Rename RSA_eay_xxx to rsa_ossl_xxx

Final part of flushing out SSLEay API's.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 922 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
deleted file mode 100644
index a09fbf05b4..0000000000
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,922 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "internal/bn_int.h"
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-#ifndef RSA_NULL
-
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa,
-                           BN_CTX *ctx);
-static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
-static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
-static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth = {
-    "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
-    RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
-    RSA_eay_public_decrypt,     /* signature verification */
-    RSA_eay_private_encrypt,    /* signing */
-    RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
-    RSA_eay_mod_exp,
-    BN_mod_exp_mont,            /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery
-                                 * if e == 3 */
-    RSA_eay_init,
-    RSA_eay_finish,
-    RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD,       /* flags */
-    NULL,
-    0,                          /* rsa_sign */
-    0,                          /* rsa_verify */
-    NULL                        /* rsa_keygen */
-};
-
-const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void)
-{
-    return (&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
-}
-
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-{
-    BIGNUM *f, *ret;
-    int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
-    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-
-    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
-    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
-        if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-            return -1;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-    if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    switch (padding) {
-    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
-        break;
-    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
-        break;
-    case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
-        break;
-    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-        break;
-    default:
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (i <= 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
-        /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,
-               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
-            goto err;
-
-    if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
-                               rsa->_method_mod_n))
-        goto err;
-
-    /*
-     * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
-     * modulus
-     */
-    j = BN_num_bytes(ret);
-    i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j]));
-    for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
-        to[k] = 0;
-
-    r = num;
- err:
-    if (ctx != NULL)
-        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
-    return (r);
-}
-
-static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    BN_BLINDING *ret;
-    int got_write_lock = 0;
-    CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
-
-    CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-
-    if (rsa->blinding == NULL) {
-        CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-        got_write_lock = 1;
-
-        if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
-            rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
-    }
-
-    ret = rsa->blinding;
-    if (ret == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
-    if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) {
-        /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
-
-        *local = 1;
-    } else {
-        /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
-
-        /*
-         * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the
-         * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and
-         * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING
-         */
-        *local = 0;
-
-        if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) {
-            if (!got_write_lock) {
-                CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-                CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-                got_write_lock = 1;
-            }
-
-            if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
-                rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
-        }
-        ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
-    }
-
- err:
-    if (got_write_lock)
-        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-    else
-        CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
-                                BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    if (unblind == NULL)
-        /*
-         * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING.
-         */
-        return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
-    else {
-        /*
-         * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING.
-         */
-        int ret;
-        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-        ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
-        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-        return ret;
-    }
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
-                               BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    /*
-     * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
-     * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING
-     * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
-     * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and
-     * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe
-     * to access the blinding without a lock.
-     */
-    return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
-}
-
-/* signing */
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-{
-    BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
-    int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
-    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-    int local_blinding = 0;
-    /*
-     * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
-     * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
-     * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
-     */
-    BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
-    BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-    if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    switch (padding) {
-    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
-        break;
-    case RSA_X931_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen);
-        break;
-    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-        break;
-    case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-    default:
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (i <= 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
-        /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
-               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
-        blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
-        if (blinding == NULL) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (blinding != NULL) {
-        if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    }
-
-    if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
-        ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
-         (rsa->q != NULL) &&
-         (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
-        if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    } else {
-        BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL;
-
-        if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-            local_d = d = BN_new();
-            if (d == NULL) {
-                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                goto err;
-            }
-            BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-        } else
-            d = rsa->d;
-
-        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) {
-                BN_free(local_d);
-                goto err;
-            }
-
-        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
-                                   rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
-            BN_free(local_d);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        BN_free(local_d);
-    }
-
-    if (blinding)
-        if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
-            goto err;
-
-    if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
-        BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
-        if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
-            res = f;
-        else
-            res = ret;
-    } else
-        res = ret;
-
-    /*
-     * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
-     * modulus
-     */
-    j = BN_num_bytes(res);
-    i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j]));
-    for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
-        to[k] = 0;
-
-    r = num;
- err:
-    if (ctx != NULL)
-        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
-    return (r);
-}
-
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-{
-    BIGNUM *f, *ret;
-    int j, num = 0, r = -1;
-    unsigned char *p;
-    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-    int local_blinding = 0;
-    /*
-     * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
-     * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
-     * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
-     */
-    BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
-    BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-    if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
-     * top '0' bytes
-     */
-    if (flen > num) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
-               RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* make data into a big number */
-    if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
-               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
