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* More Kerberos SSL patches from Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil>.Richard Levitte2001-07-211-68/+98
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | His comments are: This patch fixes the problem of modern Kerberos using "derived keys" to encrypt the authenticator by disabling the authenticator check for all derived keys enctypes. I think I've got all the bugfixes that Jeffrey and I discussed rolled into this. There were some problems with Jeffrey's code to convert the authenticator's Kerberos timestring into struct tm (e.g. Z, -1900; it helps to have an actual decryptable authenticator to play with). So I've shamelessly pushed in my code, while stealing some bits from Jeffrey.
* Prevent KSSL server from requesting a client certificate.Richard Levitte2001-07-121-1/+4
| | | | Submitted by Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@columbia.edu>
* paddr may be NULL. Do not crash if it is.Richard Levitte2001-07-121-5/+10
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* Changes to the Kerberos SSL code by Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@columbia.edu>Richard Levitte2001-07-111-6/+197
| | | | | | | | | | | His comments are: . adds use of replay cache to protect against replay attacks . adds functions kssl_tgt_is_available() and kssl_keytab_is_available() which are used within s3_lib.c and ssl_lib.c to determine at runtime whether or not KRB5 ciphers can be supported during the current session.
* Code to avoid the use of non-standard strptime(). ByRichard Levitte2001-07-111-7/+38
| | | | | | | | Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@columbia.edu> (Really, the time that's being parsed is a GeneralizedTime, so if ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_get() ever gets implemented, it should be used instead)
* Changes to the Kerberos SSL code by Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@columbia.edu>Richard Levitte2001-07-111-54/+123
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | His comments are: . Fixed all of the Windows dynamic loading functions, prototypes, etc. . Corrected all of the unsigned/signed comparison warnings . Replaced the references to krb5_cksumarray[] for two reasons. First, it was an internal variable that should not have been referenced outside the library; nor could it have been with a shared library with restricted exports. Second, the variable is no longer used in current Kerberos implementations. I replaced the code with equivalent functionality using functions that are exported from the library.
* If I define _XOPEN_SOURCE before including *any* system header file,Richard Levitte2001-07-091-1/+1
| | | | things will work much more smoothly.
* Patches from Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> to get Kerberos 5 inRichard Levitte2001-07-091-90/+858
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SSL according to RFC 2712. His comment is: This is a patch to openssl-SNAP-20010702 to support Kerberized SSL authentication. I'm expecting to have the full kssl-0.5 kit up on sourceforge by the end of the week. The full kit includes patches for mod-ssl, apache, and a few text clients. The sourceforge URL is http://sourceforge.net/projects/kssl/ . Thanks to a note from Simon Wilkinson I've replaced my KRB5 AP_REQ message with a real KerberosWrapper struct. I think this is fully RFC 2712 compliant now, including support for the optional authenticator field. I also added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for a few Kerberos structs; see crypto/krb5/ if you're interested.
* DEC C on VMS is pedantic by definition.Richard Levitte2001-02-201-1/+1
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* Use new-style system-id macros everywhere possible. I hope I haven'tRichard Levitte2001-02-201-5/+5
| | | | | | | missed any. This compiles and runs on Linux, and external applications have no problems with it. The definite test will be to build this on VMS.
* Temporary fix for build break.Ulf Möller2001-02-191-0/+1
| | | | It's still inconsistent - probably better to undo the whole OPENSSL_NO_* thing.
* Fix warnings.Ben Laurie2000-12-031-1/+7
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* Typo corrected.Richard Levitte2000-12-011-1/+1
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* First tentative impementation of Kerberos 5 cryptos and keys for SSL/TLS. ↵Richard Levitte2000-11-301-21/+473
| | | | Implemented by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil>, further hacked and distributed by Jeffrey Altman <jaltnab@columbia.edu>
* I've checked again and again. There really is no need to expand a toRichard Levitte2000-11-161-0/+582
4 times it's size when bn_sqr_recursive() won't look farther than the original length. Thereby, constification is no longer a problem.