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| author | Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> | 2020-04-06 10:41:36 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> | 2020-04-07 13:21:13 +0200 |
| commit | 1eb9b54af7e00fa12196411964ce742ea8677766 (patch) | |
| tree | 76c5d90d1a031b3ac7446e311062035929ba62b3 /crypto/ec/ec_lib.c | |
| parent | d803930448476c3a6c50904b1cfb5ef20433652f (diff) | |
| download | openssl-1eb9b54af7e00fa12196411964ce742ea8677766.tar.gz | |
Fix the error handling in EC_POINTs_mul
This was pointed out by a false-positive
-fsanitizer warning ;-)
However from the cryptographical POV the
code is wrong:
A point R^0 on the wrong curve
is infinity on the wrong curve.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11475)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/ec/ec_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/ec/ec_lib.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c index 5540ec1bc2..f90d833914 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c @@ -1051,14 +1051,14 @@ int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; #endif - if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0)) { - return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); - } - if (!ec_point_is_compat(r, group)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); return 0; } + + if (scalar == NULL && num == 0) + return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (!ec_point_is_compat(points[i], group)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); |