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* Copyright year updatesMatt Caswell2023-09-071-1/+1
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Release: yes
* ec: update to structure based atomicsPauli2023-07-011-8/+4
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21260)
* Stop raising ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE in most placesRichard Levitte2022-10-051-7/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since OPENSSL_malloc() and friends report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, and at least handle the file name and line number they are called from, there's no need to report ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE where they are called directly, or when SSLfatal() and RLAYERfatal() is used, the reason `ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` is changed to `ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB`. There were a number of places where `ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE` was reported even though it was a function from a different sub-system that was called. Those places are changed to report ERR_R_{lib}_LIB, where {lib} is the name of that sub-system. Some of them are tricky to get right, as we have a lot of functions that belong in the ASN1 sub-system, and all the `sk_` calls or from the CRYPTO sub-system. Some extra adaptation was necessary where there were custom OPENSSL_malloc() wrappers, and some bugs are fixed alongside these changes. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19301)
* Rework and make DEBUG macros consistent.Rich Salz2021-05-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove unused -DCONF_DEBUG and -DBN_CTX_DEBUG. Rename REF_PRINT to REF_DEBUG for consistency, and add a new tracing category and use it for printing reference counts. Rename -DDEBUG_UNUSED to -DUNUSED_RESULT_DEBUG Fix BN_DEBUG_RAND so it compiles and, when set, force DEBUG_RAND to be set also. Rename engine_debug_ref to be ENGINE_REF_PRINT also for consistency. Fixes #15357 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15353)
* Use numbers definition of int128_t and uint128_tAmitay Isaacs2021-04-081-5/+3
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Amitay Isaacs <amitay@ozlabs.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14784)
* Update copyright yearMatt Caswell2021-03-111-1/+1
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14512)
* Fix external symbols related to ec & sm2 keysShane Lontis2021-02-261-79/+81
| | | | | | | | | | | Partial fix for #12964 This adds ossl_ names for the following symbols: ec_*, ecx_*, ecdh_*, ecdsa_*, sm2_* Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14231)
* Convert all {NAME}err() in crypto/ to their corresponding ERR_raise() callRichard Levitte2020-11-131-18/+14
| | | | | | | | | | This includes error reporting for libcrypto sub-libraries in surprising places. This was done using util/err-to-raise Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13318)
* Avoid undefined behavior with unaligned accessesBernd Edlinger2020-05-271-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | Fixes: #4983 [extended tests] Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6074)
* Rename FIPS_MODE to FIPS_MODULERichard Levitte2020-04-281-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | This macro is used to determine if certain pieces of code should become part of the FIPS module or not. The old name was confusing. Fixes #11538 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11539)
* Update copyright yearMatt Caswell2020-04-231-1/+1
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11616)
* [crypto/ec] deprecate Jprojective_coordinates_GFp functionsBilly Brumley2020-04-221-6/+3
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11527)
* Use build.info, not ifdef for crypto modulesRich Salz2020-04-161-13/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | Don't wrap conditionally-compiled files in global ifndef tests. Instead, test if the feature is disabled and, if so, do not compile it. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11263)
* Deprecate the ECDSA and EV_KEY_METHOD functions.Pauli2020-02-041-0/+6
| | | | | | | | Use of the low level ECDSA and EC_KEY_METHOD functions has been informally discouraged for a long time. We now formally deprecate them. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10960)
* Fix potential SCA vulnerability in some EC_METHODsNicola Tuveri2020-01-051-4/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This commit addresses a potential side-channel vulnerability in the internals of some elliptic curve low level operations. The side-channel leakage appears to be tiny, so the severity of this issue is rather low. The issue was reported by David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9239)
* Reorganize local header filesDr. Matthias St. Pierre2019-09-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called local header files, which are located next to source files in the source directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like '*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h' This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
* [ec/ecp_nistp*.c] restyle: use {} around `else` tooNicola Tuveri2019-09-071-6/+6
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
* [ec/ecp_nistp*.c] remove flip_endian()Nicola Tuveri2019-09-071-28/+20
| | | | | | | | | Replace flip_endian() by using the little endian specific BN_bn2lebinpad() and BN_lebin2bn(). Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
* Fix a SCA leak using BN_bn2bin()Nicola Tuveri2019-09-071-7/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BN_bn2bin() is not constant-time and leaks the number of bits in the processed BIGNUM. The specialized methods in ecp_nistp224.c, ecp_nistp256.c and ecp_nistp521.c internally used BN_bn2bin() to convert scalars into the internal fixed length representation. This can leak during ECDSA/ECDH key generation or handling the nonce while generating an ECDSA signature, when using these implementations. The amount and risk of leaked information useful for a SCA attack varies for each of the three curves, as it depends mainly on the ratio between the bitlength of the curve subgroup order (governing the size of the secret nonce/key) and the limb size for the internal BIGNUM representation (which depends on the compilation target architecture). To fix this, we replace BN_bn2bin() with BN_bn2binpad(), bounding the output length to the width of the internal representation buffer: this length is public. Internally the final implementation of both BN_bn2binpad() and BN_bn2bin() already has masking in place to avoid leaking bn->top through memory access patterns. Memory access pattern still leaks bn->dmax, the size of the lazily allocated buffer for representing the BIGNUM, which is inevitable with the current BIGNUM architecture: reading past bn->dmax would be an out-of-bound read. As such, it's the caller responsibility to ensure that bn->dmax does not leak secret information, by explicitly expanding the internal BIGNUM buffer to a public value sufficient to avoid any lazy reallocation while manipulating it: this is already done at the top level alongside setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. Finally, the internal implementation of BN_bn2binpad() indirectly calls BN_num_bits() via BN_num_bytes(): the current implementation of BN_num_bits() can leak information to a SCA attacker, and is addressed in the next commit. Thanks to David Schrammel and Samuel Weiser for reporting this issue through responsible disclosure. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9511)
