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author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2015-06-25 09:47:15 +0100 |
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committer | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2015-07-07 21:57:11 +0100 |
commit | aae41f8c54257d9fa6904d3a9aa09c5db6cefd0d (patch) | |
tree | dfdf107f25fc6355b6427091b8a178854c091d3b /doc | |
parent | 593e9c638c58e1a510c519db0d024527113330f3 (diff) | |
download | openssl-aae41f8c54257d9fa6904d3a9aa09c5db6cefd0d.tar.gz |
Reject calls to X509_verify_cert that have not been reinitialised
The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
|ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase where
|ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
in between.
2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
the value of |ctx->chain| directly.
With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
not be supported to allow this.
With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.
Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
|ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod | 3 |
2 files changed, 11 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod index d8d3346632..7c154572ec 100644 --- a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod +++ b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod @@ -40,10 +40,15 @@ is no longer valid. If B<ctx> is NULL nothing is done. X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up B<ctx> for a subsequent verification operation. -The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end entity certificate -to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional certificates (which -will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in B<chain>. Any or -all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be B<NULL>. +It must be called before each call to X509_verify_cert(), i.e. a B<ctx> is only +good for one call to X509_verify_cert(); if you want to verify a second +certificate with the same B<ctx> then you must call X509_XTORE_CTX_cleanup() +and then X509_STORE_CTX_init() again before the second call to +X509_verify_cert(). The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end +entity certificate to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional +certificates (which will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in +B<chain>. Any or all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be +B<NULL>. X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of B<ctx> to B<sk>. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod index e5cfc6f813..48055b0f96 100644 --- a/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod +++ b/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod @@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ OpenSSL internally for certificate validation, in both the S/MIME and SSL/TLS code. The negative return value from X509_verify_cert() can only occur if no -certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error) or if a retry +certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error); if X509_verify_cert() +twice without reinitialising B<ctx> in between; or if a retry operation is requested during internal lookups (which never happens with standard lookup methods). It is however recommended that application check for <= 0 return value on error. |