Updated version of gost engine.

1 files changed, 125 insertions, 105 deletions

diff --git a/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c b/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c
index 120ec69d3c..7b81c23f92 100644
--- a/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c
+++ b/engines/ccgost/gost2001_keyx.c
@@ -13,49 +13,48 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include "gost89.h"
 #include "gosthash.h"
-#include "gost_asn1.h"
 #include "e_gost_err.h"
-#include "keywrap.h"
-#include "crypt.h"
-#include "sign.h"
-#include "pmeth.h"
-#include "tools.h"
-#include "gostkeyx.h"
+#include "gost_keywrap.h"
+#include "gost_lcl.h"
 
 /* Transform ECDH shared key into little endian as required by Cryptocom
  * key exchange */
-static void *make_key_le(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen) {
+static void *make_key_le(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen)
+	{
 	const char* inbuf= in;
 	char* outbuf= out;
 	int i;
-	if (*outlen < inlen) {
-			return NULL;
-	}
-	for (i=0;i<inlen;i++) {
+	if (*outlen < inlen)
+		{
+		return NULL;
+		}
+	for (i=0;i<inlen;i++)
+		{
 		outbuf[inlen-1-i]=inbuf[i];
-	}
+		}
 	*outlen = inlen;
 	return out;
-}	
+	}	
 
 /* Create gost 2001 ephemeral key with same parameters as peer key */
-static EC_KEY *make_ec_ephemeral_key(EC_KEY *peer_key,BIGNUM *seckey) {
+static EC_KEY *make_ec_ephemeral_key(EC_KEY *peer_key,BIGNUM *seckey)
+	{
 	EC_KEY *out = EC_KEY_new();
 	EC_KEY_copy(out,peer_key);
 	EC_KEY_set_private_key(out,seckey);
 	gost2001_compute_public(out);
 	return out;
-}
+	}
 /* Packs GOST elliptic curve key into EVP_PKEY setting same parameters
  * as in passed pubkey
  */
 static EVP_PKEY *ec_ephemeral_key_to_EVP(EVP_PKEY *pubk,int type,EC_KEY *ephemeral) 
-{
+	{
 	EVP_PKEY *newkey;
 	newkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
 	EVP_PKEY_assign(newkey,type,ephemeral);
 	return newkey;
-}	
+	}	
 
 /*  
  * EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback encrypt  
@@ -64,7 +63,7 @@ static EVP_PKEY *ec_ephemeral_key_to_EVP(EVP_PKEY *pubk,int type,EC_KEY *ephemer
 
 int pkey_GOST01cc_encrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,unsigned char *out, 
 	size_t *out_len, const unsigned char *key,size_t key_len)
-{
+	{
 	EVP_PKEY *pubk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
 	struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(pctx);	
 	GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt = NULL;
@@ -73,66 +72,68 @@ int pkey_GOST01cc_encrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,unsigned char *out,
 	EC_KEY *ephemeral=NULL;
 	const EC_POINT *pub_key_point=NULL;
 	unsigned char shared_key[32],encrypted_key[32],hmac[4],
-				  iv[8]={0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0};
+		iv[8]={0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0};
 	ephemeral = make_ec_ephemeral_key(EVP_PKEY_get0(pubk), gost_get_priv_key(data->eph_seckey));
 	if (!ephemeral) goto err;
 	/* compute shared key */
 	pub_key_point=EC_KEY_get0_public_key(EVP_PKEY_get0(pubk));
 	if (!ECDH_compute_key(shared_key,32,pub_key_point,ephemeral,make_key_le)) 
-	{
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_COMPUTING_SHARED_KEY);
 		goto err;
-	}	
+		}	
 	/* encrypt session key */
 	gost_init(&ctx, &GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet);
 	gost_key(&ctx,shared_key);
 	encrypt_cryptocom_key(key,key_len,encrypted_key,&ctx);
 	/* compute hmac of session key */
 	if (!gost_mac(&ctx,32,key,32,hmac)) 
-	{
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_COMPUTING_MAC);
 		return -1;
-    }
+		}
 	gkt = GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_new();
 	if (!gkt) 
-	{
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_NO_MEMORY);
 		return -1;
-	}	
+		}	
 	/* Store IV which is always zero in our case */
 	if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv,iv,8))
-	{
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_STORING_IV);
 		goto err;
-	}	
+		}	
 	if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->imit,hmac,4)) 
-	{
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_STORING_MAC);
 		goto err;
-	}	
+		}	
 	if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->encrypted_key,encrypted_key,32))
-	{	
+		{	
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_STORING_ENCRYPTED_KEY);
 		goto err;
-	}
+		}
 	
