| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This allows PBKDF2 to change the saltlen to something other than the
new default value of 16. Previously this app hardwired the salt length
to a maximum of 8 bytes. Non PBKDF2 mode uses EVP_BytesToKey()
internally, which is documented to only allow 8 bytes.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21858)
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The PKCS5 (RFC 8018) standard uses a 64 bit salt length for PBE, and
recommends a minimum of 64 bits for PBES2. For FIPS compliance PBKDF2
requires a salt length of 128 bits.
This affects OpenSSL command line applications such as "genrsa" and "pkcs8"
and API's such as PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() that are reliant on the
default salt length.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21858)
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The default was changed in 10536b7f5b07aab3dc9631e94a56258155a1d942
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21845)
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Signed-off-by: Xu Yizhou <xuyizhou1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20754)
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Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21802)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21550)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21451)
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21467)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21384)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21386)
(cherry picked from commit dfc4b6c93b99f6666cd958c5643a24bb6edff7b7)
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Ensure builds enable QUIC without explicitly having to ask for it. To
disable QUIC pass "no-quic" to Configure.
As a result we can remove all use of "enable-quic" from the various CI
runs.
We also add a CHANGES and NEWS entry for QUIC support.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21332)
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This is defined in NIST SP 800-208 as the truncation to 192 bits of
SHA256. Unlike other truncated hashes in the SHA2 suite, this variant
doesn't have a different initial state, it is just a pure truncation
of the output.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21180)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21217)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21190)
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Typos in doc/man* will be fixed in a different commit.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20910)
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Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21130)
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OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
sub-identifier.
To mitigate this, a restriction on the size that OBJ_obj2txt() will
translate to canonical numeric text form is added, based on RFC 2578
(STD 58), which says this:
> 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
>
> An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative numbers.
> For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a sub-identifier,
> there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, and each sub-identifier
> has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
Fixes otc/security#96
Fixes CVE-2023-2650
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
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it available
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20248)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21057)
(cherry picked from commit 3afa246520852ba3bfc16c7c976cb3c2064a3baa)
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Also mentions the new FIN command in s_client advance mode
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20580)
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20798)
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Original author: Nevine Ebeid (Amazon)
Fixes: CVE-2023-1255
The buffer overread happens on decrypts of 4 mod 5 sizes.
Unless the memory just after the buffer is unmapped this is harmless.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20759)
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This is about a timing leak in the topmost limb
of the internal result of RSA_private_decrypt,
before the padding check.
There are in fact at least three bugs together that
caused the timing leak:
First and probably most important is the fact that
the blinding did not use the constant time code path
at all when the RSA object was used for a private
decrypt, due to the fact that the Montgomery context
rsa->_method_mod_n was not set up early enough in
rsa_ossl_private_decrypt, when BN_BLINDING_create_param
needed it, and that was persisted as blinding->m_ctx,
although the RSA object creates the Montgomery context
just a bit later.
Then the infamous bn_correct_top was used on the
secret value right after the blinding was removed.
And finally the function BN_bn2binpad did not use
the constant-time code path since the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
was not set on the secret value.
In order to address the first problem, this patch
makes sure that the rsa->_method_mod_n is initialized
right before the blinding context.
And to fix the second problem, we add a new utility
function bn_correct_top_consttime, a const-time
variant of bn_correct_top.
Together with the fact, that BN_bn2binpad is already
constant time if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set,
this should eliminate the timing oracle completely.
In addition the no-asm variant may also have
branches that depend on secret values, because the last
invocation of bn_sub_words in bn_from_montgomery_word
had branches when the function is compiled by certain
gcc compiler versions, due to the clumsy coding style.
So additionally this patch stream-lined the no-asm
C-code in order to avoid branches where possible and
improve the resulting code quality.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20281)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20566)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20521)
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Add support for the RFC7250 certificate-type extensions.
Alows the use of only private keys for connection (i.e. certs not needed).
Add APIs
Add unit tests
Add documentation
Add s_client/s_server support
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18185)
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The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking.
Fixes: CVE-2023-0466
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20561)
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Also updated the entries for CVE-2023-0464
Related-to: CVE-2023-0465
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20585)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20571)
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https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9106/
Signed-off-by: Čestmír Kalina <ckalina@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12256)
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Fixes #19989
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20241)
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Also add checks on failing cert/CRL up_ref calls; improve coding style.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19199)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19312)
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20343)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20228)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20228)
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OSSL_PARAM.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20205)
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20219)
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OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19901 backported the
"Honor OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT as set and default to
UNCOMPRESSED" changeset to 3.0.
This commit updates:
- the HISTORY notes of the relevant documentation to mark the change
happened since 3.0.8.