-        blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
-        if (blinding == NULL) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (blinding != NULL) {
-        if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* do the decrypt */
-    if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
-        ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
-         (rsa->q != NULL) &&
-         (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
-        if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    } else {
-        BIGNUM *d = NULL, *local_d = NULL;
-
-        if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-            local_d = d = BN_new();
-            if (d == NULL) {
-                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                goto err;
-            }
-            BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-        } else
-            d = rsa->d;
-
-        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) {
-                BN_free(local_d);
-                goto err;
-            }
-        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
-                                   rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
-            BN_free(local_d);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        BN_free(local_d);
-    }
-
-    if (blinding)
-        if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
-            goto err;
-
-    p = buf;
-    j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);      /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
-
-    switch (padding) {
-    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
-        break;
-    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
-        break;
-    case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
-        break;
-    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num);
-        break;
-    default:
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (r < 0)
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
- err:
-    if (ctx != NULL)
-        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
-    return (r);
-}
-
-/* signature verification */
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-{
-    BIGNUM *f, *ret;
-    int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-    unsigned char *p;
-    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-
-    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
-    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
-        if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-            return -1;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-    if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
-     * top '0' bytes
-     */
-    if (flen > num) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,
-               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
-            goto err;
-
-    if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
-                               rsa->_method_mod_n))
-        goto err;
-
-    if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((bn_get_words(ret)[0] & 0xf) != 12))
-        if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret))
-            goto err;
-
-    p = buf;
-    i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);
-
-    switch (padding) {
-    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num);
-        break;
-    case RSA_X931_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
-        break;
-    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num);
-        break;
-    default:
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (r < 0)
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
- err:
-    if (ctx != NULL)
-        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
-    return (r);
-}
-
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
-    BIGNUM *local_dmp1, *local_dmq1, *local_c, *local_r1;
-    BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;
-    int ret = 0;
-
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
-    local_dmp1 = BN_new();
-    local_dmq1 = BN_new();
-    local_c = BN_new();
-    local_r1 = BN_new();
-    if (local_dmp1 == NULL
-            || local_dmq1 == NULL || local_c == NULL || local_r1 == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
-    {
-        BIGNUM *local_p = NULL, *local_q = NULL;
-        BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
-
-        /*
-         * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
-         * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
-         */
-        if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-            local_p = p = BN_new();
-            if (p == NULL)
-                goto err;
-            BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
-            local_q = q = BN_new();
-            if (q == NULL) {
-                BN_free(local_p);
-                goto err;
-            }
-            BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-        } else {
-            p = rsa->p;
-            q = rsa->q;
-        }
-
-        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)
-                || !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q,
-                                           CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) {
-                BN_free(local_p);
-                BN_free(local_q);
-                goto err;
-            }
-        }
-        BN_free(local_p);
-        BN_free(local_q);
-    }
-
-    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
-            goto err;
-
-    /* compute I mod q */
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-        c = local_c;
-        BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-        if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    } else {
-        if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-        dmq1 = local_dmq1;
-        BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-    } else
-        dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
-    if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q))
-        goto err;
-
-    /* compute I mod p */
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-        c = local_c;
-        BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-        if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    } else {
-        if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-        dmp1 = local_dmp1;
-        BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-    } else
-        dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
-    if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p))
-        goto err;
-
-    if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
-        goto err;
-    /*
-     * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the
-     * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size
-     */
-    if (BN_is_negative(r0))
-        if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
-            goto err;
-
-    if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx))
-        goto err;
-
-    /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-        pr1 = local_r1;
-        BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-    } else
-        pr1 = r1;
-    if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx))
-        goto err;
-
-    /*
-     * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p'
-     * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can
-     * break the private key operations: the following second correction
-     * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen
-     * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve]
-     */
-    if (BN_is_negative(r0))
-        if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
-            goto err;
-    if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx))
-        goto err;
-    if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
-        goto err;
-
-    if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
-        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
-                                   rsa->_method_mod_n))
-            goto err;
-        /*
-         * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
-         * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
-         * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for
-         * absolute equality, just congruency.
-         */
-        if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
-            goto err;
-        if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
-            goto err;
-        if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
-            if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n))
-                goto err;
-        if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
-            /*
-             * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
-             * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and
-             * return that instead.
-             */
-
-            BIGNUM *local_d = NULL;
-            BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-
-            if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
-                local_d = d = BN_new();
-                if (d == NULL)
-                    goto err;
-                BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-            } else
-                d = rsa->d;
-            if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx,
-                                       rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
-                BN_free(local_d);
-                goto err;
-            }
-
-            BN_free(local_d);
-        }
-    }
-    ret = 1;
- err:
-    BN_free(local_dmp1);
-    BN_free(local_dmq1);
-    BN_free(local_c);
-    BN_free(local_r1);
-    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    return (ret);
-}
-
-static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
-{
-    rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
-    return (1);
-}
-
-static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
-{
-    BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
-    BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
-    BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
-    return (1);
-}
-
-#endif