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author | rhe <rhe@b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e> | 2016-05-20 15:05:25 +0000 |
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committer | rhe <rhe@b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e> | 2016-05-20 15:05:25 +0000 |
commit | f52ab6e4940f9095c4fc5e2f7860bd56747f1c7c (patch) | |
tree | 49c9339ea609dadfc6bc96012cb4f362d3c6869f /ext/openssl/ossl_pkey_dsa.c | |
parent | 02cafdf4916480c2a5b015553cf5b02d6120aed4 (diff) | |
download | ruby-f52ab6e4940f9095c4fc5e2f7860bd56747f1c7c.tar.gz |
openssl: improve handling of password for encrypted PEM
* ext/openssl/ossl.c (ossl_pem_passwd_value): Added. Convert the
argument to String with StringValue() and validate the length is in
4..PEM_BUFSIZE. PEM_BUFSIZE is a macro defined in OpenSSL headers.
(ossl_pem_passwd_cb): When reading/writing encrypted PEM format, we
used to pass the password to PEM_def_callback() directly but it was
problematic. It is not NUL character safe. And surprisingly, it
silently truncates the password to 1024 bytes. [GH ruby/openssl#51]
* ext/openssl/ossl.h: Add function prototype declaration of newly
added ossl_pem_passwd_value().
* ext/openssl/ossl_pkey.c (ossl_pkey_new_from_data): Use
ossl_pem_passwd_value() to validate the password String.
* ext/openssl/ossl_pkey_dsa.c (ossl_dsa_initialize, ossl_dsa_export):
ditto.
* ext/openssl/ossl_pkey_ec.c (ossl_ec_key_initialize,
ossl_ec_key_to_string): ditto.
* ext/openssl/ossl_pkey_rsa.c (ossl_rsa_initialize, ossl_rsa_export):
ditto.
* test/openssl/test_pkey_{dsa,ec,rsa}.rb: test this.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@55087 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
Diffstat (limited to 'ext/openssl/ossl_pkey_dsa.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ext/openssl/ossl_pkey_dsa.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/ext/openssl/ossl_pkey_dsa.c b/ext/openssl/ossl_pkey_dsa.c index 4c0c3f1bd7..281d3a00c9 100644 --- a/ext/openssl/ossl_pkey_dsa.c +++ b/ext/openssl/ossl_pkey_dsa.c @@ -216,7 +216,6 @@ ossl_dsa_initialize(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self) EVP_PKEY *pkey; DSA *dsa; BIO *in; - char *passwd = NULL; VALUE arg, pass; GetPKey(self, pkey); @@ -229,10 +228,10 @@ ossl_dsa_initialize(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self) } } else { - if (!NIL_P(pass)) passwd = StringValuePtr(pass); + pass = ossl_pem_passwd_value(pass); arg = ossl_to_der_if_possible(arg); in = ossl_obj2bio(arg); - dsa = PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey(in, NULL, ossl_pem_passwd_cb, passwd); + dsa = PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey(in, NULL, ossl_pem_passwd_cb, (void *)pass); if (!dsa) { OSSL_BIO_reset(in); dsa = PEM_read_bio_DSA_PUBKEY(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); @@ -320,26 +319,20 @@ ossl_dsa_export(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self) EVP_PKEY *pkey; BIO *out; const EVP_CIPHER *ciph = NULL; - char *passwd = NULL; VALUE cipher, pass, str; GetPKeyDSA(self, pkey); rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "02", &cipher, &pass); if (!NIL_P(cipher)) { ciph = GetCipherPtr(cipher); - if (!NIL_P(pass)) { - StringValue(pass); - if (RSTRING_LENINT(pass) < OSSL_MIN_PWD_LEN) - ossl_raise(eOSSLError, "OpenSSL requires passwords to be at least four characters long"); - passwd = RSTRING_PTR(pass); - } + pass = ossl_pem_passwd_value(pass); } if (!(out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) { ossl_raise(eDSAError, NULL); } if (DSA_HAS_PRIVATE(pkey->pkey.dsa)) { if (!PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(out, pkey->pkey.dsa, ciph, - NULL, 0, ossl_pem_passwd_cb, passwd)){ + NULL, 0, ossl_pem_passwd_cb, (void *)pass)){ BIO_free(out); ossl_raise(eDSAError, NULL); } |