aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/ext/openssl/ossl.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorrhe <rhe@b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e>2016-05-20 15:05:25 +0000
committerrhe <rhe@b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e>2016-05-20 15:05:25 +0000
commitf4a408b8d2741b25051152198387129493ece147 (patch)
tree49c9339ea609dadfc6bc96012cb4f362d3c6869f /ext/openssl/ossl.c
parent7f6f4b22bbfc398c67b19e27bdb6ed1a57f91209 (diff)
downloadruby-f4a408b8d2741b25051152198387129493ece147.tar.gz
openssl: improve handling of password for encrypted PEM
* ext/openssl/ossl.c (ossl_pem_passwd_value): Added. Convert the argument to String with StringValue() and validate the length is in 4..PEM_BUFSIZE. PEM_BUFSIZE is a macro defined in OpenSSL headers. (ossl_pem_passwd_cb): When reading/writing encrypted PEM format, we used to pass the password to PEM_def_callback() directly but it was problematic. It is not NUL character safe. And surprisingly, it silently truncates the password to 1024 bytes. [GH ruby/openssl#51] * ext/openssl/ossl.h: Add function prototype declaration of newly added ossl_pem_passwd_value(). * ext/openssl/ossl_pkey.c (ossl_pkey_new_from_data): Use ossl_pem_passwd_value() to validate the password String. * ext/openssl/ossl_pkey_dsa.c (ossl_dsa_initialize, ossl_dsa_export): ditto. * ext/openssl/ossl_pkey_ec.c (ossl_ec_key_initialize, ossl_ec_key_to_string): ditto. * ext/openssl/ossl_pkey_rsa.c (ossl_rsa_initialize, ossl_rsa_export): ditto. * test/openssl/test_pkey_{dsa,ec,rsa}.rb: test this. git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@55087 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
Diffstat (limited to 'ext/openssl/ossl.c')
-rw-r--r--ext/openssl/ossl.c57
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/ext/openssl/ossl.c b/ext/openssl/ossl.c
index 2b5579e389..a0a7574cc6 100644
--- a/ext/openssl/ossl.c
+++ b/ext/openssl/ossl.c
@@ -147,6 +147,31 @@ ossl_buf2str(char *buf, int len)
/*
* our default PEM callback
*/
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL requires passwords for PEM-encoded files to be at least four
+ * characters long. See crypto/pem/pem_lib.c (as of 1.0.2h)
+ */
+#define OSSL_MIN_PWD_LEN 4
+
+VALUE
+ossl_pem_passwd_value(VALUE pass)
+{
+ if (NIL_P(pass))
+ return Qnil;
+
+ StringValue(pass);
+
+ if (RSTRING_LEN(pass) < OSSL_MIN_PWD_LEN)
+ ossl_raise(eOSSLError, "password must be at least %d bytes", OSSL_MIN_PWD_LEN);
+ /* PEM_BUFSIZE is currently used as the second argument of pem_password_cb,
+ * that is +max_len+ of ossl_pem_passwd_cb() */
+ if (RSTRING_LEN(pass) > PEM_BUFSIZE)
+ ossl_raise(eOSSLError, "password must be shorter than %d bytes", PEM_BUFSIZE);
+
+ return pass;
+}
+
static VALUE
ossl_pem_passwd_cb0(VALUE flag)
{
@@ -159,13 +184,29 @@ ossl_pem_passwd_cb0(VALUE flag)
}
int
-ossl_pem_passwd_cb(char *buf, int max_len, int flag, void *pwd)
+ossl_pem_passwd_cb(char *buf, int max_len, int flag, void *pwd_)
{
- int len, status = 0;
- VALUE rflag, pass;
+ int len, status;
+ VALUE rflag, pass = (VALUE)pwd_;
+
+ if (RTEST(pass)) {
+ /* PEM_def_callback(buf, max_len, flag, StringValueCStr(pass)) does not
+ * work because it does not allow NUL characters and truncates to 1024
+ * bytes silently if the input is over 1024 bytes */
+ if (RB_TYPE_P(pass, T_STRING)) {
+ len = RSTRING_LEN(pass);
+ if (len >= OSSL_MIN_PWD_LEN && len <= max_len) {
+ memcpy(buf, RSTRING_PTR(pass), len);
+ return len;
+ }
+ }
+ OSSL_Debug("passed data is not valid String???");
+ return -1;
+ }
- if (pwd || !rb_block_given_p())
- return PEM_def_callback(buf, max_len, flag, pwd);
+ if (!rb_block_given_p()) {
+ return PEM_def_callback(buf, max_len, flag, NULL);
+ }
while (1) {
/*
@@ -181,12 +222,12 @@ ossl_pem_passwd_cb(char *buf, int max_len, int flag, void *pwd)
return -1;
}
len = RSTRING_LENINT(pass);
- if (len < 4) { /* 4 is OpenSSL hardcoded limit */
- rb_warning("password must be longer than 4 bytes");
+ if (len < OSSL_MIN_PWD_LEN) {
+ rb_warning("password must be at least %d bytes", OSSL_MIN_PWD_LEN);
continue;
}
if (len > max_len) {
- rb_warning("password must be shorter then %d bytes", max_len-1);
+ rb_warning("password must be shorter than %d bytes", max_len);
continue;
}
memcpy(buf, RSTRING_PTR(pass), len);