14 +227,13 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) #endif return dest; -err: + err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); SSL_SESSION_free(dest); return NULL; } -const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, - unsigned int *len) +const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) { if (len) *len = s->session_id_length; @@ -481,8 +480,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id) data.ssl_version = s->version; memset(data.session_id, 0, sizeof(data.session_id)); if (!PACKET_copy_all(session_id, data.session_id, - sizeof(data.session_id), - &local_len)) { + sizeof(data.session_id), &local_len)) { goto err; } data.session_id_length = local_len; @@ -684,8 +682,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) ret = 1; if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) { - while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > - SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) { + while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) { if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) break; else @@ -757,7 +754,7 @@ void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss) OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity_hint); OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity); @@ -868,7 +865,7 @@ unsigned long SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *s) } void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *s, const unsigned char **tick, - size_t *len) + size_t *len) { *len = s->tlsext_ticklen; if (tick != NULL) @@ -1068,8 +1065,7 @@ static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) } void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, - int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, - SSL_SESSION *sess)) + int (*cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)) { ctx->new_session_cb = cb; } @@ -1098,8 +1094,9 @@ void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, } SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *ssl, - const unsigned char *data, - int len, int *copy) { + const unsigned char + *data, int len, + int *copy) { return ctx->get_session_cb; } @@ -1153,11 +1150,11 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, } void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, - int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie, + int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, + const unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)) { ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb = cb; } -IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, - SSL_SESSION) +IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) diff --git a/ssl/ssl_stat.c b/ssl/ssl_stat.c index 230eadf776..cc0d477544 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_stat.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_stat.c @@ -110,7 +110,6 @@ const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s) } } - const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s) { if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) @@ -335,7 +334,7 @@ const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value) return "bad certificate hash value"; case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: return "unknown PSK identity"; - case TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL: + case TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL: return "no application protocol"; default: return "unknown"; diff --git a/ssl/ssl_txt.c b/ssl/ssl_txt.c index 2da3c0a86b..dbbf9d9e8d 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_txt.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_txt.c @@ -128,11 +128,11 @@ int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x) if (x->tlsext_tick) { if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n TLS session ticket:\n") <= 0) goto err; - if (BIO_dump_indent(bp, (const char *)x->tlsext_tick, x->tlsext_ticklen, 4) + if (BIO_dump_indent + (bp, (const char *)x->tlsext_tick, x->tlsext_ticklen, 4) <= 0) goto err; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (x->compress_meth != 0) { SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; @@ -140,12 +140,11 @@ int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x) if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(x, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &comp, 0)) goto err; if (comp == NULL) { - if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Compression: %d", x->compress_meth) <= - 0) + if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Compression: %d", x->compress_meth) <= 0) goto err; } else { if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n Compression: %d (%s)", comp->id, - comp->name) <= 0) + comp->name) <= 0) goto err; } } diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem.c b/ssl/statem/statem.c index 9bfd29dcd1..3df4ce61e1 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem.c @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ */ /* Sub state machine return values */ -typedef enum { +typedef enum { /* Something bad happened or NBIO */ SUB_STATE_ERROR, /* Sub state finished go to the next sub state */ @@ -165,7 +165,8 @@ void ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(SSL *s) s->statem.hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; } -int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s) { +int ossl_statem_connect(SSL *s) +{ return state_machine(s, 0); } @@ -174,7 +175,9 @@ int ossl_statem_accept(SSL *s) return state_machine(s, 1); } -static void (*get_callback(SSL *s))(const SSL *, int, int) +typedef void (*info_cb) (const SSL *, int, int); + +static info_cb get_callback(SSL *s) { if (s->info_callback != NULL) return s->info_callback; @@ -237,7 +240,6 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) if (!SSL_clear(s)) return -1; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* @@ -282,8 +284,7 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) && - (server - || (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))) { + (server || (s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } @@ -320,7 +321,6 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server) */ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - /* * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO ...but not with * SCTP @@ -471,15 +471,16 @@ static void init_read_state_machine(SSL *s) * control returns to the calling application. When this function is recalled we * will resume in the same state where we left off. */ -static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) { +static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s) +{ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ret, mt; unsigned long len = 0; - int (*transition)(SSL *s, int mt); + int (*transition) (SSL *s, int mt); PACKET pkt; - MSG_PROCESS_RETURN (*process_message)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); - WORK_STATE (*post_process_message)(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); - unsigned long (*max_message_size)(SSL *s); + MSG_PROCESS_RETURN(*process_message) (SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); + WORK_STATE(*post_process_message) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); + unsigned long (*max_message_size) (SSL *s); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; cb = get_callback(s); @@ -620,7 +621,7 @@ static int statem_do_write(SSL *s) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE - || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE) { + || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE) { if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); else @@ -675,10 +676,10 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ret; - WRITE_TRAN (*transition)(SSL *s); - WORK_STATE (*pre_work)(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); - WORK_STATE (*post_work)(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); - int (*construct_message)(SSL *s); + WRITE_TRAN(*transition) (SSL *s); + WORK_STATE(*pre_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); + WORK_STATE(*post_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); + int (*construct_message) (SSL *s); void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; cb = get_callback(s); @@ -807,7 +808,7 @@ int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s) * ServerHello yet then we allow app data */ if (st->hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE - || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO) + || st->hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO) return 1; } else { /* diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem.h b/ssl/statem/statem.h index e2aef15583..2fca39b0db 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem.h +++ b/ssl/statem/statem.h @@ -71,7 +71,6 @@ typedef enum { WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK } WRITE_STATE; - /***************************************************************************** * * * This structure should be considered "opaque" to anything outside of the * @@ -89,13 +88,10 @@ struct ossl_statem_st { OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE hand_state; int in_init; int read_state_first_init; - /* true when we are actually in SSL_accept() or SSL_connect() */ int in_handshake; - /* Should we skip the CertificateVerify message? */ unsigned int no_cert_verify; - int use_timer; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP int in_sctp_read_sock; @@ -103,7 +99,6 @@ struct ossl_statem_st { }; typedef struct ossl_statem_st OSSL_STATEM; - /***************************************************************************** * * * The following macros/functions represent the libssl internal API to the * @@ -126,5 +121,3 @@ __owur int ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(SSL *s); void ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(SSL *s, int read_sock); __owur int ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(SSL *s); #endif - - diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c index 338a23babe..8f250cdc13 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c @@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p); - /* * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? * @@ -77,8 +76,8 @@ static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) { /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION - && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) - || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) + && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) + || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) return 0; return 1; @@ -122,7 +121,7 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ske_expected; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; @@ -153,9 +152,9 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; return 1; } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION - && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL - && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL - && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL + && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL + && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on @@ -166,7 +165,7 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth - & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { + & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; return 1; @@ -175,19 +174,19 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ if (ske_expected - || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) - && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { + || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) + && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST - && cert_req_allowed(s)) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; - return 1; + && cert_req_allowed(s)) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; + return 1; } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; - return 1; + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; + return 1; } } } @@ -207,9 +206,8 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ - if (ske_expected - || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) - && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { + if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) + && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; @@ -280,99 +278,99 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { - case TLS_ST_OK: - /* Renegotiation - fall through */ - case TLS_ST_BEFORE: - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - - case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: - /* - * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what - * we will be sent - */ - return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + switch (st->hand_state) { + case TLS_ST_OK: + /* Renegotiation - fall through */ + case TLS_ST_BEFORE: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: + /* + * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what + * we will be sent + */ + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; - case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; - else - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; + else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: - /* - * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is - * sent, but no verify packet is sent - */ - /* - * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH - * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We - * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's - * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; - } else { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; - } - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; - } - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: + /* + * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is + * sent, but no verify packet is sent + */ + /* + * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH + * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We + * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's + * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; + } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + } + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #else - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; - else - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #endif - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; #endif - case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: - if (s->hit) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - } else { - return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; - } + case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: + if (s->hit) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } else { + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + } - case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: - if (s->hit) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - } else { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - } + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: + if (s->hit) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } else { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; } } @@ -384,7 +382,7 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -433,7 +431,7 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) s->init_num = 0; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; @@ -516,7 +514,7 @@ int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_construct_client_hello(s); @@ -562,46 +560,47 @@ unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { - case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: - return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; + switch (st->hand_state) { + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: + return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; - case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: - return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; + case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: + return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; - case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: - return s->max_cert_list; + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: + return s->max_cert_list; - case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: - return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: + return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; - case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: - return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: + return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; - case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: - /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. - * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are - * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs - */ - return s->max_cert_list; + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + /* + * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In + * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured + * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs + */ + return s->max_cert_list; - case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: - return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: + return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; - case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: - if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - return 3; - return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: + if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + return 3; + return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; - case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: - return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: + return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; - case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: - return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: + return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + break; } return 0; @@ -614,40 +613,40 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { - case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: - return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); + switch (st->hand_state) { + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: + return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); - case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: - return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); + case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: + return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: - return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: + return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: - return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: + return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: - return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: + return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: - return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: - return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: + return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: - return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: + return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: - return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: + return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: - return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: + return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + break; } return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; @@ -661,7 +660,7 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); @@ -711,8 +710,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) goto err; } - if ((sess == NULL) || - !