| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Especially since after the #ifdef cleanups this is not useful.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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--strict-warnings started showing warnings for this today...
Surely an error should be raised if these reads fail?
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Change NextProto message processing to use the PACKET API.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Modify CertificateVerify processing to use the new PACKET API.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Use the PACKET API for processing ClientCertificate messages
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Some of the PACKET functions were returning incorrect data. An unfortunate
choice of test data in the unit test was masking the failure.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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The move of CCS into the state machine was causing make errors to fail. This
fixes it.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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The move of CCS into the state machine introduced a bug in ssl3_read_bytes.
The value of |recvd_type| was not being set if we are satisfying the request
from handshake fragment storage. This can occur, for example, with
renegotiation and causes the handshake to fail.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Continuing on from the previous commit this moves the processing of DTLS
CCS messages out of the record layer and into the state machine.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not
a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages.
Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality
is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake.
Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In
order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state
a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS.
Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should
only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not
visible to the state machine.
Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine.
This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit
will handle DTLS.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Uses the new PACKET code to process the incoming ClientHello including all
extensions etc.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Provide more robust (inline) functions to replace n2s, n2l, etc. These
functions do the same thing as the previous macros, but also keep track
of the amount of data remaining and return an error if we try to read more
data than we've got.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte
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Commit e481f9b90b164 removed OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT from the code.
Previously if OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT *was not* defined then the server random was
filled during getting of the ClientHello. If it *was* defined then the
server random would be filled in ssl3_send_server_hello(). Unfortunately in
commit e481f9b90b164 the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT guards were removed but *both*
server random fillings were left in. This could cause problems for session
ticket callbacks.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Note: some of the RFC4279 ciphersuites were originally part of PR#2464.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Move PSK premaster secret algorithm to ssl_generate_master secret so
existing key exchange code can be used and modified slightly to add
the PSK wrapping structure.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Add support for RSAPSK, DHEPSK and ECDHEPSK server side.
Update various checks to ensure certificate and server key exchange messages
are only sent when required.
Update message handling. PSK server key exchange parsing now include an
identity hint prefix for all PSK server key exchange messages. PSK
client key exchange message expects PSK identity and requests key for
all PSK key exchange ciphersuites.
Update flags for RSA, DH and ECDH so they are also used in PSK.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Add support for RSAPSK, DHEPSK and ECDHEPSK client side.
Update various checks to ensure certificate and server key exchange messages
are only expected when required.
Update message handling. PSK server key exchange parsing now expects an
identity hint prefix for all PSK server key exchange messages. PSK
client key exchange message requests PSK identity and key for all PSK
key exchange ciphersuites and includes identity in message.
Update flags for RSA, DH and ECDH so they are also used in PSK.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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For SHA384 PRF PSK ciphersuites we have to switch to default PRF for
TLS < 1.2
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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The DTLS code is supposed to drop packets if we try to write them out but
the underlying BIO write buffers are full. ssl3_write_pending() contains
an incorrect test for DTLS that controls this. The test only checks for
DTLS1 so DTLS1.2 does not correctly clear the internal OpenSSL buffer which
can later cause an assert to be hit. This commit changes the test to cover
all DTLS versions.
RT#3967
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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This flag was not set anywhere within the codebase (only read). It could
only be set by an app reaching directly into s->s3->flags and setting it
directly. However that method became impossible when libssl was opaquified.
Even in 1.0.2/1.0.1 if an app set the flag directly it is only relevant to
ssl3_connect(), which calls SSL_clear() during initialisation that clears
any flag settings. Therefore it could take effect if the app set the flag
after the handshake has started but before it completed. It seems quite
unlikely that any apps really do this (especially as it is completely
undocumented).
The purpose of the flag is suppress flushing of the write bio on the client
side at the end of the handshake after the client has written the Finished
message whilst resuming a session. This enables the client to send
application data as part of the same flight as the Finished message.
This flag also controls the setting of a second flag SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
There is an interesting comment in the code about this second flag in the
implementation of ssl3_write:
/* This is an experimental flag that sends the
* last handshake message in the same packet as the first
* use data - used to see if it helps the TCP protocol during
* session-id reuse */
It seems the experiment did not work because as far as I can tell nothing
is using this code. The above comment has been in the code since SSLeay.
This commit removes support for SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED, as well
as the associated SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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Add support for loading verify and chain stores in SSL_CONF.
Commands to set verify mode and client CA names.
Add documentation.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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The PSK identity hint should be stored in the SSL_SESSION structure
and not in the parent context (which will overwrite values used
by other SSL structures with the same SSL_CTX).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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We always free the handshake buffer when digests are freed so move
it into ssl_free_digest_list()
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Rewrite ssl3_digest_cached_records handling. Only digest cached records
if digest array is NULL: this means it is safe to call
ssl3_digest_cached_records multiple times (subsequent calls are no op).
Remove flag TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE instead only update handshake buffer
if digest array is NULL.
Add additional "keep" parameter to ssl3_digest_cached_records to indicate
if the handshake buffer should be retained after digesting cached records
(needed for TLS 1.2 client authentication).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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