Make s_client/s_server-style cert verification output configurable by

command line, and make the peer-authentication similarly configurable.

1 files changed, 65 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/demos/tunala/cb.c b/demos/tunala/cb.c
index ebc69bc690..37a474e37e 100644
--- a/demos/tunala/cb.c
+++ b/demos/tunala/cb.c
@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
 
 /* For callbacks generating output, here are their file-descriptors. */
 static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_info = NULL;
+static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_verify = NULL;
+
+/* Other static rubbish (to mirror s_cb.c where required) */
+static int verify_depth = 10;
+static int verify_error = X509_V_OK;
 
 /* This function is largely borrowed from the one used in OpenSSL's "s_client"
  * and "s_server" utilities. */
@@ -21,12 +26,12 @@ void cb_ssl_info(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
 	str2 = SSL_state_string_long(s);
 
 	if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)
-		fprintf(stderr, "%s:%s\n", str1, str2);
+		fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:%s\n", str1, str2);
 	else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
 		if (ret == 0)
-			fprintf(stderr, "%s:failed in %s\n", str1, str2);
+			fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:failed in %s\n", str1, str2);
 		else if (ret < 0)
-			fprintf(stderr, "%s:error in %s\n", str1, str2);
+			fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:error in %s\n", str1, str2);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -35,5 +40,62 @@ void cb_ssl_info_set_output(FILE *fp)
 	fp_cb_ssl_info = fp;
 }
 
+/* Stolen wholesale from apps/s_cb.c :-) */
+int cb_ssl_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	char buf[256];
+	X509 *err_cert;
+	int err, depth;
+	BIO *bio;
+
+	if(!fp_cb_ssl_verify)
+		return ok;
+	/* There's no <damned>FILE*</damned> version of ASN1_TIME_print */
+	bio = BIO_new_fp(fp_cb_ssl_verify, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+	err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+	err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+	depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+
+	X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
+	fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "depth=%d %s\n", depth, buf);
+	if(!ok) {
+		fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify,"verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
+			X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+		if(verify_depth >= depth) {
+			ok = 1;
+			verify_error = X509_V_OK;
+		} else {
+			ok=0;
+			verify_error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
+		}
+	}
+	switch (ctx->error) {
+	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+		X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert),
+				buf, 256);
+		fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "issuer= %s\n", buf);
+		break;
+	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+		fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "notBefore=");
+		ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert));
+		fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "\n");
+		break;
+	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+		fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "notAfter=");
+		ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert));
+		fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "\n");
+		break;
+	}
+	fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "verify return:%d\n",ok);
+	return ok;
+}
+
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_output(FILE *fp)
+{
+	fp_cb_ssl_verify = fp;
+}
+
 #endif /* !defined(NO_OPENSSL) */