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) || + if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) || /* * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared * "ticket" without a session ID. @@ -742,8 +740,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) } else i = 1; - if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, - sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0) + if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0) goto err; /* Do the message type and length last */ @@ -846,7 +843,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) *(p++) = comp->id; } #endif - *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ + *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ /* TLS extensions */ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { @@ -881,7 +878,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) PACKET cookiepkt; if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; @@ -1145,7 +1142,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); goto f_err; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; @@ -1159,10 +1155,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, - sizeof(sctpauthkey), - labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, - 0) <= 0) + sizeof(sctpauthkey), + labelbuffer, + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) goto err; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), @@ -1194,14 +1189,14 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) { + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { + || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); @@ -1274,9 +1269,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx - && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC || - (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 - && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) { + && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC || + (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 + && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) { x = NULL; al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, @@ -1333,7 +1328,7 @@ static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, - &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { + &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -1384,7 +1379,7 @@ static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) } /* We must check if there is a certificate */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS)) + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); return 1; @@ -1422,8 +1417,7 @@ static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) } p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); - g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), - NULL); + g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL); bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL); if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { @@ -1470,7 +1464,7 @@ static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS)) + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ @@ -1522,7 +1516,7 @@ static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags); - if (curve_nid == 0) { + if (curve_nid == 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); @@ -1689,7 +1683,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) { /* wrong packet length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); goto err; } @@ -1701,12 +1696,12 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), - PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) { + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), + PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); @@ -1724,7 +1719,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } else { /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) - && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { + && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */ @@ -1767,7 +1762,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* get the certificate types */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) { + || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; @@ -1790,7 +1785,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) { + || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); @@ -1819,7 +1814,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* get the CA RDNs */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) { + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; @@ -1827,7 +1822,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) { + || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); @@ -1885,8 +1880,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint; if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) { + || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; @@ -1968,13 +1963,13 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) unsigned int type; if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) - || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { + || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; @@ -2007,7 +2002,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { @@ -2050,7 +2044,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ @@ -2064,7 +2057,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Only applies to renegotiation */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - && s->renegotiate != 0) + && s->renegotiate != 0) return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; else #endif @@ -2379,8 +2372,8 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 - /* Generate session key */ - || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + /* Generate session key */ + || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; @@ -2389,8 +2382,7 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) { - if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer - (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) { + if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) { /* * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key * * would be used @@ -2404,12 +2396,12 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) */ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ukm_hash == NULL - || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { + || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; @@ -2506,7 +2498,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) p = ssl_handshake_start(s); if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) - && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, &p, &pskhdrlen, &al)) + && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, &p, &pskhdrlen, &al)) goto err; if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { @@ -2603,8 +2595,8 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, - sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) + sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) goto err; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, @@ -2917,8 +2909,7 @@ int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) return i; } -int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, - unsigned char *p) +int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p) { int i, j = 0; const SSL_CIPHER *c; diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c b/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c index 3f44175252..46843ce0fc 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c @@ -124,8 +124,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == - (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); + (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); if (s->write_hash) { if (s->enc_write_ctx @@ -230,16 +229,14 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) */ return -1; } - dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, - len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); + dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf-> data[s->init_off]); } - ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], - len); + ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], len); if (ret < 0) { /* * might need to update MTU here, but we don't know which @@ -339,8 +336,7 @@ int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, unsigned long *len) again: ok = dtls_get_reassembled_message(s, &tmplen); - if (tmplen == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT - || tmplen == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) { + if (tmplen == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || tmplen == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) { /* bad fragment received */ goto again; } else if (tmplen <= 0 && !ok) { @@ -386,7 +382,6 @@ int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, unsigned long *len) s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; - s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; *len = s->init_num; @@ -412,8 +407,7 @@ static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) * msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked against max * above */ - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean - (s->init_buf, msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; } @@ -639,8 +633,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, */ if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq || msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL || - (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) - { + (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) { unsigned char devnull[256]; while (frag_len) { @@ -975,8 +968,7 @@ int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s) if (dtls1_retransmit_message(s, (unsigned short) dtls1_get_queue_priority (frag->msg_header.seq, - frag->msg_header.is_ccs), - &found) <= 0) + frag->msg_header.is_ccs), &found) <= 0) return -1; } @@ -1004,7 +996,8 @@ int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) if (is_ccs) { /* For DTLS1_BAD_VER the header length is non-standard */ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + - ((s->version==DTLS1_BAD_VER)?3:DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) + ((s->version == + DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 3 : DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) == (unsigned int)s->init_num); } else { OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + @@ -1046,8 +1039,7 @@ int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) return 1; } -int -dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, int *found) +int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, int *found) { int ret; /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */ @@ -1106,7 +1098,8 @@ dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, int *found) s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress; s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session; DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(&s->rlayer, - frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch); + frag->msg_header. + saved_retransmit_state.epoch); ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ? SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); @@ -1138,8 +1131,7 @@ void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s) void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, unsigned long len, - unsigned long frag_off, - unsigned long frag_len) + unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) { if (frag_off == 0) { s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; @@ -1166,8 +1158,7 @@ dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, } static void -dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, - unsigned long frag_len) +dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) { struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; @@ -1189,8 +1180,7 @@ static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) return p; } -void -dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) +void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) { memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); msg_hdr->type = *(data++); @@ -1200,5 +1190,3 @@ dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off); n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len); } - - diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c index 7cf84c70f1..fac9684ce2 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c @@ -138,13 +138,13 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER - && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) - || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER - && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) + || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER + && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + goto f_err; } } else { if (remain != 0) { @@ -349,16 +349,18 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) do { while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, - &p[s->init_num], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, 0); + &p[s->init_num], + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, + 0); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; return 0; } if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* - * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur - * in the middle of a handshake message. - */ + * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur + * in the middle of a handshake message. + */ if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, @@ -428,7 +430,7 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) goto f_err; } if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, - (int)l + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + (int)l + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } @@ -490,11 +492,11 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) return 0; } if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, + s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } else { if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, - s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); *len = 0; @@ -522,8 +524,7 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) { - if (pk == NULL && - (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) + if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) return -1; switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { @@ -637,8 +638,8 @@ static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) typedef struct { int version; - const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth)(void); - const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth)(void); + const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); + const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); } version_info; #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION @@ -647,26 +648,26 @@ typedef struct { static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 - { TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method }, + {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, #else - { TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, + {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 - { TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method }, + {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, #else - { TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, + {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 - { TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method }, + {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, #else - { TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, + {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 - { SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method }, + {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, #else - { SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, + {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif - { 0, NULL, NULL }, + {0, NULL, NULL}, }; #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION @@ -675,18 +676,18 @@ static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 - { DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method }, + {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, #else - { DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, + {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 - { DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method }, - { DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL }, + {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, + {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, #else - { DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, - { DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL }, + {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, + {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, #endif - { 0, NULL, NULL }, + {0, NULL, NULL}, }; /* @@ -707,7 +708,7 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && - version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) + version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) @@ -794,8 +795,7 @@ int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) } for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { - if (vent->smeth != NULL && - ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) + if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) return s->version == vent->version; } return 0; @@ -995,7 +995,8 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. */ -int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) +int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, + int *max_version) { int version; int hole; diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h b/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h index 9f7ec88b6b..a46e6c7971 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h @@ -96,13 +96,12 @@ __owur int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey); __owur int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); __owur int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s); __owur int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s); -__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, - PACKET *pkt); +__owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s); -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG __owur int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s); -# endif +#endif __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); /* some server-only functions */ @@ -119,7 +118,7 @@ __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); __owur WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst); __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); -# endif +#endif __owur int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s); diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c index d662163944..ae1c65d9ae 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c @@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ * OTHERWISE. */ - #include <stdio.h> #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" @@ -64,8 +63,9 @@ static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, - int sslv2format, int *al); + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) + **skp, int sslv2format, + int *al); /* * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) * the server certificate contains the server's public key for * key exchange. */ - if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE) + if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) /* * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if * provided @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) #endif - ) { + ) { return 1; } @@ -284,11 +284,11 @@ static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) * RFC 2246): */ && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) - /* - * ... except when the application insists on - * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts - * this for SSL 3) - */ + /* + * ... except when the application insists on + * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts + * this for SSL 3) + */ || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_BEFORE: - /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */; + /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case TLS_ST_OK: @@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified - && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) + && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ /* normal PSK or SRP */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & - (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { + (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; @@ -549,8 +549,9 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, - sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, + 0) <= 0) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } @@ -573,7 +574,8 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } #endif if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, - SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { + SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) + { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } @@ -786,11 +788,10 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if ( /* Is this SCTP? */ - BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - /* Are we renegotiating? */ - && s->renegotiate - && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { + if ( /* Is this SCTP? */ + BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + /* Are we renegotiating? */ + && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); @@ -847,8 +848,8 @@ int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s) } unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf, - unsigned char *cookie, - unsigned char cookie_len) + unsigned char *cookie, + unsigned char cookie_len) { unsigned int msg_len; unsigned char *p; @@ -884,10 +885,9 @@ int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) } len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH], - s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); + s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); - dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, - len); + dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, len); len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; /* number of bytes to write */ @@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) - || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { + || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { /* * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record @@ -1012,8 +1012,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) PACKET challenge; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { + || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; @@ -1080,15 +1080,15 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0) - return 1; + return 1; } } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; } /* Could be empty. */ extensions = *pkt; @@ -1099,16 +1099,16 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie), - PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) { + PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == + 0) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; /* else cookie verification succeeded */ } - /* default verification */ - } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, - s->d1->cookie_len)) { + /* default verification */ + } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; @@ -1183,8 +1183,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) id = s->session->cipher->id; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", - sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); + fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); #endif for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); @@ -1405,7 +1404,8 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); if (rv == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (rv < 0) { @@ -1414,17 +1414,19 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } - cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); + cipher = + ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); if (cipher == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, - ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); + ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); if (s->session->not_resumable) /* do not send a session ticket */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; @@ -1480,7 +1482,7 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) */ if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto f_err; } } @@ -1799,7 +1801,7 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - /* + /*- * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here @@ -1811,7 +1813,7 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) n += 2 + nr[i]; } - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) { if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) { @@ -1866,7 +1868,7 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - /* + /*- * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length * as the prime @@ -1929,13 +1931,13 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 - || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { + || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 + || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]), + (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; @@ -2017,10 +2019,8 @@ int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s) for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean - (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; @@ -2066,8 +2066,7 @@ static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, - SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); return 0; } @@ -2078,7 +2077,7 @@ static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, - psk, sizeof(psk)); + psk, sizeof(psk)); if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -2115,7 +2114,6 @@ static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) #endif } - static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA @@ -2174,8 +2172,7 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ - if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, - sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) + if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) goto err; /* @@ -2203,7 +2200,7 @@ static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & - constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); + constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); } @@ -2419,7 +2416,7 @@ static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) const unsigned char *data; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { + || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); return 0; @@ -2428,8 +2425,7 @@ static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; } - if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 - || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { + if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); return 0; @@ -2516,10 +2512,9 @@ static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, - &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED - || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE - || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { + if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, + &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; @@ -2571,7 +2566,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ @@ -2597,7 +2593,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto err; } else { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); goto err; } @@ -2628,8 +2625,9 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, - sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, + 0) <= 0) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR;; } @@ -2641,13 +2639,13 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B) - /* Is this SCTP? */ - && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - /* Are we renegotiating? */ - && s->renegotiate - /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */ - && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify) - && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { + /* Is this SCTP? */ + && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + /* Are we renegotiating? */ + && s->renegotiate + /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */ + && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify) + && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); @@ -2660,8 +2658,9 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) #endif if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { - /* No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need the - * handshake_buffer + /* + * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need + * the handshake_buffer */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); @@ -2771,7 +2770,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) - || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { + || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; @@ -2797,7 +2796,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST { int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); @@ -2860,8 +2858,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) - || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; @@ -2869,7 +2867,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { + || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); @@ -3065,9 +3063,10 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) hctx, 1); if (ret == 0) { - l2n(0, p); /* timeout */ - s2n(0, p); /* length */ - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s))) + l2n(0, p); /* timeout */ + s2n(0, p); /* length */ + if (!ssl_set_handshake_header + (s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s))) goto err; OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); @@ -3205,8 +3204,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto err; } - if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, - &next_proto_len)) { + if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) { s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; goto err; } @@ -3214,7 +3212,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; -err: + err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } @@ -3225,8 +3223,7 @@ err: STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, - int sslv2format, int *al - ) + int sslv2format, int *al) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; @@ -3276,7 +3273,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them. */ if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0') - continue; + continue; /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c index 70f70d146c..4aa5ddd18a 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, goto err; ret = 1; - err: + err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return ret; } @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret, *mac_secret_size); if (mac_key == NULL - || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) { + || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err2; @@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) } } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { int taglen; - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8|SSL_AES256CCM8)) + if (s->s3->tmp. + new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) taglen = 8; else taglen = 16; @@ -377,8 +378,7 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash; s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; - num = - EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); + num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); num *= 2; ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); @@ -449,8 +449,7 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) return (ret); } -int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, - unsigned char *out) +int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) { int hashlen; unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; @@ -477,10 +476,10 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) { unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; int hashlen; - /* Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): - * this won't affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer - * at the same point (after client key exchange and before certificate - * verify) + /* + * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this wont + * affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same + * point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify) */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) return -1; @@ -611,8 +610,7 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, goto ret; err1: - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, - SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); rv = 0; goto ret; err2: diff --git a/ssl/t1_ext.c b/ssl/t1_ext.c index 2db949d8ac..a8e9f9a9cd 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_ext.c +++ b/ssl/t1_ext.c @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ #include <openssl/ct.h> #include "ssl_locl.h" - /* Find a custom extension from the list. */ static custom_ext_method *custom_ext_find(const custom_ext_methods *exts, unsigned int ext_type) @@ -68,8 +67,7 @@ int custom_ext_parse(SSL *s, int server, if (!meth->parse_cb) return 1; - return meth->parse_cb(s, ext_type, ext_data, ext_size, al, - meth->parse_arg); + return meth->parse_cb(s, ext_type, ext_data, ext_size, al, meth->parse_arg); } /* @@ -139,7 +137,7 @@ int custom_exts_copy(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src) if (src->meths_count) { dst->meths = OPENSSL_memdup(src->meths, - sizeof(custom_ext_method) * src->meths_count); + sizeof(custom_ext_method) * src->meths_count); if (dst->meths == NULL) return 0; dst->meths_count = src->meths_count; @@ -214,8 +212,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg, - custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, - void *parse_arg) + custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* @@ -235,8 +232,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg, - custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, - void *parse_arg) + custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg) { return custom_ext_meth_add(&ctx->cert->srv_ext, ext_type, add_cb, free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg); diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index ca4e7d6956..938f8be15f 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -209,7 +209,6 @@ static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = { 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ }; - static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = { 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 @@ -250,8 +249,7 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.) */ static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, - const unsigned char **pcurves, - size_t *num_curves) + const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves) { size_t pcurveslen = 0; if (sess) { @@ -384,8 +382,7 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */ return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; if (!tls1_get_curvelist - (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, - &num_pref)) + (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref)) return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; /* @@ -396,7 +393,7 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) supp = eccurves_all; num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; } else if (num_pref == 0 && - (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { + (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { pref = eccurves_all; num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; } @@ -489,8 +486,7 @@ static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) } /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */ -int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, - const char *str) +int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str) { nid_cb_st ncb; ncb.nidcnt = 0; @@ -716,19 +712,19 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ +# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ #else # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ +# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ #else # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC -# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ +# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */ #else # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, #endif @@ -746,8 +742,8 @@ static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001, - TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256, - TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512 + TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256, + TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512 #endif }; @@ -862,8 +858,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, } /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, - EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), - (void *)sig)) { + EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return 0; } @@ -890,13 +885,13 @@ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0; ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK); ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver); -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ if (!s->psk_client_callback) { s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK; } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; @@ -921,10 +916,10 @@ int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op) if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0) return 1; if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) - || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) + || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) return 1; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) - || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) + || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) return 1; return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c); @@ -937,7 +932,8 @@ static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s) return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL); } -static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) { +static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) +{ unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1); unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2); if (u1 < u2) @@ -956,7 +952,8 @@ static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) { * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error * occurred. */ -static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) { +static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) +{ PACKET extensions = *packet; size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0; unsigned int *extension_types = NULL; @@ -1030,7 +1027,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) - || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) { + || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) { using_ecc = 1; break; } @@ -1084,8 +1081,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, */ if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 - || (size_str = - strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) + || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; /* extension type and length */ @@ -1191,7 +1187,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s2n(curves_list_len, ret); ret += curves_list_len; } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (tls_use_ticket(s)) { int ticklen; @@ -1243,7 +1239,6 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s2n(salglen, etmp); ret += salglen; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { int i; @@ -1491,7 +1486,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves * extension */ -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) { if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) @@ -1499,7 +1494,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); s2n(0, ret); } else { - /* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket later */ + /* + * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket + * later + */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; } @@ -1509,7 +1507,6 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); s2n(0, ret); } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { int el; @@ -1664,8 +1661,7 @@ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, - &s->s3->alpn_proposed, - &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { + &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -1773,7 +1769,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt) s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, ext_len); } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of @@ -1813,7 +1809,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt); -# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); @@ -1962,8 +1958,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { PACKET ec_point_format_list; - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, - &ec_point_format_list) + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { return 0; } @@ -1971,7 +1966,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!s->hit) { if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, - &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) { + &s-> + session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -1980,8 +1976,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) PACKET elliptic_curve_list; /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, - &elliptic_curve_list) + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list) || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) { return 0; @@ -1990,18 +1985,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!s->hit) { if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list, &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, - &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) { + &s-> + session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension), PACKET_remaining(&extension), - s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { + s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) + { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2014,7 +2011,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } - if (!s->hit) { + if (!s->hit) { if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs), PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) { return 0; @@ -2025,12 +2022,12 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) { return 0; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { const unsigned char *ext_data; PACKET responder_id_list, exts; - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list)) + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 + (&extension, &responder_id_list)) return 0; while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { @@ -2099,7 +2096,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) unsigned int hbtype; if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype) - || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) { + || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2177,7 +2174,9 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */ + /* + * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. + */ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2230,7 +2229,7 @@ static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt) while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol) - || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) + || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) return 0; } @@ -2278,7 +2277,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) PACKET spkt; if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size) - || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size)) + || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size)) goto ri_check; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) @@ -2300,7 +2299,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length; if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length) - || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { + || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2323,7 +2322,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && @@ -2338,8 +2337,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { + } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { /* * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status * request message. @@ -2390,10 +2388,10 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } - if (s-> - ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, - size, - s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != + if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, + size, + s-> + ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; @@ -2423,9 +2421,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len) - || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len - || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len) - || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) { + || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len) + || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2473,8 +2470,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) { + } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) { s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!s->hit) s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; @@ -2495,7 +2491,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { if (s->tlsext_hostname) { if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { - s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); + s->session->tlsext_hostname = + OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; @@ -2534,7 +2531,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); return 0; - } + } } return 1; @@ -2593,6 +2590,7 @@ static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) return 1; } } + /* Initialise digests to default values */ void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s) { @@ -2743,7 +2741,7 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) } } ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = @@ -2864,7 +2862,7 @@ int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, unsigned int type, size; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) { + || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) { /* Shouldn't ever happen */ retv = -1; goto end; @@ -2938,7 +2936,7 @@ int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, } if (have_ticket == 0) retv = 0; -end: + end: return retv; } @@ -3005,11 +3003,12 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, - etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0) { + || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, + tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, + etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= + 0) { goto err; - } + } } /* * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity @@ -3022,7 +3021,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, eticklen -= mlen; /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 - || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { + || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { goto err; } HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); @@ -3035,8 +3034,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); - if (sdec == NULL - || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { + if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_free(sdec); return -1; @@ -3074,7 +3072,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. */ return 2; -err: + err: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); return ret; @@ -3128,8 +3126,7 @@ static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) return NID_undef; } -int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, - const EVP_MD *md) +int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) { int sig_id, md_id; if (!md) @@ -3164,9 +3161,11 @@ static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = { {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}, - {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411}, - {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256}, - {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, + TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, + TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512}, }; static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg) @@ -3175,8 +3174,7 @@ static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg) if (hash_alg == 0) return NULL; - for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) - { + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) { if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg) return tls12_md_info + i; } @@ -3210,7 +3208,7 @@ static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: return SSL_PKEY_ECC; #endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001: return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; @@ -3219,7 +3217,7 @@ static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512: return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; -# endif +#endif } return -1; } @@ -3243,8 +3241,7 @@ static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, } if (psignhash_nid) { if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef - || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, - sign_nid) <= 0) + || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0) *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; } } @@ -3470,14 +3467,16 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL) pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1(); #endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL) pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94); if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL) - pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256); + pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = + EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256); if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL) - pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512); -# endif + pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = + EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512); +#endif } return 1; } @@ -3598,8 +3597,7 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client); } -int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, - int client) +int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client) { unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr; int rhash, rsign; @@ -3945,7 +3943,6 @@ int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) { diff --git a/ssl/t1_reneg.c b/ssl/t1_reneg.c index 15a4e27a15..01dc403bdb 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_reneg.c +++ b/ssl/t1_reneg.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) /* Parse the length byte */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &d, ilen)) { + || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &d, ilen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; @@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) - || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, - s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) { + || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; @@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) - || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished, - s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) { + || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished, + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; diff --git a/ssl/t1_trce.c b/ssl/t1_trce.c index ab6cfa2d6c..00632e5820 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_trce.c +++ b/ssl/t1_trce.c @@ -415,13 +415,13 @@ static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_ciphers_tbl[] = { {0xC0AD, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM"}, {0xC0AE, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"}, {0xC0AF, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8"}, - {0xCCA8, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305" }, - {0xCCA9, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305" }, - {0xCCAA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305" }, - {0xCCAB, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305" }, - {0xCCAC, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305" }, - {0xCCAD, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305" }, - {0xCCAE, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305" }, + {0xCCA8, "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305"}, + {0xCCA9, "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305"}, + {0xCCAA, "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305"}, + {0xCCAB, "TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305"}, + {0xCCAC, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305"}, + {0xCCAD, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305"}, + {0xCCAE, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305"}, {0xFEFE, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA"}, {0xFEFF, "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA"}, }; @@ -452,9 +452,9 @@ static ssl_trace_tbl ssl_exts_tbl[] = { {TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, "heartbeat"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, "session_ticket"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, "renegotiate"}, -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG {TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, "next_proto_neg"}, -#endif +# endif {TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, "signed_certificate_timestamps"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, "padding"}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, "encrypt_then_mac"}, @@ -657,8 +657,7 @@ static int ssl_print_extension(BIO *bio, int indent, int server, int extype, xlen = ext[0]; if (extlen != xlen + 1) return 0; - return ssl_trace_list(bio, indent + 2, - ext + 1, xlen, 1, ssl_point_tbl); + return ssl_trace_list(bio, indent + 2, ext + 1, xlen, 1, ssl_point_tbl); case TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves: if (extlen < 2) @@ -666,8 +665,7 @@ static int ssl_print_extension(BIO *bio, int indent, int server, int extype, xlen = (ext[0] << 8) | ext[1]; if (extlen != xlen + 2) return 0; - return ssl_trace_list(bio, indent + 2, - ext + 2, xlen, 2, ssl_curve_tbl); + return ssl_trace_list(bio, indent + 2, ext + 2, xlen, 2, ssl_curve_tbl); case TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms: @@ -705,8 +703,7 @@ static int ssl_print_extension(BIO *bio, int indent, int server, int extype, ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 4, "client_verify_data", ext, xlen); if (server) { ext += xlen; - ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 4, - "server_verify_data", ext, xlen); + ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 4, "server_verify_data", ext, xlen); } } else { BIO_indent(bio, indent + 4, 80); @@ -758,8 +755,7 @@ static int ssl_print_extensions(BIO *bio, int indent, int server, if (msglen < extlen + 4) return 0; msg += 4; - if (!ssl_print_extension(bio, indent + 2, server, - extype, msg, extlen)) + if (!ssl_print_extension(bio, indent + 2, server, extype, msg, extlen)) return 0; msg += extlen; msglen -= extlen + 4; @@ -823,8 +819,7 @@ static int ssl_print_client_hello(BIO *bio, SSL *ssl, int indent, } static int dtls_print_hello_vfyrequest(BIO *bio, int indent, - const unsigned char *msg, - size_t msglen) + const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen) { if (!ssl_print_version(bio, indent, "server_version", &msg, &msglen)) return 0; @@ -928,8 +923,7 @@ static int ssl_print_client_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl, "EncyptedPreMasterSecret", msg, msglen); } else { if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, - "EncyptedPreMasterSecret", 2, - &msg, &msglen)) + "EncyptedPreMasterSecret", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; } break; @@ -967,8 +961,7 @@ static int ssl_print_server_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl, switch (id) { case SSL_kRSA: - if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "rsa_modulus", 2, - &msg, &msglen)) + if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "rsa_modulus", 2, &msg, &msglen)) return 0; if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "rsa_exponent", 2, &msg, &msglen)) @@ -985,7 +978,7 @@ static int ssl_print_server_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl, return 0; break; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_kECDHE: case SSL_kECDHEPSK: if (msglen < 1) @@ -1011,7 +1004,7 @@ static int ssl_print_server_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl, return 0; } break; -#endif +# endif case SSL_kPSK: case SSL_kRSAPSK: @@ -1292,8 +1285,7 @@ void SSL_trace(int write_p, int version, int content_type, if (write_p == 2) { BIO_puts(bio, "Session "); ssl_print_hex(bio, 0, - ssl_trace_str(content_type, ssl_crypto_tbl), - msg, msglen); + ssl_trace_str(content_type, ssl_crypto_tbl), msg, msglen); return; } switch (content_type) { diff --git a/ssl/tls_srp.c b/ssl/tls_srp.c index 08e22df3ef..06e5e5b669 100644 --- a/ssl/tls_srp.c +++ b/ssl/tls_srp.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include "ssl_locl.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -#include <openssl/srp.h> +# include <openssl/srp.h> int SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx) { @@ -325,8 +325,7 @@ int srp_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s) goto err; if (! (passwd = - s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback(s, - s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg))) + s->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback(s, s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg))) goto err; if ((x = SRP_Calc_x(s->srp_ctx.s, s->srp_ctx.login, passwd)) == NULL) goto err; @@ -388,8 +387,7 @@ int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s) s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a); OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); - if (! - (s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a, s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.g))) + if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a, s->srp_ctx.N, s->srp_ctx.g))) return 0; return 1; diff --git a/util/indent.pro b/util/indent.pro index 2d44e6e821..932c9b0f00 100644 --- a/util/indent.pro +++ b/util/indent.pro @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ -i4 -il1 -ip0 --l78 +-l80 -lp -nbad -nbc @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ -T BIGNUM -T BIO -T BIO_ACCEPT +-T BIO_ADDR -T BIO_ASN1_BUF_CTX -T BIO_ASN1_EX_FUNCS -T BIO_B64_CTX @@ -362,6 +363,7 @@ -T OPENSSL_PSTRING -T OPENSSL_STRING -T OPENSSL_STRING +-T OSSL_ASYNC_FD -T OTHERNAME -T P256_POINT -T P256_POINT_AFFINE @@ -442,6 +444,7 @@ -T SSL_COMP -T SSL_CONF_CTX -T SSL_CTX +-T SSL_DANE -T SSL_EXCERT -T SSL_METHOD -T SSL_SESSION @@ -727,3 +730,5 @@ -T ASYNC_JOB -T intmax_t -T uintmax_t +-T pqueue +-T danetls_record |