| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This removes all code surrounded by '#ifdef undef'
One case is left: memmove() replaced by open-coded for loop,
in crypto/stack/stack.c That needs further review.
Also removed a couple of instances of /* dead code */ if I saw them
while doing the main removal.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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If you examine changes, you are likely to wonder "but what about ILP64,
elusive as they are, don't they fall victim to 16-bit rationalization?"
No, the case was modeled and verified to work.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Rename OPENSSL_SYSNAME_xxx to OPENSSL_SYS_xxx
Remove MS_STATIC; it's a relic from platforms <32 bits.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Use setbuf(fp, NULL) instead of setvbuf(). This removes some
ifdef complexity because all of our platforms support setbuf.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160, OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD merged into OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
OPENSSL_NO_FP_API merged into OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
Two typo's on #endif comments fixed:
OPENSSL_NO_ECB fixed to OPENSSL_NO_OCB
OPENSSL_NO_HW_SureWare fixed to OPENSSL_NO_HW_SUREWARE
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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This last one for this ticket. Removes WIN16.
So long, MS_CALLBACK and MS_FAR. We won't miss you.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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This commit removes NCR, Tandem, Cray.
Regenerates TABLE.
Removes another missing BEOS fluff.
The last platform remaining on this ticket is WIN16.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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This is re-commit without unrelated modification.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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This reverts commit 4fec91506975f62a2f93be71a46acc7fae7eef45.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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when its SSL_CTX is updated.
From BoringSSL commit
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/a5dc545bbcffd9c24cebe65e9ab5ce72d4535e3a
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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This commit removes DG-UX.
It also flushes out some left-behinds in config.
And regenerates TABLE from Configure (hadn't been done in awhile).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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This commit removes Sinix/ReliantUNIX RM400
(And a missed piece of BEOS fluff)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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This commit removes MPE/iX
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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This commit removes SunOS (a sentimental favorite of mine).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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This commit removes all mention of NeXT and NextStep.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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This commit removes Sony NEWS4
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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This commit removes BEOS.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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In keygen, return KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL not INVALID_KEYBITS.
** I also increased the minimum from 256 to 512, which is now
documented in CHANGES file. **
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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the session's version (server).
See also BoringSSL's commit bdf5e72f50e25f0e45e825c156168766d8442dde.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.
(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)
Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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The server must send a NewSessionTicket message if it advertised one
in the ServerHello, so make a missing ticket message an alert
in the client.
An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
6444287806d801b9a45baf1f6f02a0e3a16e144c.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
announced in the initial ServerHello.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original: this
will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures.
Note: this is a precautionary measure, there is no known attack
which can exploit this.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e9128d9401ad617e17c5eb3772512c24b038b967)
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Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Fix a bunch of typo's and speling (sic) errors in the CHANGES file.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@cryptsoft.com>
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(If a change is already present in 1.0.1f or 1.0.1h,
don't list it again under changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.2.)
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(which didn't always handle value 0 correctly).
Reviewed-by: emilia@openssl.org
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Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Remove RFC5878 code. It is no longer needed for CT and has numerous bugs
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Closes #116.
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the master key in NSS keylog format. PR#3352
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