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* Added 'saltlen' option to the OpenSSL enc command line app.slontis2023-09-041-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | This allows PBKDF2 to change the saltlen to something other than the new default value of 16. Previously this app hardwired the salt length to a maximum of 8 bytes. Non PBKDF2 mode uses EVP_BytesToKey() internally, which is documented to only allow 8 bytes. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21858)
* Change PBES2 KDF default salt length to 16 bytes.slontis2023-09-041-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The PKCS5 (RFC 8018) standard uses a 64 bit salt length for PBE, and recommends a minimum of 64 bits for PBES2. For FIPS compliance PBKDF2 requires a salt length of 128 bits. This affects OpenSSL command line applications such as "genrsa" and "pkcs8" and API's such as PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() that are reliant on the default salt length. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21858)
* Add CHANGES.md entry for ess_cert_id_alg default changeTomas Mraz2023-08-311-0/+7
| | | | | | | | The default was changed in 10536b7f5b07aab3dc9631e94a56258155a1d942 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21845)
* Optimize SM2 on aarch64Xu Yizhou2023-08-241-0/+7
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Xu Yizhou <xuyizhou1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20754)
* Update CHANGES.md and NEWS.md for the upcoming 3.2 releaseTomas Mraz2023-08-231-26/+181
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21802)
* Add CHANGES.md and NEWS.md entries for CVE-2023-3817Tomas Mraz2023-07-271-2/+20
| | | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21550)
* Update CHANGES/NEWS for CVE-2023-3446Matt Caswell2023-07-191-0/+20
| | | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451)
* Fix typos found by codespellDimitri Papadopoulos2023-07-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21467)
* Add CHANGES.md and NEWS.md entries for CVE-2023-2975Tomas Mraz2023-07-141-0/+21
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384)
* Add a NEWS entry covering the FIPS related changes.Pauli2023-07-141-1/+10
| | | | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21386) (cherry picked from commit dfc4b6c93b99f6666cd958c5643a24bb6edff7b7)
* Enable QUIC by defaultMatt Caswell2023-07-061-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ensure builds enable QUIC without explicitly having to ask for it. To disable QUIC pass "no-quic" to Configure. As a result we can remove all use of "enable-quic" from the various CI runs. We also add a CHANGES and NEWS entry for QUIC support. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21332)
* Add support for SHA256/192Fergus Dall2023-06-281-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | This is defined in NIST SP 800-208 as the truncation to 192 bits of SHA256. Unlike other truncated hashes in the SHA2 suite, this variant doesn't have a different initial state, it is just a pure truncation of the output. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21180)
* add no-httpVladimír Kotal2023-06-191-0/+5
| | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21217)
* Partially revert #18070 (Add support for Windows CA certificate store)Hugo Landau2023-06-151-16/+5
| | | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21190)
* Fix typos found by codespellDimitri Papadopoulos2023-06-151-3/+3
| | | | | | | | Typos in doc/man* will be fixed in a different commit. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20910)
* Make link to RFC 1578 in CHANGES.md be a proper linkTomas Mraz2023-06-061-3/+2
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21130)
* Restrict the size of OBJECT IDENTIFIERs that OBJ_obj2txt will translateRichard Levitte2023-06-061-0/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that sub-identifier. To mitigate this, a restriction on the size that OBJ_obj2txt() will translate to canonical numeric text form is added, based on RFC 2578 (STD 58), which says this: > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values > > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative numbers. > For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a sub-identifier, > there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, and each sub-identifier > has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal). Fixes otc/security#96 Fixes CVE-2023-2650 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
* [feat] SSL RTT in both client and server statem. SSL_get_handshake_rtt makes ↵Jairus Christensen2023-06-021-0/+7
| | | | | | | | it available Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20248)
* Add missing CHANGES.md entriesTomas Mraz2023-05-291-0/+10
| | | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21057) (cherry picked from commit 3afa246520852ba3bfc16c7c976cb3c2064a3baa)
* Add some documentation for the new QUIC mode in s_clientMatt Caswell2023-05-081-0/+7
| | | | | | | | Also mentions the new FIN command in s_client advance mode Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20580)
* Correct the CHANGES entry for CVE-2023-1255Tomas Mraz2023-04-261-3/+3
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20798)
* aesv8-armx.pl: Avoid buffer overrread in AES-XTS decryptionTomas Mraz2023-04-201-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | Original author: Nevine Ebeid (Amazon) Fixes: CVE-2023-1255 The buffer overread happens on decrypts of 4 mod 5 sizes. Unless the memory just after the buffer is unmapped this is harmless. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20759)