-	if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&gkt->key_agreement_info->ephem_key,data->eph_seckey)) {
+	if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&gkt->key_agreement_info->ephem_key,data->eph_seckey))
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_ENCRYPT,GOST_R_CANNOT_PACK_EPHEMERAL_KEY);
 		goto err;
-	}	
+		}	
 	ASN1_OBJECT_free(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher);
 	gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_Gost28147_89_cc);
 	if ((*out_len = i2d_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(gkt,&out))>0) ret = 1;
 	;
-err:
+	err:
 	if (gkt) GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt);
 	return ret;
-}
+	}
 /*  
  * EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback decrypt  
  * Implementation of GOST2001 key transport, cryptocom variation 
  */
-int pkey_GOST01cc_decrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *key_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len) {
+int pkey_GOST01cc_decrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *key_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len)
+	{
 	/* Form DH params from compute shared key */
 	EVP_PKEY *priv=EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
 	GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt = NULL;
@@ -145,17 +146,19 @@ int pkey_GOST01cc_decrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *key_l
 	const EC_POINT *pub_key_point;
 	EVP_PKEY *eph_key;
 
-	if (!key) {
+	if (!key)
+		{
 		*key_len = 32;
 		return 1;
-	}	
+		}	
 	/* Parse passed octet string and find out public key, iv and HMAC*/
 	gkt = d2i_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(NULL,(const unsigned char **)&p,
-			in_len);
-	if (!gkt) {
+		in_len);
+	if (!gkt)
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_DECRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_PARSING_KEY_TRANSPORT_INFO);
 		return 0;
-	}	
+		}	
 	eph_key = X509_PUBKEY_get(gkt->key_agreement_info->ephem_key);
 	/* Initialization vector is really ignored here */
 	OPENSSL_assert(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->length==8);
@@ -168,37 +171,40 @@ int pkey_GOST01cc_decrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *key_l
 	i=ECDH_compute_key(shared_key,32,pub_key_point,EVP_PKEY_get0(priv),make_key_le);
 	EVP_PKEY_free(eph_key);
 	if (!i) 
-	{
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_DECRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_COMPUTING_SHARED_KEY);
 		GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt);
 		return 0;
-	}
+		}
 	/* Decrypt session key */
 	gost_init(&ctx, &GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet);
 	gost_key(&ctx,shared_key);
 	
 	if (!decrypt_cryptocom_key(key,*key_len,gkt->key_info->encrypted_key->data, 
 			gkt->key_info->encrypted_key->length, &ctx)) 
-	{
+		{
 		GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt);
 		return 0;
-	}
+		}
 	GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt);
 	/* check HMAC of session key*/
-	if (!gost_mac(&ctx,32,key,32,hmac_comp)) {
+	if (!gost_mac(&ctx,32,key,32,hmac_comp))
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_DECRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_COMPUTING_MAC);
 		return 0;
-    }
-		/* HMAC of session key is not correct */
-    if (memcmp(hmac,hmac_comp,4)!=0) {
+		}
+	/* HMAC of session key is not correct */
+    if (memcmp(hmac,hmac_comp,4)!=0)
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CC_DECRYPT,GOST_R_SESSION_KEY_MAC_DOES_NOT_MATCH);
 		return 0;
-	}	
+		}	
 	return 1; 
-}
+	}
 
 /* Implementation of CryptoPro VKO 34.10-2001 algorithm */
-static int VKO_compute_key(unsigned char *shared_key,size_t shared_key_size,const EC_POINT *pub_key,EC_KEY *priv_key,const unsigned char *ukm) {
+static int VKO_compute_key(unsigned char *shared_key,size_t shared_key_size,const EC_POINT *pub_key,EC_KEY *priv_key,const unsigned char *ukm)
+	{
 	unsigned char ukm_be[8],databuf[64],hashbuf[64];
 	BIGNUM *UKM=NULL,*p=NULL,*order=NULL,*X=NULL,*Y=NULL;
 	const BIGNUM* key=EC_KEY_get0_private_key(priv_key);
@@ -207,9 +213,10 @@ static int VKO_compute_key(unsigned char *shared_key,size_t shared_key_size,cons
 	gost_hash_ctx hash_ctx;
 	BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
 
