diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ext')
-rwxr-xr-x | ext/openssl/ossl_ts.c | 178 |
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 123 deletions
diff --git a/ext/openssl/ossl_ts.c b/ext/openssl/ossl_ts.c index f8e290b3..007bc251 100755 --- a/ext/openssl/ossl_ts.c +++ b/ext/openssl/ossl_ts.c @@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ ossl_ts_resp_get_status_text(VALUE self) GetTSResponse(self, resp); si = TS_RESP_get_status_info(resp); - if (text = TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_text(si)) { + if ((text = TS_STATUS_INFO_get0_text(si))) { for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); i++) { current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i); rb_ary_push(ret, asn1str_to_str(current)); @@ -887,157 +887,83 @@ ossl_ts_resp_to_der(VALUE self) return asn1_to_der((void *)resp, (int (*)(void *, unsigned char **))i2d_TS_RESP); } -static void int_ossl_init_roots(VALUE roots, X509_STORE * store) -{ - STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *inf; - X509_INFO *itmp; - BIO *in; - int i; - - if (roots == Qnil) { - X509_STORE_free(store); - ossl_raise(rb_eTypeError, "roots must not be nil."); - } - else if (rb_obj_is_kind_of(roots, rb_cArray)) { - for (i=0; i < RARRAY_LEN(roots); i++) { - VALUE cert = rb_ary_entry(roots, i); - X509_STORE_add_cert(store, GetX509CertPtr(cert)); - } - } - else if (rb_obj_is_kind_of(roots, cX509Cert)) { - X509_STORE_add_cert(store, GetX509CertPtr(roots)); - } - else { - in = ossl_obj2bio(&roots); - inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); - BIO_free(in); - if(!inf) { - X509_STORE_free(store); - ossl_raise(eTimestampError, "Could not parse root certificates."); - } - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(inf); i++) { - itmp = sk_X509_INFO_value(inf, i); - if (itmp->x509) { - X509_STORE_add_cert(store, itmp->x509); - } - /* ignore CRLs deliberately */ - } - sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(inf, X509_INFO_free); - } -} - -void -int_ossl_verify_ctx_set_certs(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs) -{ - int i; - - if (!certs) - return; - - TS_VERIFY_CTS_set_certs(ctx, certs); - - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); ++i) { - X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i); - X509_up_ref(cert); - } -} - /* * Verifies a timestamp token by checking the signature, validating the * certificate chain implied by tsa_certificate and by checking conformance to * a given Request. Mandatory parameters are the Request associated to this - * Response, and one or more root certificates (self-signed). The root - * certificates can be passed in various forms: - * * a single OpenSSL::X509::Certificate - * * an Array of OpenSSL::X509::Certificate - * * a File instance containing a list of PEM-encoded certificates - * * a +string+ containing a list of PEM-encoded certificates + * Response, and an OpenSSL::X509::Store of trusted roots. * - * Furthermore, intermediate certificates can optionally be supplied for - * creating the certificate chain. These intermediate certificates must all be + * Intermediate certificates can optionally be supplied for creating the + * certificate chain. These intermediate certificates must all be * instances of OpenSSL::X509::Certificate. * * If validation fails, several kinds of exceptions can be raised: * * TypeError if types don't fit - * * TimestampError if something is wrong with the timestamp token itself or if - * it is not conformant to the Request - * * CertificateValidationError if validation of the timestamp certificate chain - * fails. + * * TimestampError if something is wrong with the timestamp token itself, if + * it is not conformant to the Request, or if validation of the timestamp + * certificate chain fails. * * call-seq: - * response.verify(Request, root_certificate) -> Response - * response.verify(Request, root_certificate, intermediate_cert1, intermediate_cert2, ...) -> Response - * response.verify(Request, [ root_certificate1, root_certificate2 ]) -> Response - * response.verify(Request, [ root_cert1, root_cert2 ]. intermediate1, intermediate2, ...) -> Response - * response.verify(Request, File) -> Response - * response.verify(Request, File, intermediate1, intermediate2, ...) -> Response - * response.verify(Request, string) -> Response - * response.verify(Request, string, intermediate1, intermediate2, ...) -> Response + * response.verify(Request, root_store) -> Response + * response.verify(Request, root_store, [intermediate_cert]) -> Response */ static VALUE ossl_ts_resp_verify(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self) { - VALUE untrusted = Qnil; - VALUE ts_cert; - VALUE roots; - VALUE ts_req; + VALUE ts_req, store, intermediates; TS_RESP *resp; - PKCS7* p7; - TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx; - X509_STORE *store; TS_REQ *req; - STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL; - VALUE cert; - int i, ok; + X509_STORE *x509st; + TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx; + STACK_OF(X509) *x509inter = NULL; + PKCS7* p7; + X509 *cert; + int status, i, ok; - rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "2*", &ts_req, &roots, &untrusted); + rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "21", &ts_req, &store, &intermediates); GetTSResponse(self, resp); GetTSRequest(ts_req, req); + x509st = GetX509StorePtr(store); - if (!(store = X509_STORE_new())) - ossl_raise(eTimestampError, NULL); - int_ossl_init_roots(roots, store); + if (!(ctx = TS_REQ_to_TS_VERIFY_CTX(req, NULL))) { + ossl_raise(eTimestampError, "Error when creating the verification context."); + } - ts_cert = ossl_ts_resp_get_tsa_certificate(self); - if (ts_cert != Qnil || untrusted != Qnil) { - if (!(certs = sk_X509_new_null())) { - X509_STORE_free(store); - ossl_raise(eTimestampError, NULL); - } - if (ts_cert != Qnil) { - if (!(p7 = TS_RESP_get_token(resp))) { - X509_STORE_free(store); - sk_X509_free(certs); - ossl_raise(eTimestampError, "TS_RESP_get_token"); - } - for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(p7->d.sign->cert); i++) { - sk_X509_push(certs, sk_X509_value(p7->d.sign->cert, i)); - } - } - if (untrusted != Qnil) { - if (rb_obj_is_kind_of(untrusted, rb_cArray)) { - for (i=0; i < RARRAY_LEN(untrusted); i++) { - cert = rb_ary_entry(untrusted, i); - sk_X509_push(certs, GetX509CertPtr(cert)); - } - } - else { - sk_X509_push(certs, GetX509CertPtr(untrusted)); - } + if (intermediates != Qnil) { + x509inter = ossl_protect_x509_ary2sk(intermediates, &status); + if (status) { + TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(ctx); + rb_jump_tag(status); } + } else { + x509inter = sk_X509_new_null(); } - if (!(ctx = TS_REQ_to_TS_VERIFY_CTX(req, NULL))) { - X509_STORE_free(store); - sk_X509_free(certs); - ossl_raise(eTimestampError, "Error when creating the verification context."); - } - int_ossl_verify_ctx_set_certs(ctx, certs); - TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(ctx, store); + if (!(p7 = TS_RESP_get_token(resp))) { + TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(ctx); + sk_X509_pop_free(x509inter, X509_free); + ossl_raise(eTimestampError, "TS_RESP_get_token"); + } + for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(p7->d.sign->cert); i++) { + cert = sk_X509_value(p7->d.sign->cert, i); + X509_up_ref(cert); + sk_X509_push(x509inter, cert); + } + + TS_VERIFY_CTS_set_certs(ctx, x509inter); TS_VERIFY_CTX_add_flags(ctx, TS_VFY_SIGNATURE); + TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(ctx, x509st); ok = TS_RESP_verify_response(ctx, resp); + + /* WORKAROUND: + * X509_STORE can count references, but X509_STORE_free() doesn't check + * this. To prevent our X509_STORE from being freed with our + * TS_VERIFY_CTX we set the store to NULL first. + * Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2; bff9ce4db38b (master), 5b4b9ce976fc (1.0.2) + */ + TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(ctx, NULL); TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(ctx); if (!ok) @@ -1046,6 +972,12 @@ ossl_ts_resp_verify(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self) return self; } +void +ossl_ts_verify_ctx_free(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx) +{ + +} + static ASN1_INTEGER * ossl_tsfac_serial_cb(struct TS_resp_ctx *ctx, void *data) { |