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-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c585
1 files changed, 585 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
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+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
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+/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "lhash.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "evp.h"
+#include "asn1.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "objects.h"
+#include "pem.h"
+
+#ifndef NOPROTO
+static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+#else
+static int null_callback();
+static int internal_verify();
+#endif
+
+char *X509_version="X509 part of SSLeay 0.8.1b 29-Jun-1998";
+
+static int null_callback(ok,e)
+int ok;
+X509_STORE_CTX *e;
+ {
+ return(ok);
+ }
+
+#if 0
+static int x509_subject_cmp(a,b)
+X509 **a,**b;
+ {
+ return(X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b));
+ }
+#endif
+
+int X509_verify_cert(ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+ {
+ X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn;
+ X509_OBJECT obj;
+ int depth,i,ok=0;
+ int num;
+ int (*cb)();
+ STACK *sktmp=NULL;
+
+ if (ctx->cert == NULL)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb;
+ if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
+
+ /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
+ * present and that the first entry is in place */
+ if (ctx->chain == NULL)
+ {
+ if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+ (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)ctx->cert)))
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ ctx->last_untrusted=1;
+ }
+
+ /* We use a temporary so we can chop and hack at it */
+ if ((ctx->untrusted != NULL) && (sktmp=sk_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ num=sk_num(ctx->chain);
+ x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
+ depth=ctx->depth;
+
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ /* If we have enough, we break */
+ if (depth <= num) break;
+
+ /* If we are self signed, we break */
+ xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) == 0)
+ break;
+
+ /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
+ if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
+ {
+ xtmp=X509_find_by_subject(sktmp,xn);
+ if (xtmp != NULL)
+ {
+ if (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)xtmp))
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ sk_delete_ptr(sktmp,(char *)xtmp);
+ ctx->last_untrusted++;
+ x=xtmp;
+ num++;
+ /* reparse the full chain for
+ * the next one */
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
+ * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
+ * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
+
+ i=sk_num(ctx->chain);
+ x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),X509_get_issuer_name(x))
+ == 0)
+ {
+ /* we have a self signed certificate */
+ if (sk_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+ ctx->current_cert=x;
+ ctx->error_depth=i-1;
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* worry more about this one elsewhere */
+ chain_ss=(X509 *)sk_pop(ctx->chain);
+ ctx->last_untrusted--;
+ num--;
+ x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ /* If we have enough, we break */
+ if (depth <= num) break;
+
+ /* If we are self signed, we break */
+ xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) == 0)
+ break;
+
+ ok=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx,X509_LU_X509,xn,&obj);
+ if (ok != X509_LU_X509)
+ {
+ if (ok == X509_LU_RETRY)
+ {
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY);
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ else if (ok != X509_LU_FAIL)
+ {
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
+ /* not good :-(, break anyway */
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ x=obj.data.x509;
+ if (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)obj.data.x509))
+ {
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ num++;
+ }
+
+ /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
+ xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) != 0)
+ {
+ if ((chain_ss == NULL) || (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(chain_ss),xn) != 0))
+ {
+ if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
+ else
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
+ ctx->current_cert=x;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+
+ sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)chain_ss);
+ num++;
+ ctx->last_untrusted=num;
+ ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
+ chain_ss=NULL;
+ }
+
+ ctx->error_depth=num-1;
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
+ X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
+
+ /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */
+ if (ctx->ctx->verify != NULL)
+ ok=ctx->ctx->verify(ctx);
+ else
+ ok=internal_verify(ctx);
+end:
+ if (sktmp != NULL) sk_free(sktmp);
+ if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
+ return(ok);
+ }
+
+static int internal_verify(ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+ {
+ int i,ok=0,n;
+ X509 *xs,*xi;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ int (*cb)();
+
+ cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb;
+ if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
+
+ n=sk_num(ctx->chain);
+ ctx->error_depth=n-1;
+ n--;
+ xi=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(xi),
+ X509_get_issuer_name(xi)) == 0)
+ xs=xi;
+ else
+ {
+ if (n <= 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
+ ctx->current_cert=xi;
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ n--;
