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* Fix mem leak on error pathMatt Caswell2016-08-231-1/+3
| | | | | | The mem pointed to by cAB can be leaked on an error path. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
* Fix mem leak on error pathMatt Caswell2016-08-231-2/+2
| | | | | | The mem pointed to by tmp can be leaked on an error path. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
* Ensure the mime_hdr_free function can handle NULLsMatt Caswell2016-08-231-0/+2
| | | | | | Sometimes it is called with a NULL pointer Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
* Ensure CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free behaves properly with a NULL argMatt Caswell2016-08-231-0/+2
| | | | Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
* Fix leak on error in tls_construct_cke_gostMatt Caswell2016-08-231-1/+1
| | | | | | Don't leak pke_ctx on error. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
* Test the support curves in tlsKurt Roeckx2016-08-223-2/+802
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1472
* Closing output file from inside the loop who open itFdaSilvaYY2016-08-221-2/+3
| | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1471
* Fix no-desMatt Caswell2016-08-221-0/+13
| | | | | | The PKCS12 command line utility is not available if no-des is used. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* RT2676: Reject RSA eponent if even or 1Rich Salz2016-08-223-47/+35
| | | | | | | | | Also, re-organize RSA check to use goto err. Add a test case. Try all checks, not just stopping at first (via Richard Levitte) Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* Configure: Properly cache the configured compiler commandRichard Levitte2016-08-221-1/+4
| | | | Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* Fix a memory leak in EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters()Kazuki Yamaguchi2016-08-222-5/+31
| | | | | | | | The variable 'buffer', allocated by EC_POINT_point2buf(), isn't free'd on the success path. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
* Expose alloc functions for EC{PK,}PARAMETERSKazuki Yamaguchi2016-08-223-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | Declare EC{PK,}PARAMETERS_{new,free} functions in public headers. The free functions are necessary because EC_GROUP_get_ec{pk,}parameters() was made public by commit 60b350a3ef96 ("RT3676: Expose ECgroup i2d functions"). Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
* Fix loopargs_t object duplication into ASYNC contextFdaSilvaYY2016-08-221-31/+34
| | | | | | | | | | Code was relying on an implicit data-sharing through duplication of loopargs_t pointer-members made by ASYNC_start_job(). Now share structure address instead of structure content. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
* Avoid more compiler warnings for use of uninitialised variablesRichard Levitte2016-08-221-1/+1
| | | | Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
* Make 'openssl req -x509' more equivalent to 'openssl req -new'Richard Levitte2016-08-221-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following would fail, or rather, freeze: openssl genrsa -out rsa2048.pem 2048 openssl req -x509 -key rsa2048.pem -keyform PEM -out cert.pem In that case, the second command wants to read a certificate request from stdin, because -x509 wasn't fully flagged as being for creating something new. This changes makes it fully flagged. RT#4655 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
* bn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: implement slightly alternative page-walking.Andy Polyakov2016-08-223-179/+274
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Original strategy for page-walking was adjust stack pointer and then touch pages in order. This kind of asks for double-fault, because if touch fails, then signal will be delivered to frame above adjusted stack pointer. But touching pages prior adjusting stack pointer would upset valgrind. As compromise let's adjust stack pointer in pages, touching top of the stack. This still asks for double-fault, but at least prevents corruption of neighbour stack if allocation is to overstep the guard page. Also omit predict-non-taken hints as they reportedly trigger illegal instructions in some VM setups. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* Choose a ciphersuite for testing that won't be affected by "no-*" optionsMatt Caswell2016-08-221-1/+1
| | | | | | The previous ciphersuite broke in no-ec builds. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* Fix overflow check in BN_bn2dec()Kazuki Yamaguchi2016-08-221-3/+2
| | | | | | | | Fix an off by one error in the overflow check added by 07bed46f332fc ("Check for errors in BN_bn2dec()"). Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
* ssltestlib: Tell compiler we don't care about the value when we don'tRichard Levitte2016-08-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | In mempacket_test_read(), we've already fetched the top value of the stack, so when we shift the stack, we don't care for the value. The compiler needs to be told, or it will complain harshly when we tell it to be picky. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
* crypto/pkcs12: facilitate accessing data with non-interoperable password.Andy Polyakov2016-08-228-27/+144
| | | | | | | | | | | Originally PKCS#12 subroutines treated password strings as ASCII. It worked as long as they were pure ASCII, but if there were some none-ASCII characters result was non-interoperable. But fixing it poses problem accessing data protected with broken password. In order to make asscess to old data possible add retry with old-style password. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* crypto/pkcs12: default to UTF-8.Andy Polyakov2016-08-222-4/+16
| | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* Add PKCS#12 UTF-8 interoperability test.Andy Polyakov2016-08-222-0/+31
| | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* crypto/pkcs12: add UTF8 support.Andy Polyakov2016-08-225-2/+186
| | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* Prevent DTLS Finished message injectionMatt Caswell2016-08-221-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Follow on from CVE-2016-2179 The investigation and analysis of CVE-2016-2179 highlighted a related flaw. This commit fixes a security "near miss" in the buffered message handling code. Ultimately this is not currently believed to be exploitable due to the reasons outlined below, and therefore there is no CVE for this on its own. The issue this commit fixes is a MITM attack where the attacker can inject a Finished message into the handshake. In the description below it is assumed that the attacker injects the Finished message for the server to receive it. The attack could work equally well the other way around (i.e where the client receives the injected Finished message). The MITM requires the following capabilities: - The ability to manipulate the MTU that the client selects such that it is small enough for the client to fragment Finished messages. - The ability to selectively drop and modify records sent from the client - The ability to inject its own records and send them to the server The MITM forces the client to select a small MTU such that the client will fragment the Finished message. Ideally for the attacker the first fragment will contain all but the last byte of the Finished message, with the second fragment containing the final byte. During the handshake and prior to the client sending the CCS the MITM injects a plaintext Finished message fragment to the server containing all but the final byte of the Finished message. The message sequence number should be the one expected to be used for the real Finished message. OpenSSL will recognise that the received fragment is for the future and will buffer it for later use. After the client sends the CCS it then sends its own Finished message in two fragments. The MITM causes the first of these fragments to be dropped. The OpenSSL server will then receive the second of the fragments and reassemble the complete Finished message consisting of the MITM fragment and the final byte from the real client. The advantage to the attacker in injecting a Finished message is that this provides the capability to modify other handshake messages (e.g. the ClientHello) undetected. A difficulty for the attacker is knowing in advance what impact any of those changes might have on the final byte of the handshake hash that is going to be sent in the "real" Finished message. In the worst case for the attacker this means that only 1 in 256 of such injection attempts will succeed. It may be possible in some situations for the attacker to improve this such that all attempts succeed. For example if the handshake includes client authentication then the final message flight sent by the client will include a Certificate. Certificates are ASN.1 objects where the signed portion is DER encoded. The non-signed portion could be BER encoded and so the attacker could re-encode the certificate such that the hash for the whole handshake comes to a different value. The certificate re-encoding would not be detectable because only the non-signed portion is changed. As this is the final flight of messages sent from the client the attacker knows what the complete hanshake hash value will be that the client will send - and therefore knows what the final byte will be. Through a process of trial and error the attacker can re-encode the certificate until the modified handhshake also has a hash with the same final byte. This means that when the Finished message is verified by the server it will be correct in all cases. In practice the MITM would need to be able to perform the same attack against both the client and the server. If the attack is only performed against the server (say) then the server will not detect the modified handshake, but the client will and will abort the connection. Fortunately, although OpenSSL is vulnerable to Finished message injection, it is not vulnerable if *both* client and server are OpenSSL. The reason is that OpenSSL has a hard "floor" for a minimum MTU size that it will never go below. This minimum means that a Finished message will never be sent in a fragmented form and therefore the MITM does not have one of its pre-requisites. Therefore this could only be exploited if using OpenSSL and some other DTLS peer that had its own and separate Finished message injection flaw. The fix is to ensure buffered messages are cleared on epoch change. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attackMatt Caswell2016-08-225-20/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS). That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled. The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the point that we need to use it. However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented) message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get removed. Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number (starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future. However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything greater than that in the queue is just left there. So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At that point all the queues are flushed. An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion. I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be an issue. A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange, CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0 to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future. Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send that could get orphaned would typically be 15. The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of "orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k. Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be orphaned per connection. As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed. Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have to open many simultaneous connections. Issue reported by Quan Luo. CVE-2016-2179 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* Fix enable-zlibMatt Caswell2016-08-221-1/+1
| | | | | | The enable-zlib option was broken by the recent "const" changes. Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
* VMS: Use strict refdef extern model when building library object filesRichard Levitte2016-08-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Most of the time, this isn't strictly needed. However, in the default extern model (called relaxed refdef), symbols are treated as weak common objects unless they are initialised. The librarian doesn't include weak symbols in the (static) libraries, which renders them invisible when linking a program with said those libraries, which is a problem at times. Using the strict refdef model is much more like standard C on all other platforms, and thereby avoid the issues that come with the relaxed refdef model. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* Add test/bio_enc_test.c.Andy Polyakov2016-08-213-1/+157
| | | | | | RT#4628 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* evp/bio_enc.c: refine non-overlapping logic.Andy Polyakov2016-08-211-27/+42
| | | | | | RT#4628 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* ecp_nistz256.c: get is_one on 32-bit platforms right.Andy Polyakov2016-08-211-15/+22
| | | | | | Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* Move BIO index lock creationRich Salz2016-08-215-6/+18
| | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* update ordinalsDr. Stephen Henson2016-08-211-3/+3
| | | | Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
* Add X509_getm_notBefore, X509_getm_notAfterDr. Stephen Henson2016-08-218-50/+37
| | | | | | | | Add mutable versions of X509_get0_notBefore and X509_get0_notAfter. Rename X509_SIG_get0_mutable to X509_SIG_getm. Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
* Duplicate includesFdaSilvaYY2016-08-202-2/+0
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1475)
* Fix off by 1 in ASN1_STRING_set()Kurt Roeckx2016-08-201-1/+1
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> MR: #3176
* Add BIO_get_new_index()Rich Salz2016-08-197-30/+55
| | | | Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
* fix warning about trailing commaDr. Stephen Henson2016-08-191-1/+1
| | | | Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* make updateDr. Stephen Henson2016-08-191-4/+8
| | | | Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* rename ordinalsDr. Stephen Henson2016-08-191-4/+4
| | | | Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* Constify certificate and CRL time routines.Dr. Stephen Henson2016-08-1912-65/+115
| | | | | | Update certificate and CRL time routines to match new standard. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* Add -dane_ee_no_namechecks s_client(1) optionViktor Dukhovni2016-08-192-1/+28
| | | | | | | | The DANE API supports a DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS option, but there was no way to exercise/enable it via s_client. This commit addresses that gap. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* Set certificate times in one function.Dr. Stephen Henson2016-08-195-23/+44
| | | | Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* Avoid duplicated code.Dr. Stephen Henson2016-08-193-43/+18
| | | | | | | The certificate and CRL time setting functions used similar code, combine into a single utility function. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* RT3940: For now, just document the issue.Rich Salz2016-08-192-0/+6
| | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* MEMPACKET is typedef'd in ssltestlib.h, don't do so again in ssltestlib.cRichard Levitte2016-08-191-2/+2
| | | | Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* Allow to run all speed test when async_jobs activeFdaSilvaYY2016-08-191-33/+54
| | | | | | | ... without any interruption. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1468)
* make updateDr. Stephen Henson2016-08-191-0/+1
| | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* Convert PKCS12* functions to use const gettersMatt Caswell2016-08-197-50/+66
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
* Update function error codeMatt Caswell2016-08-191-1/+1
| | | | | | A function error code needed updating due to merge issues. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* Fix some clang warningsMatt Caswell2016-08-193-3/+5
| | | | | | | | Clang was complaining about some unused functions. Moving the stack declaration to the header seems to sort it. Also the certstatus variable in dtlstest needed to be declared static. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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