-	for (i=0;i<8;i++) {
+	for (i=0;i<8;i++)
+		{
 		ukm_be[7-i]=ukm[i];
-	}
+		}
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
 	UKM=getbnfrombuf(ukm_be,8);
 	p=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -220,15 +227,16 @@ static int VKO_compute_key(unsigned char *shared_key,size_t shared_key_size,cons
 	BN_mod_mul(p,key,UKM,order,ctx);	
 	EC_POINT_mul(EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key),pnt,NULL,pub_key,p,ctx);
 	EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key),
-			pnt,X,Y,ctx);
+		pnt,X,Y,ctx);
 	/*Serialize elliptic curve point same way as we do it when saving
 	 * key */
 	store_bignum(Y,databuf,32);
 	store_bignum(X,databuf+32,32);
  	/* And reverse byte order of whole buffer */
-	for (i=0;i<64;i++) {
+	for (i=0;i<64;i++)
+		{
 		hashbuf[63-i]=databuf[i];
-	}
+		}
 	init_gost_hash_ctx(&hash_ctx,&GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet);
 	start_hash(&hash_ctx);
 	hash_block(&hash_ctx,hashbuf,64);
@@ -239,7 +247,7 @@ static int VKO_compute_key(unsigned char *shared_key,size_t shared_key_size,cons
 	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
 	EC_POINT_free(pnt);
 	return 32;
-}
+	}
 
 /* Generates ephemeral key based on pubk algorithm
  * computes shared key using VKO and returns filled up
@@ -247,9 +255,9 @@ static int VKO_compute_key(unsigned char *shared_key,size_t shared_key_size,cons
  */
 /* Public, because it would be needed in SSL implementation */
 GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *make_rfc4490_keytransport_2001(EVP_PKEY *pubk,BIGNUM *eph_key,
-		const unsigned char *key,size_t keylen, unsigned char *ukm,
-		size_t ukm_len)
-{
+	const unsigned char *key,size_t keylen, unsigned char *ukm,
+	size_t ukm_len)
+	{
 
 	const struct gost_cipher_info *param=get_encryption_params(NULL);
 	EC_KEY *ephemeral = NULL;
@@ -260,43 +268,49 @@ GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *make_rfc4490_keytransport_2001(EVP_PKEY *pubk,BIGNUM *eph_ke
 	EVP_PKEY *newkey=NULL;
 	
 	/* Do not use vizir cipher parameters with cryptopro */
-	if (!getenv("CRYPT_PARAMS") && param ==  gost_cipher_list) {
+	if (!get_gost_engine_param(GOST_PARAM_CRYPT_PARAMS) && param ==  gost_cipher_list)
+		{
 		param= gost_cipher_list+1;
-	}	
+		}	
 	ephemeral = make_ec_ephemeral_key(EVP_PKEY_get0(pubk),eph_key);
     VKO_compute_key(shared_key,32,pub_key_point,ephemeral,ukm);
 	gost_init(&ctx,param->sblock);	
 	keyWrapCryptoPro(&ctx,shared_key,ukm,key,crypted_key);
 	gkt = GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_new();
-	if (!gkt) {
+	if (!gkt)
+		{
 		goto memerr;
-	}	
+		}	
 	if(!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv,
-				                ukm,8)) {
+			ukm,8))
+		{
 		goto memerr;
-	}	
-	if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->imit,crypted_key+40,4)) {
+		}	
+	if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->imit,crypted_key+40,4))
+		{
 		goto memerr;
-	}
-	if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->encrypted_key,crypted_key+8,32)) {
+		}
+	if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(gkt->key_info->encrypted_key,crypted_key+8,32))
+		{
 		goto memerr;
-	}
+		}
 	newkey = ec_ephemeral_key_to_EVP(pubk,NID_id_GostR3410_2001,ephemeral);
-	if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&gkt->key_agreement_info->ephem_key,newkey)) {
+	if (!X509_PUBKEY_set(&gkt->key_agreement_info->ephem_key,newkey))
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_MAKE_RFC4490_KEYTRANSPORT_2001,GOST_R_CANNOT_PACK_EPHEMERAL_KEY);
 		goto err;
-	}	
+		}	
 	ASN1_OBJECT_free(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher);
 	gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher = OBJ_nid2obj(param->nid);
 	EVP_PKEY_free(newkey);
 	return gkt;
-memerr:
-		GOSTerr(GOST_F_MAKE_RFC4490_KEYTRANSPORT_2001,
-				GOST_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-err:		
-		GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt);
-		return NULL;
-}
+	memerr:
+	GOSTerr(GOST_F_MAKE_RFC4490_KEYTRANSPORT_2001,
+		GOST_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	err:		
+	GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt);
+	return NULL;
+	}
 
