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| author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2002-08-23 00:02:11 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2002-08-23 00:02:11 +0000 |
| commit | 41ab00bedf7259c60555a080219ed68e1afb8a22 (patch) | |
| tree | de4d1dfb1d2d362b8c7b5ef97a550943bfa8038f /crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c | |
| parent | fc85ac20c7540c2db46235f32b3505db6ca7f304 (diff) | |
| download | openssl-41ab00bedf7259c60555a080219ed68e1afb8a22.tar.gz | |
Reinstate the check for invalid length BIT STRINGS,
which was effectively bypassed in the ASN1 changed.
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c index 0fc1f421e2..f87c08793a 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c @@ -913,10 +913,10 @@ static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass, char *i ctx->ptag = ptag; ctx->hdrlen = p - q; ctx->valid = 1; - /* If definite length, length + header can't exceed total - * amount of data available. + /* If definite length, and no error, length + + * header can't exceed total amount of data available. */ - if(!(i & 1) && ((plen + ctx->hdrlen) > len)) { + if(!(i & 0x81) && ((plen + ctx->hdrlen) > len)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); asn1_tlc_clear(ctx); return 0; |