* Alternative fix for CVE-2022-4304Bernd Edlinger2023-04-041-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is about a timing leak in the topmost limb of the internal result of RSA_private_decrypt, before the padding check. There are in fact at least three bugs together that caused the timing leak: First and probably most important is the fact that the blinding did not use the constant time code path at all when the RSA object was used for a private decrypt, due to the fact that the Montgomery context rsa->_method_mod_n was not set up early enough in rsa_ossl_private_decrypt, when BN_BLINDING_create_param needed it, and that was persisted as blinding->m_ctx, although the RSA object creates the Montgomery context just a bit later. Then the infamous bn_correct_top was used on the secret value right after the blinding was removed. And finally the function BN_bn2binpad did not use the constant-time code path since the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME was not set on the secret value. In order to address the first problem, this patch makes sure that the rsa->_method_mod_n is initialized right before the blinding context. And to fix the second problem, we add a new utility function bn_correct_top_consttime, a const-time variant of bn_correct_top. Together with the fact, that BN_bn2binpad is already constant time if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set, this should eliminate the timing oracle completely. In addition the no-asm variant may also have branches that depend on secret values, because the last invocation of bn_sub_words in bn_from_montgomery_word had branches when the function is compiled by certain gcc compiler versions, due to the clumsy coding style. So additionally this patch stream-lined the no-asm C-code in order to avoid branches where possible and improve the resulting code quality. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20281)
* Add some documentation for the new advanced s_client command modeMatt Caswell2023-03-301-0/+9
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20566)
* changes: note the banning of truncated hashes with DRBGsPauli2023-03-291-0/+7
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20521)
* RFC7250 (RPK) supportTodd Short2023-03-281-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for the RFC7250 certificate-type extensions. Alows the use of only private keys for connection (i.e. certs not needed). Add APIs Add unit tests Add documentation Add s_client/s_server support Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18185)
* Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()Tomas Mraz2023-03-281-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking. Fixes: CVE-2023-0466 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20561)
* Updated CHANGES.md and NEWS.md for CVE-2023-0465Matt Caswell2023-03-281-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | Also updated the entries for CVE-2023-0464 Related-to: CVE-2023-0465 Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20585)
* changes: note about policy tree size limits and circumventionPauli2023-03-221-1/+12
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20571)
* providers: add Argon2 KDFČestmír Kalina2023-03-171-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9106/ Signed-off-by: Čestmír Kalina <ckalina@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12256)
* Add option to FIPS module to enforce EMS check during KDF TLS1_PRF.slontis2023-03-071-0/+7
| | | | | | | | Fixes #19989 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20241)
* CMS_add0_cert: if cert already present, do not throw error but ignore itDr. David von Oheimb2023-02-241-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | Also add checks on failing cert/CRL up_ref calls; improve coding style. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19199)
* first cut at sigalg loadingMichael Baentsch2023-02-241-0/+9
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19312)
* update changes entry to note EdDSA is not FIPS approvedPauli2023-02-221-2/+2
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20343)
* Correct a copy&paste error in a link URLTomas Mraz2023-02-111-1/+1
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20228)
* Sync CHANGES.md and NEWS.md with 3.0.8 releaseTomas Mraz2023-02-111-1/+159
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20228)
* New function EC_GROUP_to_params to convert an EC_GROUP to an array of ↵Oliver Mihatsch2023-02-081-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | OSSL_PARAM. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20205)
* remove EdDSA from changes entry about non-fips algorithmsPauli2023-02-081-1/+2
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20219)
* [doc] Sync documentation now that 3.0 honors ↵Nicola Tuveri2023-01-311-14/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19901 backported the "Honor OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT as set and default to UNCOMPRESSED" changeset to 3.0. This commit updates: - the HISTORY notes of the relevant documentation to mark the change happened since 3.0.8. - the `CHANGES.md file` to sync up with the tip of the `openssl-3.0` branch Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20003)
* APPS: generated certs bear X.509 V3, unless -x509v1 option of req app is givenDr. David von Oheimb2023-01-241-0/+7
| | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19271)
* changes entry about non-approved FIPS algorithmsPauli2023-01-241-0/+8
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20079)
* Add CHANGES.md entry for support for KMAC in KBKDFTomas Mraz2022-12-211-0/+4
| | | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> Release: yes (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19943) (cherry picked from commit c75203021bd37571c6259317b1d0e63dc7857c45)
* rsa: add implicit rejection CHANGES entryHubert Kario2022-12-121-0/+12
| | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