+ ctx->error_depth=n;
+ xs=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n);
+ }
+ }
+
+/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
+ while (n >= 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error_depth=n;
+ if (!xs->valid)
+ {
+ if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ ctx->current_cert=xi;
+ ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+ ctx->current_cert=xs;
+ ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ pkey=NULL;
+
+ i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs));
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
+ ctx->current_cert=xs;
+ ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ if (i > 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
+ ctx->current_cert=xs;
+ ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ xs->valid=1;
+ }
+
+ i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs));
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
+ ctx->current_cert=xs;
+ ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
+ ctx->current_cert=xs;
+ ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* CRL CHECK */
+
+ /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
+ ctx->current_cert=xs;
+ ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+
+ n--;
+ if (n >= 0)
+ {
+ xi=xs;
+ xs=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n);
+ }
+ }
+ ok=1;
+end:
+ return(ok);
+ }
+
+int X509_cmp_current_time(ctm)
+ASN1_UTCTIME *ctm;
+ {
+ char *str;
+ ASN1_UTCTIME atm;
+ time_t offset;
+ char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
+ int i,j;
+
+ p=buff1;
+ i=ctm->length;
+ str=(char *)ctm->data;
+ if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return(0);
+ memcpy(p,str,10);
+ p+=10;
+ str+=10;
+
+ if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
+ { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
+ else { *(p++)= *(str++); *(p++)= *(str++); }
+ *(p++)='Z';
+ *(p++)='\0';
+
+ if (*str == 'Z')
+ offset=0;
+ else
+ {
+ if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
+ return(0);
+ offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
+ offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
+ if (*str == '-')
+ offset-=offset;
+ }
+ atm.type=V_ASN1_UTCTIME;
+ atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
+ atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
+
+ X509_gmtime_adj(&atm,offset);
+
+ i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
+ if (i < 70) i+=100;
+ j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
+ if (j < 70) j+=100;
+
+ if (i < j) return (-1);
+ if (i > j) return (1);
+ i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
+ if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
+ return(-1);
+ else
+ return(i);
+ }
+
+ASN1_UTCTIME *X509_gmtime_adj(s, adj)
+ASN1_UTCTIME *s;
+long adj;
+ {
+ time_t t;
+
+ time(&t);
+ t+=adj;
+ return(ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t));
+ }
+
+int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(pkey,chain)
+EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+STACK *chain;
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
+ int i,j;
+
+ if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return(1);
+
+ for (i=0; i<sk_num(chain); i++)
+ {
+ ktmp=X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)sk_value(chain,i));
+ if (ktmp == NULL)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
+ break;
+ else
+ {
+ ktmp=NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ktmp == NULL)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ /* first, populate the other certs */
+ for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
+ {
+ ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)sk_value(chain,j));
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
+ }
+
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(x)
+X509 *x;
+ {
+ return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
+ }
+
+int X509_check_private_key(x,k)
+X509 *x;
+EVP_PKEY *k;
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *xk=NULL;
+ int ok=0;
+
+ xk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ if (xk->type != k->type) goto err;
+ switch (k->type)
+ {
+#ifndef NO_RSA
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.rsa->n,k->pkey.rsa->n) != 0) goto err;
+ if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.rsa->e,k->pkey.rsa->e) != 0) goto err;
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef NO_DSA
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.dsa->pub_key,k->pkey.dsa->pub_key) != 0)
+ goto err;
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef NO_DH
+ case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+ /* No idea */
+ goto err;
+#endif
+ default:
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ok=1;
+err:
+ return(ok);
+ }
+
+int X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx,x)
+X509_STORE *ctx;
+X509 *x;
+ {
+ X509_OBJECT *obj,*r;
+ int ret=1;
+
+ if (x == NULL) return(0);
+ obj=(X509_OBJECT *)Malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT));
+ if (obj == NULL)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ obj->type=X509_LU_X509;
+ obj->data.x509=x;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
+ X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj);
+
+ r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
+ if (r != NULL)
+ { /* oops, put it back */
+ lh_delete(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
+ X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj);
+ Free(obj);
+ lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)r);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE);
+ ret=0;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+