- the `CHANGES.md file` to sync up with the tip of the `openssl-3.0`
branch
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20003)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19271)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20079)
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Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Release: yes
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19943)
(cherry picked from commit c75203021bd37571c6259317b1d0e63dc7857c45)
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Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
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FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
the hash function output block (in bytes)."
Introduce a new option RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX and make it the
default. The new value will behave like RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO, but will
not use more than the digest length when signing, so that FIPS 186-4 is
not violated. This value has two advantages when compared with
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: (1) It will continue to do auto-detection when
verifying signatures for maximum compatibility, where
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST would fail for other digest sizes. (2) It will
work for combinations where the maximum salt length is smaller than the
digest size, which typically happens with large digest sizes (e.g.,
SHA-512) and small RSA keys.
J.-S. Coron shows in "Optimal Security Proofs for PSS and Other
Signature Schemes. Advances in Cryptology – Eurocrypt 2002, volume 2332
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 272 – 287. Springer Verlag,
2002." that longer salts than the output size of modern hash functions
do not increase security: "For example,for an application in which at
most one billion signatures will be generated, k0 = 30 bits of random
salt are actually sufficient to guarantee the same level of security as
RSA, and taking a larger salt does not increase the security level."
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19724)
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Fixes openssl#19771
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19787)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19808)
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UNCOMPRESSED
Originally the code to im/export the EC pubkey was meant to be consumed
only by the im/export functions when crossing the provider boundary.
Having our providers exporting to a COMPRESSED format octet string made
sense to avoid memory waste, as it wasn't exposed outside the provider
API, and providers had all tools available to convert across the three
formats.
Later on, with #13139 deprecating the `EC_KEY_*` functions, more state
was added among the params imported/exported on an EC provider-native
key (including `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT`, although it
did not affect the format used to export `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY`).
Finally, in #14800, `EVP_PKEY_todata()` was introduced and prominently
exposed directly to users outside the provider API, and the choice of
COMPRESSED over UNCOMPRESSED as the default became less sensible in
light of usability, given the latter is more often needed by
applications and protocols.
This commit fixes it, by using `EC_KEY_get_conv_form()` to get the
point format from the internal state (an `EC_KEY` under the hood) of the
provider-side object, and using it on
`EVP_PKEY_export()`/`EVP_PKEY_todata()` to format
`OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY`.
The default for an `EC_KEY` was already UNCOMPRESSED, and it is altered
if the user sets `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_POINT_CONVERSION_FORMAT` via
`EVP_PKEY_fromdata()`, `EVP_PKEY_set_params()`, or one of the
more specialized methods.
For symmetry, this commit also alters `ec_pkey_export_to()` in
`crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c`, part of the `EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD` for legacy EC
keys: it exclusively used COMPRESSED format, and now it honors the
conversion format specified in the EC_KEY object being exported to a
provider when this function is called.
Expand documentation about `OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY` and mention the
3.1 change in behavior for our providers.
Fixes #16595
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19681)
(cherry picked from commit 926db476bc669fdcc4c4d2f1cb547060bdbfa153)
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This supports all the modes, suites and export mechanisms defined
in RFC9180 and should be relatively easily extensible if/as new
suites are added. The APIs are based on the pseudo-code from the
RFC, e.g. OSS_HPKE_encap() roughly maps to SetupBaseS(). External
APIs are defined in include/openssl/hpke.h and documented in
doc/man3/OSSL_HPKE_CTX_new.pod. Tests (test/hpke_test.c) include
verifying a number of the test vectors from the RFC as well as
round-tripping for all the modes and suites. We have demonstrated
interoperability with other HPKE implementations via a fork [1]
that implements TLS Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) which uses HPKE.
@slontis provided huge help in getting this done and this makes
extensive use of the KEM handling code from his PR#19068.
[1] https://github.com/sftcd/openssl/tree/ECH-draft-13c
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17172)
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TLS device offload allows to perform zerocopy sendfile transmissions.
FreeBSD provides this feature by default, and Linux 5.19 introduced it
as an opt-in. Zerocopy improves the TX rate significantly, but has a
side effect: if the underlying file is changed while being transmitted,
and a TCP retransmission happens, the receiver may get a TLS record
containing both new and old data, which leads to an authentication
failure and termination of connection. This effect is the reason Linux
makes a copy on sendfile by default.
This commit adds support for TLS zerocopy sendfile on Linux disabled by
default to avoid any unlikely backward compatibility issues on Linux,
although sacrificing consistency in OpenSSL's behavior on Linux and
FreeBSD. A new option called KTLSTxZerocopySendfile is added to enable
the new zerocopy behavior on Linux. This option should be used when the
the application guarantees that the file is not modified during
transmission, or it doesn't care about breaking the connection.
The related documentation is also added in this commit. The unit test
added doesn't test the actual functionality (it would require specific
hardware and a non-local peer), but solely checks that it's possible to
set the new option flag.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18650)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19565)
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