* Fix 9bf682f which broke nistp224_methodPatrick Steuer2019-08-161-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9607)
* Enable curve-spefific ECDSA implementations via EC_METHODPatrick Steuer2019-08-151-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | which are already enabled for ECDH. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9348)
* Fix enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128Matt Caswell2019-08-071-2/+2
| | | | | | | When creating a BN_CTX, make sure we store it in the right variable! Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9546)
* Make the EC code available from inside the FIPS providerMatt Caswell2019-08-061-6/+21
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9380)
* Make the array zeroing explicit using memset.Pauli2019-03-291-1/+3
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8611)
* SCA hardening for mod. field inversion in EC_GROUPBilly Brumley2019-02-171-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This commit adds a dedicated function in `EC_METHOD` to access a modular field inversion implementation suitable for the specifics of the implemented curve, featuring SCA countermeasures. The new pointer is defined as: `int (*field_inv)(const EC_GROUP*, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX*)` and computes the multiplicative inverse of `a` in the underlying field, storing the result in `r`. Three implementations are included, each including specific SCA countermeasures: - `ec_GFp_simple_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through blinding. - `ec_GFp_mont_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through Fermat's Little Theorem (FLT) inversion. - `ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv()`, that uses `BN_GF2m_mod_inv()` which already features SCA hardening through blinding. From a security point of view, this also helps addressing a leakage previously affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates. This commit also adds a new error reason code (i.e., `EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT`) to improve consistency between the three implementations as all of them could fail for the same reason but through different code paths resulting in inconsistent error stack states. Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8254)
* Following the license change, modify the boilerplates in crypto/ec/Richard Levitte2018-12-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | [skip ci] Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7791)
* Use the new non-curve type specific EC functions internallyMatt Caswell2018-07-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | Fixes #6646 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6815)
* EC2M Lopez-Dahab ladder: use it also for ECDSA verifyNicola Tuveri2018-07-161-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | By default `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` (which uses the Lopez-Dahab ladder implementation) is used only for (k * Generator) or (k * VariablePoint). ECDSA verification uses (a * Generator + b * VariablePoint): this commit forces the use of `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` also for the ECDSA verification path, while using the default wNAF implementation for any other case. With this commit `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` loses the static attribute, and is added to ec_lcl.h so EC_METHODs can directly use it. While working on a new custom EC_POINTs_mul implementation, I realized that many checks (e.g. all the points being compatible with the given EC_GROUP, creating a temporary BN_CTX if `ctx == NULL`, check for the corner case `scalar == NULL && num == 0`) were duplicated again and again in every single implementation (and actually some implementations lacked some of the tests). I thought that it makes way more sense for those checks that are independent from the actual implementation and should always be done, to be moved in the EC_POINTs_mul wrapper: so this commit also includes these changes. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
* EC point multiplication: add `ladder` scaffoldNicola Tuveri2018-07-161-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | for specialized Montgomery ladder implementations PR #6009 and #6070 replaced the default EC point multiplication path for prime and binary curves with a unified Montgomery ladder implementation with various timing attack defenses (for the common paths when a secret scalar is feed to the point multiplication). The newly introduced default implementation directly used EC_POINT_add/dbl in the main loop. The scaffolding introduced by this commit allows EC_METHODs to define a specialized `ladder_step` function to improve performances by taking advantage of efficient formulas for differential addition-and-doubling and different coordinate systems. - `ladder_pre` is executed before the main loop of the ladder: by default it copies the input point P into S, and doubles it into R. Specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition to different coordinate systems before copying and doubling; - `ladder_step` is the core of the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it computes `S := R+S; R := 2R;`, but specific implementations could, e.g., implement a more efficient formula for differential addition-and-doubling; - `ladder_post` is executed after the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it's a noop, but specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition back from the coordinate system used for optimizing the differential addition-and-doubling or recover the y coordinate of the result point. This commit also renames `ec_mul_consttime` to `ec_scalar_mul_ladder`, as it better corresponds to what this function does: nothing can be truly said about the constant-timeness of the overall execution of this function, given that the underlying operations are not necessarily constant-time themselves. What this implementation ensures is that the same fixed sequence of operations is executed for each scalar multiplication (for a given EC_GROUP), with no dependency on the value of the input scalar. Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
* enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128: Fix function prototype warning [-Wstrict-prototypes]Nicola Tuveri2018-06-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | Fix prototype warnings triggered by -Wstrict-prototypes when configuring with `enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128` Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6556)
* Implement coordinate blinding for EC_POINTSohaib ul Hassan2018-06-191-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This commit implements coordinate blinding, i.e., it randomizes the representative of an elliptic curve point in its equivalence class, for prime curves implemented through EC_GFp_simple_method, EC_GFp_mont_method, and EC_GFp_nist_method. This commit is derived from the patch https://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=131194808413635 by Billy Brumley. Coordinate blinding is a generally useful side-channel countermeasure and is (mostly) free. The function itself takes a few field multiplicationss, but is usually only necessary at the beginning of a scalar multiplication (as implemented in the patch). When used this way, it makes the values that variables take (i.e., field elements in an algorithm state) unpredictable. For instance, this mitigates chosen EC point side-channel attacks for settings such as ECDH and EC private key decryption, for the aforementioned curves. For EC_METHODs using different coordinate representations this commit does nothing, but the corresponding coordinate blinding function can be easily added in the future to extend these changes to such curves. Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6501)
* Better error code when lacking __SIZEOF_INT128__Richard Levitte2018-05-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | Fixes #6327 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6328)
* Correct the equation for Y' in the comment of point_double functionKunxian Xia2018-04-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5908)
* Fix a bug in ecp_nistp224.c.David Benjamin2018-04-031-16/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | felem_neg does not produce an output within the tight bounds suitable for felem_contract. This affects build configurations which set enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128. point_double and point_add, in the non-z*_is_zero cases, tolerate and fix up the wider bounds, so this only affects point_add calls where the other point is infinity. Thus it only affects the final addition in arbitrary-point multiplication, giving the wrong y-coordinate. This is a no-op for ECDH and ECDSA, which only use the x-coordinate of arbitrary-point operations. Note: ecp_nistp521.c has the same issue in that the documented preconditions are violated by the test case. I have not addressed this in this PR. ecp_nistp521.c does not immediately produce the wrong answer; felem_contract there appears to be a bit more tolerant than its documented preconditions. However, I haven't checked the point_add property above holds. ecp_nistp521.c should either get this same fix, to be conservative, or have the bounds analysis and comments reworked for the wider bounds. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5779)
* Update copyright yearMatt Caswell2018-02-271-1/+1
| | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* ec/ecp_nistp{224,256,521}.c: harmonize usage of __uint128_t.Andy Polyakov2018-02-241-2/+2
| | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5449)
* ec/ecp_nistp*.c: sanitize for undefined/implmentation-specific behaviour.Andy Polyakov2017-12-271-1/+0
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4974)
* Consistent formatting for sizeof(foo)Rich Salz2017-12-071-3/+3
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4872)
* Many spelling fixes/typo's corrected.Josh Soref2017-11-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | Around 138 distinct errors found and fixed; thanks! Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3459)
* Fix the return type of felem_is_zero_int which should be int.Bernd Edlinger2017-10-021-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Change argument type of xxxelem_is_zero_int to const void* to avoid the need of type casts. Fixes #4413 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4450)
* Change to check last return value of BN_CTX_getPaul Yang2017-06-261-9/+13
| | | | | | | | To make it consistent in the code base Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3749)
* Add support for reference counting using C11 atomicsKurt Roeckx2016-11-171-3/+3
| | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1500
* Copyright consolidation 06/10Rich Salz2016-05-171-1/+7
| | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* Convert CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_* to new multi-threading APIAlessandro Ghedini2016-03-081-3/+22
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* Add default operations to EC_METHODDr. Stephen Henson2016-03-011-2/+11
| | | | Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
* Add group_order_bits to EC_METHOD.Dr. Stephen Henson2016-02-281-0/+1
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
* Use NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT, consistently.Rich Salz2016-02-091-3/+3
| | | | | | This also closes RT 4123 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* Fix bug in nistp224/256/521 where have_precompute_mult always returns 0Matt Caswell2016-01-291-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | During precomputation if the group given is well known then we memcpy a well known precomputation. However we go the wrong label in the code and don't store the data properly. Consequently if we call have_precompute_mult the data isn't there and we return 0. RT#3600 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* Remove /* foo.c */ commentsRich Salz2016-01-261-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | This was done by the following find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script: print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@; close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $. And then some hand-editing of other files. Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
* Call single parent free_comp routine.Rich Salz2016-01-131-2/+1
| | | | Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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