| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160, OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD merged into OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
OPENSSL_NO_FP_API merged into OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
Two typo's on #endif comments fixed:
OPENSSL_NO_ECB fixed to OPENSSL_NO_OCB
OPENSSL_NO_HW_SureWare fixed to OPENSSL_NO_HW_SUREWARE
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Introduce use of DECLARE_DEPRECATED
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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When calling X509_set_version to set v1 certificate, that
should mean that the version number field is omitted.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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i2d_re_X509_tbs re-encodes the TBS portion of the certificate.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Add a declaration for get_issuer_sk() so that other
functions in x509_vf.c could use it. (Planned work
around cross-certification chains.)
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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Reduces number of silly casts in OpenSSL code and likely most
applications. Consistent with (char *) for "peername" value from
X509_check_host() and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername().
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Pass address of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID peername to X509_check_host().
Document modified interface.
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Declaration, memory management, accessor and documentation.
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Implemented as STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING).
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Just store NUL-terminated strings. This works better when we add
support for multiple hostnames.
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When looking for the issuer of a certificate, if current candidate is
expired, continue looking. Only return an expired certificate if no valid
certificates are found.
PR#3359
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Fixes to host checking wild card support and add support for
setting host checking flags when verifying a certificate
chain.
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(cherry picked from commit bdfc0e284c89dd5781259cc19aa264aded538492)
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when adding duplicates in add_cert_dir.
PR: 3261
Reported by: Marian Done
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When a chain is complete and ends in a trusted root checks are also
performed on the TA and the callback notified with ok==1. For
consistency do the same for chains where the TA is not self signed.
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Move the IP, email and host checking fields from the public
X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure into an opaque X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
structure. By doing this the structure can be modified in future
without risk of breaking any applications.
(cherry picked from commit adc6bd73e3bd10ce6e76867482e8d137071298d7)
Conflicts:
crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
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For consistency with other cases if we are performing
partial chain verification with just one certificate
notify the callback with ok==1.
(cherry picked from commit 852553d9005e13aed7feb986a5d71cb885b994c7)
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When verifying a partial path always check to see if the EE certificate
is explicitly trusted: the path could contain other untrusted certificates.
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PR #3090
Reported by: Franck Youssef <fry@open.ch>
If no new reason codes are obtained after checking a CRL exit with an
error to avoid repeatedly checking the same CRL.
This will only happen if verify errors such as invalid CRL scope are
overridden in a callback.
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Reencode certificates in X509_sign_ctx as well as X509_sign.
This was causing a problem in the x509 application when it modified an
existing certificate.
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the trust store.
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trusted store instead of the default which is to return an error if
we can't build the complete chain.
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