* signature: Clamp PSS salt len to MD lenClemens Lang2022-12-081-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection 5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of the hash function output block (in bytes)." Introduce a new option RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX and make it the default. The new value will behave like RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO, but will not use more than the digest length when signing, so that FIPS 186-4 is not violated. This value has two advantages when compared with RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: (1) It will continue to do auto-detection when verifying signatures for maximum compatibility, where RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST would fail for other digest sizes. (2) It will work for combinations where the maximum salt length is smaller than the digest size, which typically happens with large digest sizes (e.g., SHA-512) and small RSA keys. J.-S. Coron shows in "Optimal Security Proofs for PSS and Other Signature Schemes. Advances in Cryptology – Eurocrypt 2002, volume 2332 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 272 – 287. Springer Verlag, 2002." that longer salts than the output size of modern hash functions do not increase security: "For example,for an application in which at most one billion signatures will be generated, k0 = 30 bits of random salt are actually sufficient to guarantee the same level of security as RSA, and taking a larger salt does not increase the security level." Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19724)
* Replace "a RSA" with "an RSA"Daniel Fiala2022-12-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | Fixes openssl#19771 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19787)
* Sync CHANGES.md and NEWS.md with 3.1 releaseTomas Mraz2022-12-051-63/+68
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19808)
* Honor OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT as set and default to ↵Nicola Tuveri2022-11-291-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | UNCOMPRESSED Originally the code to im/export the EC pubkey was meant to be consumed only by the im/export functions when crossing the provider boundary. Having our providers exporting to a COMPRESSED format octet string made sense to avoid memory waste, as it wasn't exposed outside the provider API, and providers had all tools available to convert across the three formats. Later on, with #13139 deprecating the `EC_KEY_*` functions, more state was added among the params imported/exported on an EC provider-native key (including `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT`, although it did not affect the format used to export `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY`). Finally, in #14800, `EVP_PKEY_todata()` was introduced and prominently exposed directly to users outside the provider API, and the choice of COMPRESSED over UNCOMPRESSED as the default became less sensible in light of usability, given the latter is more often needed by applications and protocols. This commit fixes it, by using `EC_KEY_get_conv_form()` to get the point format from the internal state (an `EC_KEY` under the hood) of the provider-side object, and using it on `EVP_PKEY_export()`/`EVP_PKEY_todata()` to format `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY`. The default for an `EC_KEY` was already UNCOMPRESSED, and it is altered if the user sets `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT` via `EVP_PKEY_fromdata()`, `EVP_PKEY_set_params()`, or one of the more specialized methods. For symmetry, this commit also alters `ec_pkey_export_to()` in `crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c`, part of the `EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD` for legacy EC keys: it exclusively used COMPRESSED format, and now it honors the conversion format specified in the EC_KEY object being exported to a provider when this function is called. Expand documentation about `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY` and mention the 3.1 change in behavior for our providers. Fixes #16595 Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19681) (cherry picked from commit 926db476bc669fdcc4c4d2f1cb547060bdbfa153)
* Implements Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) as per RFC9180.Stephen Farrell2022-11-251-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This supports all the modes, suites and export mechanisms defined in RFC9180 and should be relatively easily extensible if/as new suites are added. The APIs are based on the pseudo-code from the RFC, e.g. OSS_HPKE_encap() roughly maps to SetupBaseS(). External APIs are defined in include/openssl/hpke.h and documented in doc/man3/OSSL_HPKE_CTX_new.pod. Tests (test/hpke_test.c) include verifying a number of the test vectors from the RFC as well as round-tripping for all the modes and suites. We have demonstrated interoperability with other HPKE implementations via a fork [1] that implements TLS Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) which uses HPKE. @slontis provided huge help in getting this done and this makes extensive use of the KEM handling code from his PR#19068. [1] https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/tree/ECH-draft-13c Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17172)
* Add support for KTLS zerocopy sendfile on LinuxMaxim Mikityanskiy2022-11-241-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | TLS device offload allows to perform zerocopy sendfile transmissions. FreeBSD provides this feature by default, and Linux 5.19 introduced it as an opt-in. Zerocopy improves the TX rate significantly, but has a side effect: if the underlying file is changed while being transmitted, and a TCP retransmission happens, the receiver may get a TLS record containing both new and old data, which leads to an authentication failure and termination of connection. This effect is the reason Linux makes a copy on sendfile by default. This commit adds support for TLS zerocopy sendfile on Linux disabled by default to avoid any unlikely backward compatibility issues on Linux, although sacrificing consistency in OpenSSL's behavior on Linux and FreeBSD. A new option called KTLSTxZerocopySendfile is added to enable the new zerocopy behavior on Linux. This option should be used when the the application guarantees that the file is not modified during transmission, or it doesn't care about breaking the connection. The related documentation is also added in this commit. The unit test added doesn't test the actual functionality (it would require specific hardware and a non-local peer), but solely checks that it's possible to set the new option flag. Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18650)
* Update CHANGES.md and NEWS.md from 3.0.7Tomas Mraz2022-11-221-11/+53
| | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19565)
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