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authorKazuki Yamaguchi <k@rhe.jp>2016-09-20 21:27:28 +0900
committerKazuki Yamaguchi <k@rhe.jp>2016-09-28 14:38:30 +0900
commit8108e0a6db133f3375608303fdd2083eb5115062 (patch)
tree837db3f6cbf45b6239e24232e11dd391566a918d
parent4eda40878fc42ac5bad6dd7b1ebc8f0eac796b94 (diff)
downloadruby-openssl-topic/cipher-no-initialize-null-key.tar.gz
cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initializetopic/cipher-no-initialize-null-key
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28). r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate() before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV. The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL. So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any sense, this should not break existing applications. Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with their own responsibility. Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768 Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221 Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
-rw-r--r--ext/openssl/ossl_cipher.c25
-rw-r--r--test/test_cipher.rb29
2 files changed, 36 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/ext/openssl/ossl_cipher.c b/ext/openssl/ossl_cipher.c
index f1f3459e..ffa080b5 100644
--- a/ext/openssl/ossl_cipher.c
+++ b/ext/openssl/ossl_cipher.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
*/
VALUE cCipher;
VALUE eCipherError;
-static ID id_auth_tag_len;
+static ID id_auth_tag_len, id_key_set;
static VALUE ossl_cipher_alloc(VALUE klass);
static void ossl_cipher_free(void *ptr);
@@ -118,7 +118,6 @@ ossl_cipher_initialize(VALUE self, VALUE str)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
char *name;
- unsigned char dummy_key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 };
name = StringValueCStr(str);
GetCipherInit(self, ctx);
@@ -129,16 +128,7 @@ ossl_cipher_initialize(VALUE self, VALUE str)
if (!(cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(name))) {
ossl_raise(rb_eRuntimeError, "unsupported cipher algorithm (%"PRIsVALUE")", str);
}
- /*
- * EVP_CipherInit_ex() allows to specify NULL to key and IV, however some
- * ciphers don't handle well (OpenSSL's bug). [Bug #2768]
- *
- * The EVP which has EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY flag (such as DES3) allows
- * uninitialized key, but other EVPs (such as AES) does not allow it.
- * Calling EVP_CipherUpdate() without initializing key causes SEGV so we
- * set the data filled with "\0" as the key by default.
- */
- if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, dummy_key, NULL, -1) != 1)
+ if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1) != 1)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
return self;
@@ -251,6 +241,9 @@ ossl_cipher_init(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self, int mode)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
}
+ if (p_key)
+ rb_ivar_set(self, id_key_set, Qtrue);
+
return self;
}
@@ -337,6 +330,8 @@ ossl_cipher_pkcs5_keyivgen(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof key);
OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, sizeof iv);
+ rb_ivar_set(self, id_key_set, Qtrue);
+
return Qnil;
}
@@ -387,6 +382,9 @@ ossl_cipher_update(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "11", &data, &str);
+ if (!RTEST(rb_attr_get(self, id_key_set)))
+ ossl_raise(eCipherError, "key not set");
+
StringValue(data);
in = (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(data);
if ((in_len = RSTRING_LEN(data)) == 0)
@@ -488,6 +486,8 @@ ossl_cipher_set_key(VALUE self, VALUE key)
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(key), NULL, -1) != 1)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
+ rb_ivar_set(self, id_key_set, Qtrue);
+
return key;
}
@@ -1082,4 +1082,5 @@ Init_ossl_cipher(void)
rb_define_method(cCipher, "padding=", ossl_cipher_set_padding, 1);
id_auth_tag_len = rb_intern_const("auth_tag_len");
+ id_key_set = rb_intern_const("key_set");
}
diff --git a/test/test_cipher.rb b/test/test_cipher.rb
index 74c5394f..015bb561 100644
--- a/test/test_cipher.rb
+++ b/test/test_cipher.rb
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ class OpenSSL::TestCipher < OpenSSL::TestCase
def test_empty_data
@c1.encrypt
+ @c1.random_key
assert_raise(ArgumentError){ @c1.update("") }
end
@@ -136,12 +137,10 @@ class OpenSSL::TestCipher < OpenSSL::TestCase
}
end
- def test_AES_crush
- 500.times do
- assert_nothing_raised("[Bug #2768]") do
- # it caused OpenSSL SEGV by uninitialized key
- OpenSSL::Cipher::AES128.new("ECB").update "." * 17
- end
+ def test_update_raise_if_key_not_set
+ assert_raise(OpenSSL::Cipher::CipherError) do
+ # it caused OpenSSL SEGV by uninitialized key [Bug #2768]
+ OpenSSL::Cipher::AES128.new("ECB").update "." * 17
end
end
@@ -317,6 +316,24 @@ class OpenSSL::TestCipher < OpenSSL::TestCase
}
end if has_cipher?("aes-128-ocb")
+ def test_aes_gcm_key_iv_order_issue
+ pt = "[ruby/openssl#49]"
+ cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new("aes-128-gcm").encrypt
+ cipher.key = "x" * 16
+ cipher.iv = "a" * 12
+ ct1 = cipher.update(pt) << cipher.final
+ tag1 = cipher.auth_tag
+
+ cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new("aes-128-gcm").encrypt
+ cipher.iv = "a" * 12
+ cipher.key = "x" * 16
+ ct2 = cipher.update(pt) << cipher.final
+ tag2 = cipher.auth_tag
+
+ assert_equal ct1, ct2
+ assert_equal tag1, tag2
+ end if has_cipher?("aes-128-gcm")
+
private
def new_encryptor(algo)