 /*  
  * EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback encrypt  
@@ -304,32 +318,34 @@ err:
  */
 
 int pkey_GOST01cp_encrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, const unsigned char *key,size_t key_len) 
-{
+	{
 	GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt=NULL; 
 	EVP_PKEY *pubk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
 	struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(pctx);
 	unsigned char ukm[8];
 	int ret=0;
-	if (RAND_bytes(ukm,8)<=0) {
+	if (RAND_bytes(ukm,8)<=0)
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST01CP_ENCRYPT,
 			GOST_R_RANDOM_GENERATOR_FAILURE);
 		return 0;
-	}	
+		}	
 		
-	if (!(gkt=make_rfc4490_keytransport_2001(pubk,gost_get_priv_key(data->eph_seckey),key, key_len,ukm,8))) {
+	if (!(gkt=make_rfc4490_keytransport_2001(pubk,gost_get_priv_key(data->eph_seckey),key, key_len,ukm,8)))
+		{
 		goto err;
-	}	
+		}	
 	if ((*out_len = i2d_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(gkt,&out))>0) ret =1;
 	GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt);
 	return ret;	
-err:		
-		GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt);
-		return -1;
-}
+	err:		
+	GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt);
+	return -1;
+	}
 /* Public, because it would be needed in SSL implementation */
 int decrypt_rfc4490_shared_key_2001(EVP_PKEY *priv,GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt,
-		unsigned char *key_buf,int key_buf_len) 
-{
+	unsigned char *key_buf,int key_buf_len) 
+	{
 	unsigned char wrappedKey[44];
 	unsigned char sharedKey[32];
 	gost_ctx ctx;
@@ -346,40 +362,44 @@ int decrypt_rfc4490_shared_key_2001(EVP_PKEY *priv,GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt,
 	OPENSSL_assert(gkt->key_info->imit->length==4);
 	memcpy(wrappedKey+40,gkt->key_info->imit->data,4);	
 	VKO_compute_key(sharedKey,32,EC_KEY_get0_public_key(EVP_PKEY_get0(eph_key)),
-			EVP_PKEY_get0(priv),wrappedKey);
-	if (!keyUnwrapCryptoPro(&ctx,sharedKey,wrappedKey,key_buf)) {
+		EVP_PKEY_get0(priv),wrappedKey);
+	if (!keyUnwrapCryptoPro(&ctx,sharedKey,wrappedKey,key_buf))
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKCS7_GOST94CP_KEY_TRANSPORT_DECRYPT,
-				GOST_R_ERROR_COMPUTING_SHARED_KEY);
+			GOST_R_ERROR_COMPUTING_SHARED_KEY);
 		goto err;
-	}	
+		}	
 				
 	EVP_PKEY_free(eph_key);
 	return 32;
-err:
+	err:
 	EVP_PKEY_free(eph_key);
 	return -1;
-}
+	}
 /*  
  * EVP_PKEY_METHOD callback decrypt  
  * Implementation of GOST2001 key transport, cryptopo variation 
  */
-int pkey_GOST01cp_decrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t * key_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len) {
+int pkey_GOST01cp_decrypt (EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t * key_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len)
+	{
 	const unsigned char *p = in;
 	EVP_PKEY *priv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
 	GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt = NULL;
 	int ret=0;	
 
-	if (!key) {
+	if (!key)
+		{
 		*key_len = 32;
 		return 1;
-	}	
+		}	
 	gkt = d2i_GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT(NULL,(const unsigned char **)&p,
-			in_len);
-	if (!gkt) {
+		in_len);
+	if (!gkt)
+		{
 		GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKCS7_GOST94CP_KEY_TRANSPORT_DECRYPT,GOST_R_ERROR_PARSING_KEY_TRANSPORT_INFO);
 		return -1;
-	}	
+		}	
 	ret = 	decrypt_rfc4490_shared_key_2001(priv,gkt,key,*key_len);
 	GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT_free(gkt);
 	return ret;
-}
+	}