| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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When computing the end-point shared secret, don't take the
terminating NULL character into account.
Please note that this fix breaks interoperability with older
versions of OpenSSL, which are not fixed.
Fixes #7956
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7957)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7767)
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Having post handshake auth automatically switched on breaks some
applications written for TLSv1.2. This changes things so that an explicit
function call is required for a client to indicate support for
post-handshake auth.
Fixes #6933.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6938)
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Ensure that the certificate required alert actually gets sent (and doesn't
get translated into handshake failure in TLSv1.3).
Ensure that proper reason codes are given for the new TLSv1.3 alerts.
Remove an out of date macro for TLS13_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA. This is a left
over from an earlier TLSv1.3 draft that is no longer used.
Fixes #6804
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6809)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #6208
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Adds application data into the encrypted session ticket
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3802)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.
* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code
Update documentation
Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests
DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error
Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.
This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
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This includes unnecessary use of the top as inclusion directory
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5132)
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IFF the client has ChaCha first, and server cipher priority is used,
and the new SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA_FOR_MOBILE option is used,
then reprioritize ChaCha above everything else. This way, A matching
ChaCha cipher will be selected if there is a match. If no ChaCha ciphers
match, then the other ciphers are used.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4436)
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Based on patch from Tomasz Moń:
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mailing.openssl.dev/fQxXvCg1uQY
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1008)
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When an SSL's context is swtiched from a ticket-enabled context to
a ticket-disabled context in the servername callback, no session-id
is generated, so the session can't be resumed.
If a servername callback changes the SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option, check
to see if it's changed to disable, and whether a session ticket is
expected (i.e. the client indicated ticket support and the SSL had
tickets enabled at the time), and whether we already have a previous
session (i.e. s->hit is set).
In this case, clear the ticket-expected flag, remove any ticket data
and generate a session-id in the session.
If the SSL hit (resumed) and switched to a ticket-disabled context,
assume that the resumption was via session-id, and don't bother to
update the session.
Before this fix, the updated unit-tests in 06-sni-ticket.conf would
fail test #4 (server1 = SNI, server2 = no SNI).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1529)
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"Early callback" is a little ambiguous now that early data exists.
Perhaps "ClientHello callback"?
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4349)
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cryptilib.h is the second.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4217)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4204)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4187)
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Apart from ssltest_old.c, the test suite relied on e_os.h for the
OSSL_NELEM macro and nothing else.
The ssltest_old.c also requires EXIT and some socket macros.
Create a new header to define the OSSL_NELEM macro and use that instead.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4186)
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This macro aborts the test which prevents later tests from executing. It also
bypasses the test framework output functionality.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3750)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3710)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3286)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3015)
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Add ExpectedClientCANames: for client auth this checks to see if the
list of certificate authorities supplied by the server matches the
expected value.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2969)
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Also add negative tests for password mismatch.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Don't create a custom boolean type for parsing CompressionExpected. Use
the existing one instead.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2814)
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Check whether we negotiate compression in various scenarios.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2814)
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Plumb things through in the same place as the SNI callback, since
we recommend that the early callback replace (and supplement) the
SNI callback, and add a few test cases.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2279)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2609)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2650)
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In 1.1.0 changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in
a crash leading to a DoS attack. In master this does not occur with TLS
(instead you get an internal error, which is still wrong but not a security
issue) - but the problem still exists in the DTLS code.
This commit provides a test for the issue.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2301)
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In test/ssl_test, parsing ExpectedClientSignHash ended up in the
expected_server_sign_hash field.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2289)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2235)
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2224)
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Add option ExpectedTmpKeyType to test the temporary key the server
sends is of the correct type.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2191)
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Includes addition of the various options to s_server/s_client. Also adds
one of the new TLS1.3 ciphersuites.
This isn't "real" TLS1.3!! It's identical to TLS1.2 apart from the protocol
and the ciphersuite...and the ciphersuite is just a renamed TLS1.2 one (not
a "real" TLS1.3 ciphersuite).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Add the ability to test both server initiated and client initiated reneg.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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The previous commit revealed a long standing problem where CertStatus
processing was broken in DTLS. This would have been revealed by better
testing - so add some!
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Make maximum fragment length configurable and add various fragmentation
tests, in addition to the existing multi-buffer tests.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Like OPENSSL_assert, but also prints the error stack before exiting.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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This commit only ports existing tests, and adds some coverage for
resumption. We don't appear to have any handshake tests that cover SCT
validation success, and this commit doesn't change that.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Move custom server and client options from the test dictionary to an
"extra" section of each server/client. Rename test expectations to say
"Expected".
This is a big but straightforward change. Primarily, this allows us to
specify multiple server and client contexts without redefining the
custom options for each of them. For example, instead of
"ServerNPNProtocols", "Server2NPNProtocols", "ResumeServerNPNProtocols",
we now have, "NPNProtocols".
This simplifies writing resumption and SNI tests. The first application
will be resumption tests for NPN and ALPN.
Regrouping the options also makes it clearer which options apply to the
server, which apply to the client, which configure the test, and which
are test expectations.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Fix the 80-test_ssl_test_ctx and 80-test_ssl_new tests when used with the
no-nextprotoneg option
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Undo review mistake: I changed the wrong strcmp in a previous pull
request. Add test.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Systematically test every server-side version downgrade or upgrade.
Client version upgrade or downgrade could be tested analogously but will
be done in a later change.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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In TLS during ClientAuth if the CA is not recognised you should get an
UnknownCA alert. In SSLv3 this does not exist and you should get a
BadCertificate alert.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Observe that the old tests were partly ill-defined:
setting sn_server1 but not sn_server2 in ssltest_old.c does not enable
the SNI callback.
Fix this, and also explicitly test both flavours of SNI mismatch (ignore
/ fatal alert). Tests still pass.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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