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this means that some implementations will be used automatically, e.g. aesni,
we do this for cryptodev anyway.
Setup cpuid in ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() too as some ENGINEs use it.
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TODO: robustness checking on name forms.
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This is currently *very* experimental and needs to be more fully integrated
with the main verification code.
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functions and macros.
This change has associated tags: LEVITTE_before_const and
LEVITTE_after_const. Those will be removed when this change has been
properly reviewed.
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See the commit log message for that for more information.
NB: X509_STORE_CTX's use of "ex_data" support was actually misimplemented
(initialisation by "memset" won't/can't/doesn't work). This fixes that but
requires that X509_STORE_CTX_init() be able to handle errors - so its
prototype has been changed to return 'int' rather than 'void'. All uses of
that function throughout the source code have been tracked down and
adjusted.
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setting stack (actually, array) values in ex_data. So only increment the
global counters if the underlying CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() call succeeds.
This change doesn't make "ex_data" right (see the comment at the head of
ex_data.c to know why), but at least makes the source code marginally less
frustrating.
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Split private key PEM and normal PEM handling. Private key
handling needs to link in stuff like PKCS#8.
Relocate the ASN1 *_dup() functions, to the relevant ASN1
modules using new macro IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION. Previously
these were all in crypto/x509/x_all.c along with every ASN1
BIO/fp function which linked in *every* ASN1 function if
a single dup was used.
Move the authority key id ASN1 structure to a separate file.
This is used in the X509 routines and its previous location
linked in all the v3 extension code.
Also move ASN1_tag2bit to avoid linking in a_bytes.c which
is now largely obsolete.
So far under Linux stripped binary with single PEM_read_X509
is now 238K compared to 380K before these changes.
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prototype hack. This unfortunately means that
every ASN1_*_END construct cannot have a
trailing ;
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to main trunk.
Lets see if the makes it to openssl-cvs :-)
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The old code was painfully primitive and couldn't handle
distinct certificates using the same subject name.
The new code performs several tests on a candidate issuer
certificate based on certificate extensions.
It also adds several callbacks to X509_VERIFY_CTX so its
behaviour can be customised.
Unfortunately some hackery was needed to persuade X509_STORE
to tolerate this. This should go away when X509_STORE is
replaced, sometime...
This must have broken something though :-(
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initialize ex_pathlen to -1 so it isn't checked if pathlen
is not present.
set ucert to NULL in apps/pkcs12.c otherwise it gets freed
twice.
remove extraneous '\r' in MIME encoder.
Allow a NULL to be passed to X509_gmtime_adj()
Make PKCS#7 code use definite length encoding rather then
the indefinite stuff it used previously.
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like Malloc, Realloc and especially Free conflict with already existing names
on some operating systems or other packages. That is reason enough to change
the names of the OpenSSL memory allocation macros to something that has a
better chance of being unique, like prepending them with OPENSSL_.
This change includes all the name changes needed throughout all C files.
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certificate: currently this includes trust settings
and a "friendly name".
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tolerated in certificates.
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ultimately lead to certificate chain verification. It is
VERY EXPERIMENTAL at present though.
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Fix a bug in the X509_get_d2i() functions which didn't check if crit was NULL.
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it is not needed.
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Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
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